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In 2009, five avatar-themed films were released, one of which became the highest
grossing film to date, signaling that, in addition to their popularity in videogames and virtual
worlds, avatars are culturally salient figures which demand scholarly attention. Avatars, virtual
environments, and user behavior have evolved significantly since virtual reality captured public
and academic attention at the close of the twentieth century, and this dissertation is an attempt to
theorize the avatar in contemporary digital culture. By interlacing new media philosophy and
analyses of cinematic texts I situate the avatar at the nexus between digital images and
interactive bodies, with implications for both cinema and virtual environments. Avatarial
interfaces position users in an embodiment of connections which in some ways evokes the
cyborg body, but the avatar as a theoretical figure places greater stress on the relation between
human embodiment and (digital) images, as well as suggesting a move from cyborg
fragmentation toward an avatarial gestalt. Avatars are also fruitful bodies for thinking through
agency and gender in contemporary society, and engaging the lost ‘body’ of the picture as film
has been supplanted by digital imagery. In this regard, virtuality, as a conceptual state pertaining
to images, embodiment, technology, and philosophy, serves as the connective theoretical tissue
linking bodies and images. Ultimately, in this dissertation I employ the avatar in an exploration
of the ways in which we are already virtual, and how we have become avatarial in our own skin.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever get the feeling you’re playing some vast and useless game whose goal you don’t
know and whose rules you can’t remember? … Welcome to gamespace. You are a gamer
whether you like it or not, now that we all live in a gamespace that is everywhere and
nowhere.
McKenzie Wark1
The color is the first thing you notice. Orange-tinted, high-contrast monochrome – the
color of a dirty creamsicle. Peasants flee past Polish apartment blocks as tanks cut them down
with machine gun fire – cut, literally fissured, breaking apart as the hits suspend them in
individual anguished freeze frames before they explode into pixel clods and flitter away. Bombs
burst into neat layers as slices of frozen fireballs that hang in midair, while a cloaked and masked
woman, Ash, materializes and aims a sniper rifle at a hovering plane to finish off the level. This
illegal and addictive virtual reality game set in the near future hauntingly echoes a past of Nazi
and Soviet invasion, the battles repeating themselves as levels and missions, building toward the
mysterious ‘Class Real’ at which the game ends – though Ash wonders to herself whether it
really does end at all. She takes down the plane, and while ‘Mission Complete’ flashes across the
suspended explosions, we withdraw from the game. Back in the real world, Ash removes the
heavy interface helmet and cashes in her points while denizens of an underground club stoically
watch her performance played back on a large screen. She exits the club into a world not so
different from the one she just left: high-contrast monochrome, a hint of sepia (or is that the
orange bleeding through?), rough-hewn clothing, in a nearly sunless environment – an eternally
occupied Poland, darkly rendered. A gamespace for foreign military powers and the occasional
virtual warrior that can stand up to a tank.

1

McKenzie Wark, Gamer Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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Videogame theorist McKenzie Wark could have been writing about Mamoru Oshii’s
2001 film Avalon when he wrote “The fruit of the digital is the expulsion of reality from the
world. That’s gamespace. The consolation of the game is that at least this expulsion is absolute”;
as it happens, he was writing about The Sims, the highly popular life simulation franchise in
which players function essentially as ‘gods’, in Wark’s view, controlling the lives of their sims.2
Players can become heavily invested in in their sims, personally as well as in terms of hours
spent facilitating sim progression within the game world. At other times, the iconoclastic impulse
can be equally compelling: “They are images. They are images in a world that appears as a vast
accumulation of images. Hence the pleasure in destroying images, to demonstrate again and
again their worthlessness.”3 The game offers up the possibility for seemingly conflicting
approaches to the sims, caring for them as if they were real, as a child nurtures a doll, or
destroying them because they are not real, despite their many familiar aspects in appearance,
behavior, and suburban lifestyles (or perhaps because of the familiarity, in which ordinary life as
videogame becomes uncannily iterative). Indeed, in Avalon it is not always clear whether Ash
(Malgorzata Foremniak) is playing the game or fighting the war, or whether she sees her
opponents as players, soldiers, or images; the film presents them to us as all three, letting the
flattened image linger at the moment of destruction – still an image of the soldier, still indexed to
the player, but one that has become more of an image or a different kind of image, hung briefly
like a picture to emphasize the point. Meanwhile, Ash’s success in the game depends on her
ability to prevent her own avatar (Foremniak plays both) from being similarly rendered – from
becoming too much an image.

2
3

Ibid., 38.
Ibid., 33.
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Avalon turns on the underlying mechanism of the videogame to manage images for
maximum visceral and affective impact, to make them relatable on proprioceptive and emotional
levels for the embodied player, and to create contingent hierarchies of ‘image bodies’ (that is,
one preserves one’s own image as if it were a body, and destroys other bodies as if they were
images) – not unlike the mechanism of cinema itself. The pleasure of playing with bodies and
objects in videogames is the compound of the simultaneous force of their presence (as enemies,
co-players, objects, obstacles, tools, power-ups – visual objects in videogames are eminently
functional) and their utter disposability; or, as depicted in Avalon, soldiers and battle vehicles
that enter with overwhelming power and disintegrate with a good shot. The sophisticated
graphics in contemporary games become both lush images to interact with and be immersed in
and at the same time richer, even photorealistic, images to destroy.
Wark’s outlook on contemporary society bears some of the same cynicism expressed by
Baudrillard in his critiques of simulacral culture, but Wark’s allegory emphasizes algorithm over
sign. Baudrillard portrays a society not only disconnected from reality but producing a
hyperreality to replace it, with a fantasy space like Disneyland serving as a “deterrence machine
set up in order to rejuvenate the fiction of the real in the opposite camp,” the ‘real’ America.4 In a
similar comparison, Wark posits the videogame as an almost requisite adjunct to a society that
has become gamespace: “Games redeem gamespace by offering a perfect unfreedom, a
consistent set of constraints.”5 Games offer logic without real stakes; the world as gamespace
defies clear logic, but has much at stake, and thus becomes a losing battle. Whereas for
Baudrillard the terms are set – “illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer

4

Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1994), 13.
5
Wark, Gamer Theory, 40.
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possible” – the notion of gamespace implies a space available for navigation and ‘play’ (if one,
in this case, that necessitates appropriating the violence of the system).6
Avalon offers a paradigmatic vision for ludic navigation through gamespace as Ash
battles her way into Class Real, the final level that promises great insight. Given a gun, an
evening gown, and little sense of direction, she makes her way out of her dismal apartment
building and steps into what appears to be the ‘real’ world. The picture suddenly transforms to
full color, and she is taken aback to find instead of soldiers and mercenaries, casual shoppers and
pedestrians on a street full of contemporary shops. After wandering for a while she eventually
succeeds in her mission – terminating one of the ‘unreturned’ who never left the game while his
physical body lay vegetative in a hospital – but her fate is left unclear, as the film ends with her
in Class Real and its quotidian (now uncanny) scenes of urban life and main street capitalism. A
choir sings the praises of Avalon, the paradisal haven for fallen heroes in Arthurian legend, here
presented ironically as a Westernized economy. While Ash seems uncertain about its meaning,
the implication is clear to us that she has not escaped the real world by going too deeply in the
game, but rather that she has come around to the real world by following the game to its depths.
While the film had previously drawn at least superficial distinctions between the online world of
Avalon and the offline world in which Ash lives, in the end they are both situated as virtual
realities relative to the real world – or, rather, the real world is part of the game, or a gamespace
with clear activities (shopping, for instance) but no clear rules. And while Ash is initially
disoriented, she has a clear advantage over the occupants of this world who have no idea that
they are part of a ‘game’ or virtual reality; Ash, having come to the real through the game – and
now fully embodying her avatar – can see it for the gamespace it is.

6

Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, 19.
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Figure 1. Ash in the virtual reality game Avalon (top) and in Class Real (bottom).
Wark’s notion of gamespace is a potent, if occasionally sardonic, approach to greater
issues of virtuality. The virtual as an aspect or dimension of material reality is a manifold
concept that has been developed by numerous theorists and philosophers, and while gamespace
is not synonymous with the virtual, it does represent a certain approach to virtuality that accords

5

with my own, which is why it has served here as an introduction. First, while the concept of the
virtual has a history predating the digital era, and has been theorized to be an inherent quality of
human experience and culture, the idea of gamespace is more specifically situated in our
contemporary mediascape, and I wish to emphasize the intensification of virtualization that has
attended not only the explosion of digital technologies, but also the exponentially expanded
production and distibution of images. Also, gamespace, I feel, reflects the tensions between the
‘disembodied’ images, avatar ontologies, strained semiotics (Wark’s ‘allegorithms’), and
material effects that I wish to draw out in the virtual. Gamespace is cyncial, a white flag of defeat
at the prospect that we have been virtualized beyond our capacity to function within a digital
culture that is no longer emblematic of machine logic but has fully adopted the abstraction of the
image. Ash might serve for the moment as our avatar in an exploration of a world which we can
no longer conceptualize apart from its mediation. She is wary at first, not trusting her eyes, but
she acclimates quickly, figuring out how to play the game that has no rules. “This world is where
you belong,” says the character she has been sent to kill as he lay dying, and it soon becomes
evident why. “Reality is what we choose to believe,” she says, gun in hand, “As for who controls
the game, I believe it is me.” She is not a fugitive or a bleary-eyed wanderer in this world that is
simultaneously real and virtual, quotidian reality and gamespace, but on the contrary, right at
home – and this is where the film leaves her.
Thinking virtuality through gaming also introduces the avatar as a key figure for
conceptualizing our relationship to the virtual in terms of bodies. While avatars are not virtual7
7

While scholarship post-dating the enthusiasm for virtual reality in the nineties has sought to demarcate the virtual
from its association with virtual technologies (including avatars), it is clear, as I discuss further below, that these
reclamations of the term are yet associated, sometimes obliquely or generally but in other instances quite directly,
with an understanding that reflects recent usage relative to virtual technologies. I suggest that contemporary notions
of virtuality in terms of computer use and simulation have not only indelibly influenced our understanding of the
virtual, but that the resurgence of the term cannot be disassociated from the culture that produced these technologies.
In other words, the concept of the virtual is quite distinct from virtual reality and other computer operations termed
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simply because they are produced within virtual technologies, it is one hypothesis of this
dissertation that avatar use, by virtue of its proximity to embodiment (i.e. the ‘virtualized’
experience of the body), opens the possibility for ‘touching’ the virtual where the interface
apparatus coincides with phenomenological disjunction. I use ‘disjunction’ here meaning not
separation, as in disembodiment, but as a lack of correspondence or consistency – the slippage
inherent in any construction of subjectivity relative to the body, though my focus here is on the
technological and cultural implications which the avatar as a theoretical model illuminates.
Avatar use has been much more often theorized in terms of effects and aesthetics, largely taking
the processes involved in operating avatars for granted.8 However, a deeper acknowledgement of
the interface apparatus is essential in understanding our relationship to digital media, and I apply
this strategy to avatar use in order to draw out those elements that are instrumental for
contextualizing digital media technologies in terms of human experience.
The relation between user and avatar bodies, as well as the interstitial ontology of avatars
as embodied ‘images’ representing their users within spatialized, imagistic environments,
underwrites a second hypothesis regarding the representation of avatars within the conventions
and technologies of cinema and other narrative media. In their appropriation of the avatar, these
texts represent, and occasionally express, the virtual in their strata of doubles and interfaces,
analogs of the digital in performance and embodiment, image hierarchies, naturalized
technologies, and narratives of control. In seeking contact with the virtual – to ‘render’ it – I am
not trying to make the virtual tangible, but to articulate or give substance to those processual
‘virtual’, but it would not have the viability and salience that it currently does were it not for the development and
cultural profusion of these operations.
8
One of the best treatments of avatar use that integrates process and effects is Julian Dibbell’s first-person account
of his experiences in LambdaMOO. With lucid prose befitting the literary nature of his subject, Dibbell describes the
complex interactions between various users in a text-based environment, bringing out especially the tactility of
sexual encounters transacted through wordplay. Julian Dibbell, My Tiny Life: Crime and Passion in a Virtual World
(New York: Holt, 1998).
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moments and medial embodiments in which virtuality is reflected. That is, following Mark
Hansen, I understand virtuality in phenomenological terms, in the intersection between bodies
and images or bodies and information; as these relationships are colored and inflected in the
evolving mediascape of digital culture, I investigate a few of these texts, both for the ways in
which they pass through the virtual in their representation of these relationships, as well as the
ways they fail to do so.
In artistic practice, ‘render’ connotes expression or representation, while in CG imaging
‘render’ refers to the process of making a wireframe model appear solid and dimensional; more
generally the term means ‘to cause to be or become, to make’.9 Virtuality is not a thing, nor is it
simply a state of mind, but, as I explicate in the following section, can be understood as a
relation between perceiving bodies and the material world. Intervening in this relation are those
instruments that incorporate a perceptual mode with a material object – a photograph, for
instance, or panoramic painting, or a virtual environment encountered through a computer
(although these forms do not ‘picture’ the virtual as such). These encounters may generate an
affective or cognitive dissonance that troubles, if only obliquely and ephemerally, the ontological
status of both the perceiving body and the representational object. The virtual is not in what the
picture shows, but in the relationship it embodies. I see it not as simply illusionistic, in the way
that a naturalistic painting or photographic image looks ‘real’, or in the way that a viewer of a
panorama or participant in a virtual world might feel like they are ‘there’; the virtual is
deconstructive and disarticulating, challenging one’s sense of embodiment and the material
world even as it is so integral to the fabric of our embodiment and materiality. That is to say that
we are indeed virtual, but disavow it as a condition of lived reality; encountering the virtual is

9

"render, v.". OED Online. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com (accessed July 07, 2012).
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thus at the same time a revelation of certain actualities, and the threat of disintegration when it
exposes too much.
Virtuality is not static or fixed, but contingent upon specific forms, unique instantiations,
individual perceivers, cultural conditions, and, as I seek to explore in this study, an evolving
topography of interstitial objects and medial spaces. ‘Rendering the virtual’ can be understood as
the development and use of forms and objects by which the vectors between perception and
materiality are redrawn, as well as my rhetorical attempt here to catch glimpses of the virtual as
it flickers peripherally, always just out of sight. This dissertation is about our relation to digital
images and information. I invoke the virtual as that which gives form, as abstract as it may be, to
this relation, focusing on a digital culture that privileges the visual over the informational, and
thus this study has much to do with the image. As images are divested of their traditional
material substrates, our relation to them, as embodied beings in the material world, changes – as
does our sense of the virtual.
Rendering the virtual, at least within the context of this dissertation, also necessitates a
critical acknowledgement of the gendering of the virtual. As I attempt to locate intersections
between the virtual as a relation and virtuality in representation, I find them most saliently in the
experience and form of the body. Bodies are raced and gendered, and I explore the ways in
which different kinds of bodies are positioned antithetically relative to the virtual, with male
characters in avatar films opposed to and usually achieving some kind of victory over an
encroaching virtuality, and female characters typically ensnared within it; I will argue, however,
that the feminine position ultimately suggests a model for compatibility with the virtual, in
contrast with the empty victories of male characters.

9

I am interested in avatar films for their imbrication of images and bodies within the
technological, cultural, and aesthetic registers of the digital. The phenomenological work of
Mark Hansen situates the body as the primary means for ‘framing’ digital information for human
experience. I attempt to integrate this emphasis on the body with a consideration of the
movement of digital culture away from the machine and information aesthetics, toward screens
and images. Another cinematic figure emerges in respect to image and embodiment, akin to the
avatar in its process of one body controlling another and in a certain conflation of body and
image, and that is the CG character. We have seen a number of these in recent years, from Jar Jar
Binks and Gollum (in the Star Wars and Lord of the Rings series, respectively) to the advances
recently made in James Cameron’s Avatar (2009) – which, as an avatar film as well, will be of
special interest in this study. In certain respects the digital avatar and CG character go hand in
hand; in viewing documentary footage of Avatar’s production, for instance, one gets a definite
sense of the motion-capture stage as an enormous videogame apparatus with human controllers.
However, in film CG characters and avatars tend to be inverted: whereas the avatar is most often
a body (the actor’s) playing an image (the avatar, the double), with the CG character an image
(the effect on the screen) plays a body (a character, the movements of the actor). I use the terms
‘body’ and ‘image’ a bit loosely here to give a sense of the difference between avatar and CG
character in film, but my project is ultimately to draw body and image together, and these two
figures these ‘image bodies’, are a means to this end.
While image bodies, for the purposes of this project, denote avatars and CG characters
specifically, the juxtaposition of these two potent and laden terms produces resonances far in
excess of anything this dissertation could encompass. I can only hope here to piggyback on some
of the tensions this dyad generates as I draw from the greater discursive flows amidst which this
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study is set. I do intend allusions to the disappearing ‘body’ of film, as digital imaging practices
have altered filmmaking and other imaging practices, as well as to the ways in which we
experience embodiment increasingly in terms of images – not just specific images, but, as I hope
to show, within a more abstract sense of ‘imageness’, extracted by the digital, luminescing with
virtuality. With the second part of my title, ‘avatar ontologies’, I intend to explore the situation
of avatars relative to their users, as bodies in service of other bodies, as well as the inflection of
the avatar on our own ontology – in the ways in which we have also become avatarial.

The Avatar as Theoretical Model
I became interested in avatar-themed films when five of them, along with a television
series, were released in 2009, a clear trend in the mainstreaming of the avatar I was already
exploring in Second Life. This cycle of films treated avatarism from a variety of perspectives:
Surrogates (Jonathan Mostow) contemplates a society living vicariously through robots; Gamer
(Mark Neveldine and Brian Taylor) bleakly imposes virtual sex and videogame violence on real
bodies, while exploiting their cinematic elements; Sleep Dealer (Alex Rivera) explores
immigrant labor and the Mexican-American border through the lens of virtuality; and Avatar
situates race and environmental concerns within a dialectic of photographic and digital imagery.
An anime film, Summer Wars (Mamoru Hosada), juxtaposes family and the household with an
all-consuming virtual environment, and the SyFy drama Caprica drew connections between
virtuality, religion, and robotics, making 2009 seemingly the year of the avatar in popular
media.10

10

Sleep Dealer, an independent film, debuted at the 2008 Sundance Film Festival but was released commercially in
April 2009. The Caprica pilot first aired the same month, with the series following in January 2010 (on what had by
then become the SyFy channel).
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This recent influx begs a return to the avatar as a subject of study, and particularly as a
prominent figure within digital culture. Prior treatments of avatars in film have lumped them in
with works on cyborgs, where the avatar is at best a subset. This is perhaps to be expected, as
book-length publications on cyborgs in film trailed off as avatars began appearing in cinema and
other media more frequently; over a dozen avatar films have been released, for instance, since
the 1996 publication of Claudia Springer’s Electronic Eros. Springer’s work addresses the
seminal avatar film The Lawnmower Man (1992, Brett Leonard), as well as the literary work of
cyberpunk pioneer William Gibson, within a larger framework of eroticism and gender in
cyborg-themed media. A later work, Sue Short’s Cyborg Cinema and Contemporary Subjectivity
from 2005, has served provisionally as the last word on the subject, coalescing the numerous
theoretical approaches that have been applied to the cyborg, as well as filling in a few gaping
holes in its treatment. Avatars remain largely absent, however (not even warranting an entry in
the index), while Short has little to say about The Lawnmower Man and David Cronenberg’s
avatar thriller eXistenZ (1999), nothing about Avalon or the mind-bending The Thirteenth Floor
(1999, Josef Rusnak), and bears only ill sentiment for The Matrix (1999, Andy and Larry
Wachowski).11 Not only have avatars been underrepresented, then, but I further question whether
the subsumption of the avatar within the cyborg model adequately addresses its unique qualities.
Although to some extent avatars began drifting off scholarly radar screens at the turn of
the millennium, avatar use as we are familiar with it today was was just about to explode.12
Sony’s PlayStation 2, the best-selling console to date, was released in 2000, while Second Life
launched in 2003 and World of Warcraft the following year. Venues for avatar use have

11

This brief list makes clear that 1999 was another year of particular popularity for avatars (unnoticed by Short),
with a fourth installment, the soft-core Sexual Matrix (Udo Blass) completing the picture.
12
Following a surge of critical attention in the nineties, avatars (as well as cyborgs) became less frequent topics in
the following decade.
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proliferated, with dozens of variations on social and gaming platforms boasting millions of users
(ten million alone in World of Warcraft). Many of these users are producing avatar-themed
media, including popular web series The Guild created by avid gamer Felicia Day in 2007, as
well as thousands of machinima videos that not only use avatars in their production, but
frequently address issues surrounding online interaction in virtual environments.13 Recent
cinematic treatment of avatars has emerged out of this surge in use and the exponential growth of
videogaming, and while social science research in the area of avatar use has mushroomed,
scholarly attention to avatars in film has been slow to catch up; my project here addresses the
underserved phenomenon of cinematic avatars, and explores the implications of their recent
appearances.
As such, we must consider the usefulness of the avatar as a theoretical model. The
potency of the cyborg as a figure for study has been attributable to its cultural relevance as well
as its broad applicability across real-world and fictional forms. I suggest that, like the cyborg, the
avatar can be a useful model for thinking through issues of subjectivity, but one particularly
apropos of an image culture concerned with virtuality and materiality.
The figure of the cyborg functions on multiple planes, and thus the cyborg as a theoretical
entity, like the cyborg body, exists in tension with itself. The cyborg is a conceptual image and
subject of representation, well known from films such as The Terminator (1984, James
Cameron) and RoboCop (1987, Paul Verhoeven); an object for theoretical consideration of
postwar subjectivity, aligned with feminism by writers such as Donna Haraway; and a term
applied to certain bodies in social reality, from people with mechanical implants and prostheses
13

Machinima – a neologism from ‘machine’ and ‘cinema’ – refers to movies made with game engines, at first
employing the avatars and sets of a game for purposes not intended by designers and then editing captured scenes
into a narrative or demo, or hacking the game engine to create new materials in order to realize creative vision.
Initially machinima was viewed by the industry as inapt or subversive, but distributors soon catered to players’
insistence on greater control for both game design and machinima opportunities; games like The Sims now include
machinima features as part of the software.
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to workers within Fordist systems of production, incorporating also the possibility that we, as
members of industrial societies, are cyborg by virtue of our heavy reliance on machines and
technology.
The term ‘cyborg’, short for ‘cybernetic organism’, was coined in papers by Manfred
Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960, speculating on the possibilities of self-regulating humanmachine systems for space travel, but visions of human-machine hybridity in literary fiction are
older, concomitant with the rise of industrialism that provides the basis for later representations
in film.14 These representations have foregrounded the machine, often in the context of
masculinity and domination; however, the cyborg as theoretical construct is generally antithetical
to the masculine and the implicit subjectivity of the liberal human, privileging instead
fragmentation, multiplicity, miscegenation, transgression, and the disruption of cultural binaries.
In its etymology, ‘avatar’ is a threshold word. The Sanskrit root tarati denotes a ‘crossing
over’ through descent, a transcending of the ether that separates the heavens and the earth – or, in
new media jargon, something along the lines of telepresence. More correctly translated
‘appearance’ rather than ‘incarnation’, the term denotes the physical but leaves room for the
spectral. Vishnu is the deity most associated with avatars in Hinduism, and though frequently
represented iconographically as embodied, Vishnu is described in scripture as being omnipresent
and shapeless; therefore his avatars – fish, boar, priest, sage, and innumerable others – are the
bodies assumed by his bodiless form, which, as a collective of alts, so to speak, comprise the
‘body’ of Vishnu. Thus the avatar in Hindu mythology is not merely a disguise, as we find in the
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godly machinations in Greek mythology; through avatars is Vishnu made manifest, and through
these bodies is the unknowable known, the invisible seen.
An avatar in computer use is the graphical representation of a user in computer or online
space. In its contemporary function the term was first used by Chip Morningstar and Randy
Farmer for the graphical virtual world Habitat in 1985 and further popularized in Neal
Stephenson’s cyberpunk novel Snow Crash, published in1992. Like ‘virtual’, ‘avatar’ is another
term that has been used rather loosely, referring to chat icons, MUD characters, blips, ships, and
cartoon characters in videogames, and even screen names. To my mind, however, the term is
best suited for those representations that are closer to the historical and mythological
implications of the term, by which a measure of essential being (or at least some expression of
personality) is manifest in a figure whose representative and simulative embodiment engenders
certain types of identifications and social interactions – i.e. closer to the way one approaches a
body rather than a picture.
This view is consonant with the historical development of the term in contemporary use,
as it was first used to refer to graphical, human figures in a shared environment. While the
graphics in Habitat were subpar, lagging behind videogames at the time (in order to
accommodate sluggish network speeds), presence was attached to a user-defined visible body,
and the body in turn benefited from a measure of ‘depth’ that resulted from the combination of
imagistic forms that concealed their technological structure, (bodily) movement in response to
user commands, and the temporal ‘liveness’ of presence in shared virtual space. While by this
definition single-player videogames technically don’t include ‘avatars’ (the term ‘player
character’ is frequently used in gaming), the high degree of immersion produced by sophisticated
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technologies in contemporary games, as well as the realistic bodies and, increasingly, the
potential for networked play and personalized avatars, encourage me to include such usage here.
Avatars are a significant part of social reality, as well as subjects of representation,
appearing in a number of films and other media texts, and objects with which to think through
contemporary subjectivity. While cyborgs are certainly part of the information age, avatars
specifically connect cyborg subjectivity to virtuality, in which information takes on new bodies,
moves in images, and changes the face of the hardware in which it is instantiated. The avatar in
terms of the cyborg might be thought of as the cyborg of screen or image culture, but this implies
a very different kind of cyborg; while it is essential to carry forward issues relating to the cyborg
in any consideration of the avatar, I avoid seeing the avatar as simply a modified cyborg and
instead inquire as to what the avatar as an idiosyncratic entity can bring to some of the same
issues of embodiment that the cyborg once spoke to with more frequency.
The body of films I focus on are distinguished not only from cyborg films but also from
other films dealing with computers and virtual reality. In fact, a number of the avatar films I take
as my subjects do not diegetically include virtual environments, and when they do they are more
often depicted cinematically (through metaphor and representation) rather than digitally (with a
clear digital or informational aesthetic).15 A key criterion that distinguishes avatar films for my
purposes is dualism and avatarial embodiment – films with characters that exist across two
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bodies, mediated by an interface, or in which one character controls another as an avatar.16 The
nature of these bodies, their modes of representation and performance, and the conditions of the
interface are salient points in my explication of the cinematic avatar.
I believe that the avatar offers rich possibilities for new cyborg theorizations; I offer just
a schematic overview here. A clear first step is the nature of the prosthesis. Avatars are
sometimes theorized in terms of this key component of cyborgism, but prosthetics becomes a
different matter when the replacement of the body or a body part, so eloquently explored in
Vivian Sobchack’s phenomenology, or the technological extension of the human, as theorized by
McLuhan, takes the form of a body. Avatars are not simply tools or appendages, nor are their
feedback circuits limited to the utilitarian or proprioceptive, for they are at the same time mirrors
and faces, image bodies distributed through virtual environments and social networks.
Oscillatory and contingent, avatars can be engaged and disengaged, in contrast with the
close integration of the cyborg. RoboCop’s Murphy cannot extract himself from the robotic body
which sustains his biological one, and in the end of the film must find a way to exist as a
monstrous hybrid, a body in tension with itself. Avatars approach the self-difference of the
cyborg with distance and separation, placing emphasis on agency within a world of media
influences. In Surrogates, the thematic question implied is not whether we are able to
discontinue mediated lifestyles, but whether we should. In Avatar, Jake’s trajectory toward
becoming his own avatar is a way of refiguring diegetic distance as a function of technological
distance – moving through the avatarial relation to complete the digital body.
16
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Interfaces, of both software and hardware varieties, are the technological gateways to a
variety of bodies, and highly cinematic spaces as well. Images of the vascular interface in Sleep
Dealer create a third space between the character’s life in a futuristic Tijuana and his telepresent
labor on a construction site in California, a richly symbolic bridge between competing images.
We also find many images of visual technologies couched simultaneously as experiential
technology and immersive cinema, with implications of an embodiment extending beyond the
body. Surrogates is typical of the valorization of the visual, as operators wear a light version of
VR goggles, physical appearance is emphasized, and the eye of the surrogate becomes a key
point of access to the user. In digital avatar use it is important to remember that the avatar is not
just the body on the screen, but the embodiment of a connection between two materially
dissimilar bodies.
The relation between reality and virtuality and the problem of disembodiment are central
themes in avatar films. These issues remain salient topics in the theorization of avatars and
virtual technologies, but in juxtaposing cinema and interactive media we find fruitful fields in the
representations of real and virtual, embodiment and disembodiment. Notably, the sort of
disembodiment envisioned by cyberpunk pioneer William Gibson never comes into play, as
characters are not only re-embodied, but the new bodies tend to represent cinematic fulfillment:
Neo (Keanu Reeves), for instance, doesn’t lose his body when he re-enters the Matrix, but
realizes the cinematic fulfillment of his embodiment within the simulation. Also, reclamation of
the real is often the objective of characters in avatar films, but in The Matrix, Surrogates, Avalon,
and others, we find the films struggling to define the reality that is salvaged at the end of the
film, particularly as the films themselves function as celebrations of their own exploration of the
‘virtual’.
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The cyborg image instantiates material and ontological difference in a single body (in the
integration of human and machine typically), whereas the avatar decouples the disparate
elements of the cyborg, re-situating them within avatarial relations and a variety of interfaces.
The avatar privileges dualism over hybridity, interconnection over miscegenation. While dyadic
relationships can certainly be problematic, it seems that there is more than one way to interface
bodies and images, as we can find in Elizabeth Grosz’s notion of ‘interimplication’, or Henri
Bergson’s concept of multiplicity. Duality offers the potential for dialectic, and there exist
opportunities for exploring synthesis in the Gemini (two linked together) that are unavailable in
the chimera (one divided).
Donna Haraway’s conception of human-machine integration, drawn from the cold
science of the body as machine and compelled by the defense machine of the Reagan era, sought
to wrest the power of informational technologies away from their patriarchal origins, employing
the machine as metaphor for identity as construct, a system that could incorporate flexibility.
“The machine is us,” she writes, “our processes, an aspect of our embodiment.” The avatar as
theoretical model owes much to Haraway and other insightful writing on cyborgs, but within the
contemporary mediascape I see an evolution of form that reconfigures Haraway’s border war as
medial interface. “We are responsible for boundaries,” she declares, “we are they” – which is as
astute and concise a statement as exists within the canon of cyborg theory, for certain; but,
thinking avatarially, this study asks what happens when we replace the boundary – the barrier,
partition, frontier – with the medium.17
In other words, I see a key distinction between Haraway’s concept of the computer as
machine and contemporary use of the computer as media device. As Katheryn Hayles
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demonstrates, information has a body, is embodied – but bodies can take a variety of forms, and
these forms have changed significantly in the last twenty years.18 While images of cyborgs have
constituted a potent and provocative tradition, what I find so very compelling about the avatar is
that it is a body in images, accompanied by an eschewal of the mechanistic in favor of the natural
and imaginal, so that the technology of the avatar is hidden in its construct, absent from its
appearance. In CG characters and representations of avatars – which are frequently associated
with digital reproductions of nature – we find an inversion of the cinematic cyborg: rather than a
photographic image of a technological being, a technological image of the naturalized body, as in
Avatar and the CG-enhanced Surrogates, or in bodies playing images, as we find in Gamer and
other avatar films.

Strands of the ‘Virtual’
Our contemporary sense of the moving image has evolved from three interwoven strands
of the virtual arts that engage with one another in uneven historical rhythms –
photography and film, electronic imaging and transmission, and computational processes
– and we need concepts that can bring these strands together while recognizing the
complexity of their relationships and differences.
D. N. Rodowick19
In an essay on digital cinema, Garrett Stewart asks “Why are so many recent films,
despite their obvious digital enhancement at the level of technique, concerned in their plots with
a non-electronic virtuality?”20 Stewart sees parallel, if ultimately diverging, trends in the
representation of virtuality in European and American filmmaking. On the European side, he
finds tendencies in the use of coincidence, erotic telepathy, and an uncanny “couched in the
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repeatedly elegiac dimension of the filmic medium’s self-conscious memory effects.”21 Such can
be found in the 2008 suspense film The Broken (Sean Ellis), which begins with the evocative
image of a mirror suddenly shattering during a dinner party for Gina’s (Lena Headey) family.
Subsequently, she witnesses members of her family replaced systematically and violently by
doppelgängers, and begins to realize she has one as well. Determined to confront her own double
after a series of harrowing encounters, Gina enters the apartment that once was hers, only to
discover that she herself is the doppelgänger, having killed the original Gina, but lost her
memory of it in a car accident soon afterward. Following her initial shock, she slowly comes to
terms with her ontological state, as we too must come to terms with our ‘mistaken’ identification
with the sinister double.
On the American side, Stewart finds an ‘ontological gothic’ in cinematic variations on
electronic virtuality and the supernatural, and offers as an example the noirish The Thirteenth
Floor, in which different temporal versions of a Los Angeles past (1937) and present (1990s) are
nested within a virtual reality game in the future. In the film, Hall (Craig Bierko) is helping to
develop a VR simulation of 1937 L.A. when he becomes caught up in a murder that he
supposedly committed, and over the course of his investigation is led to question the reality of
his world. On a tip, he drives to the outskirts of the city, where he finds the edge of the
simulation that has comprised the world he thought was real. Hall, who had been controlling an
avatar in the historical simulation, eventually discovers that he himself is an avatar in a larger
simulation (the same truth Thomas Anderson discovers in The Matrix of the same year).
Whereas ‘spectral others’ invade European films, notes Stewart, in recent American cinema
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“heroes may turn out to be their own spectral others: either the digital figments of someone else’s
computer program or already their own ghosts, deluded into thinking themselves still alive.”22
These revelations can certainly be traced along the Baudrillardian philosophy that drives
The Matrix, but Stewart points out a different aspect in the injection of distance into agentive
experience and
between perception and somatic engagement. Actors within a spectacle have been
transformed into spectators of their own programmed actions, with a new premium thus
placed on virtuality. In the aftermath of a character’s autonomous ‘I’, subjectivity is more
commonly overseen than internalized.23
The ontological gothic appears then to be an avatarial ontology, although the iterative avatar
relations in the film imply something more than whether a character is simply an original or a
copy, as the model of the avatar demonstrates how agency is never unilateral, but always a
negotiation. If I am avatarial, the film seems to ask, then what do my actions mean, and for
whom am I an avatar? When Hall drives out of the city and finds the end of cinematic reality (the
landscape beyond the city is only a graphical wireframe model), he faces fundamental questions
about the nature of reality when it is revealed to be a construction (Fig. 2). However, this
problem might be more productively constituted as a question of what has allowed him to take
the already constructed world and make it meaningful.
As diegetic subjects (and the actors who play them) are observing themselves, audiences
may not be entirely sure who they are watching, as a character turns out to be an avatar or
appears across two or more bodies, or in the case of motion-capture CG characters, where the
performance of the actor ends and the work of the animators begins. Both of these questions –
the matter of the constructedness of representation within digital culture, and the question of
22
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what or who we are seeing when we view digital media and its analog(ue)s in avatar films – have
to do with virtuality, images, and bodies.

Figure 2. Hall finds the outskirts of the city not yet rendered
The concept of virtuality is multifaceted, and the term ‘virtual’ has been used in
numerous, disparate ways, which has made it somewhat of a slippery notion. In this dissertation I
consider virtuality in three different senses: as referring to computer and technological
apparatuses that produce dimensional digital images and immersive experience, as in virtual
reality and virtual environments; in terms of representation, as images present and reflect various
realities and exist as both objects and views; and as part of phenomenological experience, in
which we (often intuitively and unconsciously) relate subjectively to images and their
materiality, and the technologies that produce them. In a film like The Thirteenth Floor these
three different uses converge, as digital virtuality is represented in a cinematic form, employing
an iterative performance of the body to disrupt the sense of a cohesive and ascertainable relation
between body and image, thus evoking a sense of the virtual.
This convergence can be witnessed at the level of the body in Bierko’s performance of
three (or perhaps four or five) different ‘characters’: the 1990s Hall, who turns out to be a
23

sentient artificial intelligence who is used as an avatar to perform a murder; Ferguson, the 1937
character Hall plays in the historical simulation; David, the real world player in 2024 who
manipulates Hall; David in Hall’s body during the murders and an attempted rape; and Hall in
David’s body after David is killed in the simulation and Hall’s consciousness inhabits his body.
Within these convolutions, virtual technologies are an integral part of the diegesis, although they
are with a single exception represented cinematically rather than digitally. The film’s
representational strategy is to interlink its various settings and temporal disjunctions through the
iteration of the actor’s body, and at the same time obfuscating a clear sense of character. Hall is
established to be only a construct, and one only intermittently appearing in a body, yet the film is
not self-reflexive or distanciating and so any sense of disjunction is focused on questions of
reality, and specifically in undermining the role of the body as a locus for selfhood. Also, as
multiple characters and bodies appear in the form of Craig Bierko, the body of the actor is further
produced as a redundant yet fluid image, so that at any one point in the film we do not simply see
Bierko or a particular character, but must view his performance as an abstract multiplicity. In this
respect, the relationship between body and image is challenged, and the virtual evoked.
In order to clearly distinguish between technological, representational, and
phenomenological virtuality, I’ll address each below. It is important, however, to first
acknowledge the negative connotations, in respect to material reality, with which virtuality has
been saddled following an initial wave of enthusiasm about virtual technologies in the 1990s.
The virtual is sometimes associated with absence, as in ‘not there’ or ‘not real’, or as insufficient
or inadequate, as in ‘almost, but not quite’. The virtual has also been characterized as deceptive
or even hallucinogenic, the appearance of a thing which is not only not there, but which never
was a ‘thing’, in a space that never was a ‘there’. These associations must be distinguished from
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the etymological roots of the term in potency and power, influence and moral virtue. Literally
meaning ‘manliness’, with ‘man’ (vir) at its root, the virtual is measured in its effectuality or
forcefulness – “in essence or effect, although not formally or actually,” but also “effective in
respect of inherent natural qualities and powers.”24 The effect, in this case, supercedes the object,
and in a certain sense becomes the object, which is the reason we can talk about ‘the virtual’.
With virtual technologies, the missing object (physical reality) has been replaced by
immersive graphics and computer interfaces, and the social interaction transacted through
these.25 Rhetoric surrounding the immersive technology of virtual reality (VR) reflected a belief
in the power of simulative technologies to produce experiences for users that would be as
effectual as real-world experiences.26 Early evangelists of VR, such as Jaron Lanier and Howard
Rheingold, lauded the technology as world-changing through its effects on individual
perceptions of reality. Lanier later clarified that this would not necessarily be effected through an
escape from reality, but through the realignment of the perception of one’s reality after having
experienced an alternative to it;27 however, this clarification was offered to counter the more
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popular view among both enthusiasts and critics in which VR at its cultural height was generally
discursively opposed to material reality. Cyberculture theorist Michael Heim suggested that “in
VR the images are the realities. We interact with virtual entities, and we become an entity
ourselves in the virtual environment. As in the medieval theory of transubstantiation, the symbol
becomes the reality.”28Images become real, in other words, and users become virtual. William
Gibson’s vision of cyberspace as put forth in his influential novel Neuromancer became
archetypal, imagining total disembodied presence in the network. However, when VR, which
was closely watched and upon which many projections and anxieties were pinned, failed to
emerge from its clunkier stages and take hold as a popular technology, the potency of the term as
a contemporary watchword diminished. As virtual worlds and videogames developed and their
complexity and sophistication escalated, notions of virtual embodiment increasingly gave way to
discussions of graphics, hardware, and gameplay, and avatars were foregrounded as the bodies to
occupy the new immersive spaces that were cropping up in 3D videogames like Doom and
virtual worlds like Alphaworld. Of course, VR and other virtual environments don’t produce
virtuality as such, and, according to scholars like Anne Friedberg, their appropriation of the term
‘virtual’ has distracted from its broader meaning, particularly as pertaining to other modes of
representation. Friedberg has identified these particularly with nineteenth century entertainments
such as the diarama and panorama, which offered a ‘virtual’ gaze and were predecessors to the
virtual gaze of cinema. The virtual for Friedberg is to a large extent dependent on the immersive
quality of the representative mode and its potential for seamlessness. This is a notion essential
for its consideration of the way in which we receive cinematic images and stories as effectual,
even as we know they’re not real; however, my understanding of the virtual differs somewhat in
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that I understand its greatest potency to be found in that which cannot be represented or directly
perceived.

Cracks Between and Surfaces Around
In The Virtual Window, Friedberg works to correct what she perceives as a
misunderstanding of the virtual and “reclaim its considerable utility for making distinctions
about the ontological status – and the materiality versus the immateriality – of an object.”29
Social theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi goes further, arguing that
Nothing is more destructive for the thinking and imaging of the virtual than equating it
with the digital. All arts and technologies . . . envelop the virtual, in one way or another.
Digital technologies in fact have a remarkably weak connection the virtual, by virtue of
the enormous power of their systematization of the possible.30
Evoking Bergson’s concept of the possible and the virtual, Massumi situates virtual technologies
(as a subset of the digital) oppositionally to the virtual because of the algorithmic logics that
drive them. Bergson theorized the virtual in terms of an ontological unpredictability; the
‘possible’ is that which a system is designed to produce, while the ‘virtual’ connotes
unanticipated states outside of the possible. Because digital technologies are algorithmically
based, they leave no room for the unexpected. However, we will see how human interaction with
the digital opens up possibilities for engaging the virtual when we approach it in
phenomenological terms – or, as Massumi puts it, through the ‘analog’.
The virtual isn’t inherent in the digital, but neither is it ‘contained’ in artworks or objects.
A fundamental premise of this dissertation is that we, and the world in which we live, are always
already virtual. Elizabeth Grosz, in her discussion of virtuality and architecture, writes “we did
29
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not have to wait for the computer screen or the movie projector in order to enter virtual space; we
have been living in its shadow more or less continually.”31 Anthropologist Tom Boellstorff
asserts that “virtual worlds show us how, under our very noses, our ‘real’ lives have been
‘virtual’ all along. It is in being virtual that we are human: since it is human ‘nature’ to
experience life through the prism of culture, human being has always been virtual being.”32 In
situating the virtual at the level of culture, Boellstorff points to the overarching role of culture
and society in defining relationships between the self and the world, as well as between the self
and one’s own body. And while he doesn’t use the term ‘virtual’, Foucault’s genealogies of
power and knowledge theorize the cultural flows of discourse and the implications for the body
‘inscribed’, in which the relationship between the perceiving self and the material world is
shaped by various invisible and taken-for-granted societal forces.33 This relationship is also
subject to the influences of commodity culture and “the domination of society by ‘intangible as
well as tangible things’” as Debord puts it, “which reaches its absolute fulfillment in the
spectacle, where the tangible world is replaced by a selection of images which exist above it, and
which simultaneously impose themselves as the tangible par excellence.”34 I don’t mean to imply
here that virtuality is ideological, but that ideological discourse shapes the particular forms that
virtuality takes for various groups and individuals. The notion that we are virtual is an
acknowledgement that we already exist in mediated relationships with ourselves and our world,
and the nature of these relationships becomes crucial.
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One implication of commodity culture, as well as of digital culture, is that we have
become ‘more’ virtual in the last century, in that post-industrial societies are subject to greater
virtualization than developing countries. While, following Boellstorff, virtuality is an inherent
condition of all humanity, manifest for instance in mythology and religion,35 the case can be
made that the development of cinema, radio, and television, the proliferation of images and
consumer products, and the ubiquity of computer technologies have only enhanced our
propensity for mediated experience. Such is the basis for Baudrillard’s declaration that
contemporary society has become a simulation, but again it seems a mistake to conflate the two,
as a simulacral culture may certainly affect the interconnections between perceiving beings and
the material world, but it does not constitute these connections.
The question then becomes one of access: how do we encounter and recognize the
virtual? Understanding virtuality as medial, it is clear that the arts and media technologies will
bear some relation to the virtual. Such is Friedberg’s approach when she locates the virtual
within “the register of representation itself.”36 I have alluded to her theorization of a virtual gaze
active in immersive works such as panoramas, and later cinema;37 however, it is necessary to
draw a clearer distinction between representation and the virtual, for while art and electronic
media can be instrumental in generating encounters with the virtual, they are not themselves
virtual nor do they represent virtuality directly. Massumi writes:
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The virtual, as such, is inaccessible to the senses. This does not, however, preclude
figuring it, in the sense of constructing images of it. To the contrary, it requires a
multiplication of images. The virtual that cannot be felt also cannot but be felt, in its
effects. When expressions of its effects are multiplied, the virtual fleetingly appears. Its
fleeting is in the cracks between and the surfaces around images.38
The virtual is affective, oblique, and fugitive. In order for an image to approach the virtual,
Massumi indicates that it must “twist and fold in on itself, to multiply itself internally” or
approach the virtual “topologically,” by which one might arrive at “an overimage of images of
self-varying deformation: a unity of continuous separation from self.”39 For me, the avatar and
the CG character incorporate striking configurations of self-variance, and in an attempt to engage
virtuality through these configurations, I approach them with an eye toward superimposition, in
the overlaid strata of digital, perceptual, and material elements, and spatialization, in the
distance-in-connection produced by the interface and inherent to the avatar. This approach to
images and technological apparatuses in terms of their layers and interconnections evokes that
what Grosz sees as “the embeddedness, the nesting or interimplication (perhaps another name for
difference) of the virtual and the real within each other.”40 That is, virtuality is not a singular
epistemological and experiential laminate over the material world, but virtual and real produce
and construct one another and intermingle in nested layers of history, design, convention, and
use, in addition to individual psychological and phenomenological experience.
The topography of the virtual, with its many points of connection to and tensions with
materiality, is uneven terrain. Human perception and the material world are constantly roiling
and shifting against one another, resulting in much ideological work to temper the restless
correspondence between the two. The universalizing impulses of societal order and bodily
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discipline, as well as the torrents of consumerism and the market, are sources of ideological
production that deeply affect our relation to the world and our bodies. However, as mentioned
above, the virtual is never homogeneous, but always contingent. The negotiation of embodiment
and enculturation by individuals, in addition to the particular qualities of various media and the
distinctiveness of an artwork, alter the experience of virtuality, or ‘virtualities’, as these
relationships are defined and redefined.
In this vein, it has been argued that some people are more virtual than others. In her work
on race in the internet, Lisa Nakamura contends that “people of color have always been
postmodern (and by extension ‘virtual’)” in their decentered, fragmented, and marginalized
cultural status.41 A similar sentiment relative to gender is expressed by Nigel Clark, who argues
that “‘women’s bodies have always been postmodern’ [as they] have had a longer history of
subjection to inscription by idealized images.”42 I don’t mean to conflate postmodernism and
virtuality, but in considering the problematic relationship between women’s bodies, patriarchal
mandates, and image culture, one might say that a stronger influence of virtuality is evident.
However, a different sort of connection between women and virtuality can also be drawn through
Haraway’s association of the cyborg with the feminine in order to demonstrate the
constructedness of identity – but a constructedness which, when understood and harnessed, can
yield great power. As I will show, representations of virtuality regularly make use of raced and
feminine bodies; on the surface, this results in marginalization, but depictions of women and
black men relative to the virtual can also be understood in terms of the force or effectuality that
the virtual implies.
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The indirect process of imaging the virtual, as outlined by Massumi, must be
distinguished from the practice of representing the virtual, as we see for instance in The
Thirteenth Floor, where virtual technologies are depicted and alluded to, and the cinematic
representation summons the virtual in its presentation of both an object and a view, but the
virtual is encountered indirectly, through the phenomenological encounter with the Bierko
multiplicity. One may touch upon the virtual in the process of forming an image (Massumi
suggests that “imagination is the mode of thought most precisely suited to differentiating the
vagueness of the virtual”),43 with heightened awareness of the relation between perception and
the physical world, but once the image is fixed temporally and materially, its relation to the
virtual is much more difficult to grasp. Friedberg states that the virtual marks a “secondary order
in the relationship between the real and its copy, the original and its reproduction, the image and
its likeness.”44 While I am wary of placing the virtual too firmly within modes of representation,
as noted above, I find useful her elucidation of the interstitial nature of the virtual. Friedberg
refers to it as “a second-order materiality, liminally immaterial,” and evokes Bergson’s
association of the virtual with perception, the images by which the material world is produced
phenomenologically: “Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’,” writes Bergson, “and by
‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a
representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing – an existence placed half-way
between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation.’”45 For Bergson, the image is in the beholder as a
virtual instantiation; for Friedberg, certain images and technologies produce the virtual, as
measured in the form of engagement they provide (as in virtual travel and virtual windows).
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My approach lies somewhere between, but I rely on both. Friedberg’s emphasis on the
propensity for certain images and technological forms to converge with the virtual initiates a
broader discussion of cinematic images in the era of digital effects, but at the same time these
forms must be situated relative to embodied observers. The virtual cannot be captured or fixed in
an image, but, in my view, is encountered in the moment of engagement and within the
conditions of viewership or use. With these diverging (but ultimately complementary) views in
mind, we can here briefly address a variation on the virtual that pertains to this study – the
‘virtual image’.

Virtual Images, Embodied Frames
A term Friedberg locates in nineteenth century studies of optics, ‘virtual images’ are
images with no fixed material substrate, e.g. reflected in mirrors, produced in the mind, or
registering on the retina. This is not to say that these images are divorced from materiality, as
they are reliant upon eye, brain, and mirror, but they are ephemeral, existing only in the moment
of their creation. To these we find a contemporary parallel in Manovich’s study of radar blips,
which he extends to real-time televisual and computer-mediated images; his pronouncement that
“the image, in a traditional sense, no longer exists!” refers to a culture in which real-time images
on screens have supplanted images in physical media.46 Real-time or virtual images become
ways of thinking about the materiality of images as we now frequently encounter them on
television monitors and computer displays. However, Manovich’s assertion underscores the
importance of materiality in our engagement with images – indeed, reiterating the fact that
images never simply float above their material supports or are independent of them, but when the
material substrate of an image has changed, it is no longer the same image (it is ‘pictured’
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differently); when the substrate fixing the image has disappeared, it is, for Manovich, no longer
an ‘image’.
I address images and their materiality here because, within the context of this
dissertation, I understand virtuality in terms of the shifting relationships between bodies and
images. A film like The Thirteenth Floor is interesting to me from the standpoint of the virtual
not for its digital content or complex imagery – in fact its images are cinematically quite
conventional – but for the way it evokes the digital, in both its abstraction as an informational
technology and its intimacy with human experience, through the film’s manipulation of what or
who we ‘see’ when we view Bierko in the film. CG imagery, on the other hand, tends to be
employed obviously and bluntly in the overuse of its capacity to show, but while it often lacks
nuance, it touches the virtual when it invokes the cognitive dissonance whereby we question
what it is exactly that we are ‘seeing’, and in the way in which these images are processed
simultaneously (if subtly) as both data and pictures.
W. J. T. Mitchell points out what has become clear in the proliferation of digital imagery:
the image is already ‘virtual’, that which “can be lifted off the picture, transferred to another
medium, translated into a verbal ekphrasis, or protected by copyright law.” He gives perhaps the
most succinct summation of the immateriality of images in noting that “you can hang a picture,
but you cannot hang an image.” A picture is the material instantiation of an image, which in
comparison is “phantasmatic, virtual, or spectral.”47 Thus while pictures exist in the material
world, Mitchell situates images within the plane of the virtual – an aspect that becomes
increasingly apparent as images are losing their material substrates, and must temporarily borrow
those of the devices upon which they appear.
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The ethereal qualities of the image that Mitchell suggests here can be contextualized
within our fascination and experiences with images. With the shifts toward digital production
and dissemination of images, fascination and experience must accommodate the
dematerialization (eminently transferable and modifiable images displayed on screens) and
redoubled materialization (the necessity and material presence of hardware for viewing images
that proliferate across devices rather than on paper media) that characterize contemporary digital
imagery. Both the de- and re-materialization lend themselves to a certain fantasy, of the image in
its ‘imageness’ unfettered from the fixity of a medium, and of the technological capacity to exert
power over the image – to affect the means by which one has been or might be affected, to
subject the image to the medium (the computer), and perhaps to rein in its ‘surplus value’, as
Mitchell puts it. “Everyone knows that images are, unfortunately, too valuable, and that is why
they need to be put down.”48 Digital imagery thus might be said to offer different fascinations,
simultaneously allowing the production and destruction of the ‘imageness’ of the image.
What must be made clear here is the tricky materiality of the digital image, for it not only
comes into play literally (and effusively) in films like Avatar, but it is in many ways the
capacities of the digital to which avatar films allude when they (often non-digitally) depict the
virtual. On the one hand, the ‘image’ is for Mitchell an immaterial element, which must be
instantiated in some material substrate in order to be a ‘picture’.49 And, as Freidberg writes, even
a virtual image “begins to have its own liminal materiality, even if it is on a different ontological
order.”50 Rodowick questions the presence of an image at all, suggesting that “through digital
screens our relation is not to an image, but to function or force – that of control and the
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management of information” – an interesting notion, given that virtuality etymologically relies
on forcefulness rather than physicality.51
Digital images borrow their ‘liminal’ materiality from the objects that produce or display
them. As in the science of optics, these images are associated with the instrument that
provisionally generates or presents them, whether mirror, eye, television, or computer, rather
than the medium in which they are fixed. Our contact with the image, should we wish to touch it
(or, as Mitchell suggests, kiss it) becomes contact with the instrument – and indeed,
contemporary devices and computers have been redefined as media machines that produce
images, as well as aesthetically pleasing objects that make the machines a distinct and yet
seamless part of the images they display and objects of touch by which images are selected,
swiped, zoomed, edited, and even created.52 By Mitchell’s reasoning, a clarification of Manovich
is necessary: it is pictures that are disappearing, rather than images – and in fact, we seem to be,
more than ever before, in an era of the image.
The digital image is also material in another way, in that while it seems ephemeral, it of
course must be preserved in a physical substrate, such as in magnetic alignments on a hard drive
or molecular nubs on a flash drive – which at their base levels are physical rather than
numerical.53 However, our contact with these instantiations is very different from that of analog
media, and thus the paradox we face with digital media is that they are material, but not in a way
in which they can be materially accessed by humans; they are displayed on physical hardware,
from which they borrow a certain materiality, but there is no fixed relation between the two; and
at the same time, they bear an ontological resemblance to Mitchell’s definition of an image, yet
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they are not abstractions. My attempt to relate embodiment to the lost materiality or ‘body’ of the
analog depends on these nuances, and even as I at a certain point move toward abstraction, or the
‘imageness’ of the image, it is more out of an attempt to account phenomenologically for the
ambiguity of digital materiality than to suggest that digital images are indeed disembodied.
A defining characteristic of digital culture is that it is also in many ways an image
culture. In fact it is common for writers engaging new media to employ the terms ‘numerical’,
‘informational’, and ‘binary’ rather than ‘digital’ when they want to refer to the mechanical
aspects of digital technologies, as the digital is no longer associated exclusively with
informational substrates. ‘Digital’ has come to connote the interactive, imagistic, and even
affective engagement with computer information. This includes the graphical user interface
(GUI), or practices of facilitating access to information through user friendly interfaces
employing images, graphical iconography, conversational text, and the ubiquitous buttons that
are more likely to be graphical rather than hardware elements. The GUI and its attendant
hardware, the mouse, were fundamental to the development and proliferation of the personal
computer in the eighties, where, along with videogames, the turn toward images and away from
machine language and aesthetics was already visible.54 As processing and network speeds have
increased, computers have developed into media devices, including their increasing use in image
production and distribution, while digital elements in general have seemingly been integrated
into almost every aspect of culture. An important aspect of digital culture, then, is the way in
which computer information has been integrated with media production, graphical developments,
and intuitive interfaces – a massive WYSIWYG (‘what you see is what you get’).
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To a significant extent, these developments help transform information into forms more
compatible with human experience; however, disjunctures remain within, for instance, the
ambiguous materiality of digital information, data intermingling with images in digital culture,
and even the way in which the pace and spectacle of traditional media forms (such as
advertising) have grown exponentially, fueled by developments in digital media. The body is not
removed from the contemporary shifts toward information and images, but central to them. Here,
then, I turn finally to the body and the essential role it plays, both conceptually and materially, in
processing the data streams and image influx of digital culture.
Mark Hansen, drawing from media philosopher Pierre Lévy’s writings on virtualization
and Bergson’s philosophy of images and virtuality, takes a phenomenological approach to
informational technologies and embodiment. He argues against Deleuze’s ‘disembodying’
abstraction of the body as the center of indetermination – the process, as introduced by Bergson,
by which the body isolates certain aspects of images to generate perceptions. In his theorization
of the movement-image and the time-image, Deleuze moves away from Bergson’s emphasis on
affect in its phenomenological sense, offering up instead a formal understanding of affectivity as
a permutation of the image. Hansen’s aim is to restore the framing function of the human body:
“to redeem Bergson’s embodied conception of the center of indetermination will ultimately
require us to reverse the entire trajectory of Deleuze’s study, to move not from the body to the
frame, but from the frame (back) to the body.” Thus any media content, including photographs,
cinematic images, and video signals, requires consideration of the “historically contingent
negotiation between technical capacities and the ongoing ‘evolution’ of embodied (human)
perception.”55 As technology evolves, so does the capacity of human perception – not toward a
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machine-like subjectivity, as implied by the cyborg, but requiring a greater investment of the
body. As Hanson writes:
When the body acts to enframe digital information – or, as I put it, to forge the digital
image – what it frames is in effect itself: its own affectively experienced sensation of
coming into contact with the digital. In this way, the act of enframing information can be
said to ‘give body’ to digital data – to transform something that is unframed,
disembodied, and formless into concrete embodied information intrinsically imbued with
(human) meaning.56
Hansen doesn’t explore avatars in his study, but to my mind the avatar is a salient figure at the
intersection of multiple embodying processes. As an object of affective use and cultural
signification, the avatar is well-situated for an examination of the digital through the virtual and
the corporeal, although one that in contemporary scholarship has been overlooked for its
theoretical potential in understanding an evolving digital culture.
In looking at the ways in which information is framed by the body, an awareness of the
ways in which the body is already virtual is essential for a consideration of the possibilities for
any engagement with virtuality on a phenomenological level. The term ‘embodiment’ has been
used to connote the virtual dimension of having or being a body – not simply implying a
connectedness between self and body, but in fact highlighting difference. “Embodiment never
coincides exactly with ‘the body’,” writes Hayles, even though it is the only way in which the
body can be known and experienced. ”Whereas the body is an idealized form that gestures
toward a Platonic reality, embodiment is the specific instantiation generated from the noise of
difference.”57 Because embodiment for Hayles is contingent and individual, there is “also at least
an incipient tension between it and hegemonic cultural constructs. Embodiment is thus inherently
destabilizing with respect to the body, for at any time this tension can widen into a perceived
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disparity.”58 The body in this equation is what becomes ‘virtual’ as an inaccessible ‘reality’ that
never appears except through its particular instantiations.59 Thus virtuality is primary in
embodiment – in the tensions between body and self, in the multiple ways in which the body is
experienced through and as images, and in regard to our interaction with images, media forms,
and technologies by which connections within the complex network of embodiment are shifted,
recombined, and transfigured. The avatar, as an image body connected to a human one within
what might be thought of as a circuitous embodiment, becomes in many ways an ideal figure
through which to think bodies, images, and virtuality.

A Circuitous Method
It was a sense of the uncanny that initiated my abiding interest in avatars. I began
exploring Second Life as a curiosity but was soon captivated by what I can only describe as a
perceptual refraction between avatar and user, with both simultaneously ‘present’ in different
ways. I absorbed the ethnographic and anthropological research that is routinely conducted in
Second Life, but found that these studies, while revealing much about behavior and community,
failed to capture the perplexing nature of the avatar, as their typically iconoclastic aim was to
break through the illusion on their way to engaging users. Returning to film theory gave me a
basis for understanding virtual environments as imagistic, but as these were not traditional
images a second theoretical move was required, and I brought in new media theory to
contextualize the cinematic frame through which I was approaching Second Life. Such an
approach accords with the rising influence of digital technologies in filmmaking practice and
aesthetics, which has been addressed by several scholars carving out hybrid approaches to the
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theorization of digital media; as I compared the perceptual and affective reaction I’d had with
avatars to the CG creatures and characters that were appearing with more frequency in film, it
became clear that these figures could comprise a productive secondary thread in my study. I
found fertile ground as well in the analog performances of digital technologies in the avatar films
as one way of exploring the ripples of digital culture.
While in Second Life I also developed an odd sympathy for the avatars, including a rather
compassionate attitude toward my own; these were not simply icons or cartoon characters by
which users oriented themselves in the game or environment, but in their design as richly
detailed (if occasionally clunky) human figures they seem to have tipped over into a different
plane of online interaction. I was regularly struck by what seemed to be an undeniable sense of
presence in themselves – an aspect in tension with their basic function of designating the user’s
presence.60 At the same time these were bodies used, thoroughly subject to control and
manipulation. While this was often done carefully and even lovingly by users invested in their
creations, the avatar itself became somewhat of a melancholy figure for me. In videogames, the
icon or avatar is most often thought of in terms of the presence, agency, and force of the user
within the environment, but it is important to note that the avatar is also the site of vulnerability;
this aspect of vulnerability became quite pronounced for me, and shows up as well in avatar
films such as Gamer, where sympathy for the avatar provides the (overdetermined) emotional
spine of the film, and in others, like Surrogates, where the film’s commentary on the human
condition has as much to do with bemoaning our avatarial state.
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As I was never particularly social in Second Life, the imagistic world remained quite
concrete at the level of illusion, with the ‘real’ world, the users, floating spectrally in a vast
dispersion under the surface. The sense of inversion of the material and immaterial worlds was
compelling, with the ‘immaterial’ world manifest in bodies of avatars and the physics of the
environment, and the ‘material’ world present only ‘virtually’ through the creations and actions
of the users. I sought for a way to study the virtual environment that preserved the sense of
uncanniness and traces of virtuality, as it is in these qualities that I found its phenomenological
potency. As this was a quality but not a text, however, shifting my emphasis to media
representations of the avatar provided material for substantive study that reflected back on the
virtual environment, as well as helping to develop the theoretical aspects of the avatar.
These avatar texts are mostly films, but I also analyze television and web series, as well
as interfaces and some general aspects of avatar use. As we are part of a convergence culture in
which different media forms bleed into one another, clear distinctions between them are no
longer possible – or necessarily desirable, as disciplinary rigidity can obstruct comprehensive
analysis for the particular material I take as my subject. Indeed, avatar films are inherently
convergent, with cinema appropriating new media forms in what might be thought of as
mythologies of interactive media – or what Paul Young calls ‘media fantasy films’, referring to
those texts by which cinema recontextualizes other media within classical Hollywood
paradigms.61 At the same time, virtual environments and the non-filmic texts that I explore draw
heavily from cinematic convention in their strategies of visualization and narration – in the web
series Molotov Alva and His Search for the Creator (2008, Douglas Gayeton), to take a literal
example, the protagonist is a filmmaker in Second Life. Like the cyborg in tension with itself,
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the avatar incorporates several dualisms; my transmedia approach attempts to interface between
these by considering the avatar’s many manifestations.
This dissertation is indebted to a number of theorists who have approached cinema from a
new media perspective and vice versa. Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin laid important
groundwork in Remediation: Understanding New Media, a comprehensive treatment of new
media as appropriating pre-existing media forms and language. The authors situate film texts
such as the avatarial Strange Days (1995, Kathryn Bigelow) as a film darkly appropriating the
subjective view of the FPS (first-person shooter) and its techniques for moving through space
originally acquired from cinema. This cross-media exchange is part of a discourse in which each
recasts the other according to its own logic. Bolter and Grusin’s definition of the double logic of
remediation informs my accentuation of the avatar as a medial figure. Demonstrating that a
remediative culture works to simultaneously multiply its media and erase the appearance of
mediation, the authors lay out a defining paradox of contemporary media that speaks directly to
phenomenological engagement and the knotty questions of materiality.
Manovich’s comprehensive work The Language of New Media is more specific in its
address of new media antecedents, drawing an agonistic line from Vertov’s Man With a Movie
Camera (1929) through practices of interactivity and visualization in computer media. Manovich
hangs his argument on the enduring influence of the cinema, arguing that “cinematic ways of
seeing the world, of structuring time, of narrating a story, of linking one experience to the next,
have become the basic means by which computer users access and interact with all cultural
data.”62 Cinema, for Manovich, is in a certain sense double, serving as both the classical
theatrical model which new media subvert and the broader ‘cultural interface’ by which they
repackage data for consumption. The latter assertion has sparked some resistance – Hansen, for
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instance, criticizes it as ‘overdetermined’, disallowing the full spectrum of new media
functionality by confining it to a cinematic paradigm – but to some extent at least Manovich’s
view of the dual role of cinema in the contemporary mediascape accords with the view of other
scholars, such as Rodowick, who argue that while film is disappearing, cinema persists in its
visual language and narrative techniques.
If Manovich overreaches in imposing cinema as the dominant language of new media, he
does point to an important element of digital culture in that an aesthetic of information has
yielded to the primacy of the image. The design and function of digital technologies have
steadily evolved to reflect and accommodate human experience, and thus while the body moves
to the fore in framing digital information, the design of digital culture meets it with the image –
the intersection at which the avatar is situated. Thus, in a final contrast with the cyborg model,
we find in digital culture emphasis on the movement of technology toward the human sphere.
That is, rather than humans modifying for synthesis with machines, it is the machines that are
continuously modified for greater compatibility with humans, with data presented in images (and
images increasingly computer-generated or modified), intuitive and haptic interfaces, and
mobilized devices that personalize technology.63 The framing function of the body must then
increasingly deal with images and personal devices in addition to data and machines.
With his ‘terminal identity’, Scott Bukatman uses science fiction and postmodernist
theory to posit an information age subjectivity, alluding to both the ‘termination’ of the
traditional subject and the new subjectivity formed at the television screen or computer terminal.
His encyclopedic work, coursing through a range of media texts, arts, games, and graphical
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works on its way to drawing out the theoretical implications of popular texts for contemporary
subjectivity, provides something of a roadmap for my study. The ‘virtual subject’ he describes,
well situated within cyborg and posthumanist constructs, is “a new subject capable of inhabiting
the bewildering and disembodied space of the electronic environment,” and an important
precursor for my delineation of avatar ontologies.64 The tension between the real and the digital
embodied in the avatar is a forked path seeking the way to unity and wholeness within digital
culture, whether that be through renunciation of virtual modes of being, or an acceptance of
avatarial ontology through multiplicity. Many writings on the cyborg have dealt with these issues
which I take up afresh with the avatar, and Bukatman’s handling of textual multiplicities
facilitates my treatment of the ways in which the avatar presents itself as a means for finding
unity or wholeness in and through digital culture.
I am also indebted to Vivian Sobchack’s eloquent essays on the philosophical aspects of
the prosthesis and her phenomenological approach to film in Carnal Thoughts. Her sensorial,
embodied approach to spectatorship has provided an invaluable framework for my
conceptualization of the contingencies of virtuality. Steven Shaviro’s critique of the Lacanian
model in film theory, The Cinematic Body, provides foundational elements for my use of, and
departures from, the mirror stage. And Paul Young and Claudia Springer, whom I have
mentioned above, have provided valuable insights that I use throughout this study. In particular,
Young’s treatment of cinematic texts through which classical Hollywood refashioned its
intermedia rivalries with radio, television, and the internet provided me with a conceptual
framework for thinking about avatar films in the context of their function within cinematic
tradition.
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The texts I analyze here are of the type, I feel, that Steven Shaviro calls ‘expressive’, or
giving voice to contemporary experience in digital culture. “By the term expressive,” he writes,
“I mean both symptomatic and productive. These works are symptomatic, in that they provide
indices of complex social processes. . . . But they are also productive, in the sense that they do
not represent social processes, so much as they participate freely in these processes, and help to
constitute them.”65 These films, while often far from being cinematic masterpieces, are important
texts because of highly relevant discourses in which they participate. Many of these films have
garnered little critical attention and beg further analysis, while others have been written about
extensively, as we see in the academic fever sparked by Avatar or the several books written
about the Matrix franchise. Notably, however, neither of the latter have been substantively
addressed in terms of avatars (or at least, in the case of Avatar, not avatars in the contemporary
sense), and thus these highly visible films warrant another look.66 Seeing these films from an
avatarial perspective can be, I believe, a means for honing our understanding of the digital as it
pertains to cinema and issues of embodiment.

Organization
In this dissertation I move from the avatar body, masculinity, and cinematic death toward
the image body, femininity, and digital vitality. I take as my point of departure the mirror phase,
as theorized by Lacan, as his influential formulation is critical to my work for its doubling of the
subject in its inception, and for the connection he postulated must be made between the body and
its image in the formation of the self. I am less concerned with the specific psychoanalytical
aspects of the mirror phase than I am with the configuration it suggests, for its obvious
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implications for avatars and interfaces. In Chapter 1 I begin by situating the avatar relative to the
psychoanalytic frameworks that determined how the one must be seen as two, before
complicating these approaches with an analysis of three avatarial works that demonstrate the role
of the half in constituting the double. Seeing the half and double not as imbalances but as integral
parts of an avatarial gestalt is a first step in conceptualizing the distributed, interlinked
embodiment this gestalt proposes.
Chapter 2 explores levels and hierarchies, depth and surface in avatar ‘bodies’,
identifying points of connection and sites of ambiguity between material bodies and their
imagistic counterparts. In a dissection of the avatar I plumb the depths of its digital body and
feel out the space of the interface apparatus, working toward a fuller understanding of what it
means to be an ‘avatar’. The index serves as the point of departure, while gradations of distance
from the index mark the status of the image body.
In Chapter 3 I trace the trend in avatar films of a masculine repulsion of virtuality and a
crisis of agency when the male character is positioned as avatar rather than player. In this chapter
I counter the myth of interactivity in gaming and analyze how it plays out along gender divisions
in avatar films, and then further question how the film Gamer ‘plays’ its characters in an
avatarial fashion. Chapter 4 takes mortality as its theme, as I conduct an in-depth analysis of the
final scenes of the Matrix trilogy, focusing on Neo’s avatarial ascension and death and
comparing his final act to the ‘death’ of film. In examining Neo as a layered complex, I suggest
that he becomes the ‘One’ only through his multiplicity, by fully becoming an ‘avatar’. I further
propose superimposition as a conceptual strategy for perceiving embodiment as overlapping
‘images’ of the body, moving toward the supposed vitality of the digital (and the multilayered
CG character) relative to the demise of the photographic body.
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Tracking Jake Sully’s (Sam Worthington) character trajectory in Avatar from disabled
half to composited digital whole, in Chapter 5 I examine the contest between the photographic
and the digital in Avatar, and Cameron’s use of the avatar as a device for linking audience
sympathy with a CG protagonist and effecting his vision of a total digital cinema. To make the
film work, Cameron must overcome an alterity of the digital that has precedents in animation,
and so I also examine films that combine live action and animation in order to illuminate the
hierarchy of image forms that renders animated characters as ‘natives’, cast as other to their
photographic counterparts. Nativeness segues back into gender, and in the final chapter I look at
the ways in which femininity has been positioned as being closer to the virtual, surveying the
various roles given to female characters in avatar films, and how virtuality triangulates with the
body and the image in defining and perpetuating a paradoxical discourse of the feminine as
overly near the body and simultaneously abstracted from it. Women in these films (as well as a
few raced men) are trapped in their own virtuality, but at the same time are the characters who
are best able to navigate their respective virtual worlds. If indeed our own world is becoming
more virtual (in that our relationships to images has become more and more integral to daily
life), then what guides do we have for managing these relationships?
In the conclusion I make a final proposal: drawing from my arguments on embodiment,
gestalt, and gender, I flip the model of femininity as incarcerated by virtuality and, reading
against the grain, suggest that avatar films (generally inadvertently) posit the feminine as a
model for navigating the virtual. I identify this as a medial position, one through which
embodiment is perceived as a channel for the flow of the various psychological,
phenomenological, and cultural aspects of which it is comprised. The tendency for many avatar
films to grant their male protagonists victory over the encroachment of the virtual, allowing them
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to preserve the physical body (by implication, substantively photographic) and reclaim agency,
produce only empty ideological attempts to reify an idealized notion of wholeness. It is the
women in these films who exist within an avatarial gestalt, and who are best equipped for
navigating image culture and embodying the contradictions of a digital world.
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CHAPTER 1
THE INCARNATION OF MYSELF
A recent debate between internet pundits PJ Rey and Mr. Teacup on the nature of
cyberspace relative to the real world was hashed out, quite appropriately, in cyberspace (to the
extent that such a ‘space’ exists) on their blogs, with posts entitled respectively “There is No
‘Cyberspace’” and “There is Only Cyberspace.”1 Rey’s argument took a stand against what he
and his collaborators on the Cyborgology blog refer to as ‘digital dualism’, in which online space
is falsely considered abstracted from reality. For Rey, there is no essential separation, as web
pages and videogames are grounded in the material world temporally, socially, and
economically; any experiential sense of immersion for the player in virtual space falls under
what Rey refers to as ‘augmented reality’. In this view, online and computer interaction are
merely another aspect of reality, and the concept of cyberspace as separate from reality is a
bygone relic; augmented reality represents the contemporary understanding of our relation to
virtual technologies.2 Indeed, Rey adds that in his view the qualifier ‘augmented’ is superfluous,
as it implies more difference between cyberspace and the real world than exists, explaining that
his use of it is due to the insufficiency of the already contested notion of ‘reality’ to absorb more
ambiguity.
Taking issue with Rey’s post, Teacup retorted with a Lacanian response in which he
agreed that digital dualism is an erroneous belief, but not because cyberspace is ontologically
continuous with the real and therefore does not exist; rather, Teacup argues from the opposite
1

Mr. Teacup, “There is Only Cyberspace,” A Blog of Various Philosophical Reflections and Speculations (February
3, 2012), http://www.mrteacup.org/post/there-is-only-cyberspace.html; PJ Rey, “There is No ‘Cyberspace’,”
Cyborgology (February 1, 2012), http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/02/01/there-is-no-cyberspace/.
2
Rey notes, significantly, that influential cyberspace visionary William Gibson has moved away from his seminal
characterization of cyberspace as a space distinct from the real world, as this perception “no longer describes what’s
happening.”
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perspective, that “reality does not exist, there is only cyberspace.” According to Lacan, the Real
cannot be encountered directly, and thus fantasy mediates our contact with the real world.
Cyberspace becomes another example of the many fictions through which we perceive our lives,
but Teacup grants particular weight to the internet as substantiating his metaphor. The ubiquity
and social impact of online communication and information, in addition to the internet’s ability
to encompass many other forms of fantasy, gives basis to Teacup’s rhetorical extension of the
fundamental fantasy of the Lacanian Imaginary (the site of ideals, images, and desire) into the
computer space that was once internalized in the network but has become increasingly
externalized into social reality.
Rey and Teacup’s disagreement demonstrates a key consideration for contemporary
subjectivity in the way that the real extends into the virtual, and the virtual guides the real. What
is most pertinent in this debate is not who is right, but how the conversation can happen at all
when we consider their use of the term ‘cyberspace’. Rey is talking about computer technologies,
while Teacup alludes to psychic engagement with the world, and while these are two separate
issues, their dichotomous ideas of cyberspace are not without a point of interection, in the
phenomenological experience of online space and digital data. As extensive and penetrating as
the internet is, it is not actual online space that fuels this debate, but the idea of what cyberspace
means for everyday living, and this aspect evokes the virtual.
The virtual is not a rejection of or alternative to the material world, but a way of
understanding how we exist within it, and this begins with the body. Teacup contextualizes this
relationship within a Lacanian framework that challenges Rey’s cyborg approach while offering
a provocative hypotheses relative to embodiment:
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Our subjective self-consciousness feels like it has been grafted on, and sits in an uneasy
relationship with the body. The phrase ‘we have always been cyborgs’ is often taken to
mean that we have always had different technologies, that human-constructed objects
have extended us in various ways. Lacan proposes a radical and disturbing cyborg
hypothesis: the original, zero-level alien technology that has been artificially grafted on
the body is the self.
In this view, the body is always already in tension with the self. As Donna Haraway summarily
puts it, “if the cyborg is anything at all, it is self-difference.”3 However, from a
phenomenological standpoint, the stance taken by Teacup is problematic – if at the same time
interesting for its technological bent. “Embodiment,” Vivian Sobchack writes, “is a radically
material condition of human being that necessarily entails both the body and consciousness,
objectivity and subjectivity, in an irreducible ensemble.”4 The embodied self is formed precisely
through having and being a body, and thus the concept of a graft does indeed seem alien.
However, Teacup’s Lacanian insight is in regard to the dissonance and even outright discord
between self and body. Lacan situates this initially in the mirror stage, in which idealization and
antipathy become wedged between self and an illusion of self that originates in two opposing
impressions of the body.
The mirror holds a central place in Lacan’s theory of the formation of subjectivity, in
which he conceptualizes a sort of ‘image body’, although not simply in the reflected image. In
the mirror stage, the child “assumes an image,” seeing in its reflection an idealized body that
appears whole relative to the fragmented body of still-developing motor skills he or she
experiences subjectively.5 The reflection of the mother as the adult both idealized and existing in
the real world completes the imago of what the child might become as represented by the image.
3

Donna Haraway, “The Actors are Cyborg, Nature is Coyote, and the Geography is Elsewhere: Postscript to
‘Cyborgs at Large’,” in, Technoculture, Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, eds. (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1991), 22.
4
Vivian Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts, 4.
5
Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 2.
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Although the child eventually leaves the mirror stage as he or she is inducted into the Symbolic
order with the acquisition of language, the mirror stage remains with the subject as it typifies an
essential libidinal relationship with the body image. Thus subjectivity is gained only through an
encounter with a virtual counterpart while remaining irrevocably fissured as the result of an
inability to overcome the differences between the material and image bodies.
Self-difference in at least some form does indeed inhere in embodiment, as demonstrated
in the models of mental processes and the brain produced in recent neuroscientific advances.
Teacup’s concept of grafting accords to some extent with the school of thought that our
mammalian brains evolved on top of a reptilian prototype that remains, and we are thus to some
extent constantly in conflict with our evolutionary heritage. However, other recent thought has
posited an advantage to self-difference, as in David Eagleman’s theory of the brain as a ‘team of
rivals’ moderated by the conscious mind – an evolutionary development which allows for
adaptation and complex decision-making. Eagleman paints a picture of consciousness as the tip
of the iceberg as numerous subroutines perform the bulk of the labor in managing the body and
interacting with the world. This organization is, for Eagleman, highly beneficial, as it allows the
conscious mind to focus on a few managerial decisions, especially where the ‘rivals’ are at odds,
rather than the immense work of coordinating muscle movement, processing the full range of
sensorial stimuli, and even working through difficult problems, which largely occurs under the
surface while the conscious mind ‘takes credit’ for a good idea.6 In a way this is not so different
from Freud’s model of the mind as competing factions, the superego policing the id and the ego
sustained in balance between the two. But whereas for Freud the repressed aspects of self – as if

6

This has implications for agency as well, as Eagleman writes “people have little capacity to choose or explain their
actions, motivations, and beliefs, and the captain’s wheel is steered by the unconscious brain, shaped by
innumerable generations of evolutionary selection and a lifetime of experiences.” David Eagleman,. Incognito: The
Secret Lives of the Brain (New York: Pantheon Books, 2011), 190.
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a dark double lurking in dreams and childhood trauma – threatens the ego, for Eagleman human
evolution and consciousness as we understand it depends on the mind opposed to itself in order
to work through complex decisions. Transferring conscious processes to the unconscious mind is
for Eagleman a healthy process, a move toward efficiency than repression. Acknowledging how
small a role the conscious mind may play in cognition and behavior can yet be disconcerting,
however.
There are other ways in which we are alien to ourselves as well. The interior of our
bodies – muscles, organs, blood, etc. – is strange to us, alarming when it comes to the surface
and foreign on a video monitor as viewed through a spectroscopic probe. Indeed, most of us
encounter the inner workings of the body only through images, whether in educational materials
or through medical imagery such as x-rays and MRI scans. Even our external bodies, and
especially faces, are encountered largely through images as objective views of ourselves exist
outside our field of vision. Photographs and home video become means for self-reflection – and
increasingly for self-expression with the rise of social media – with the mirror, of course,
operating as the basic technology for encountering the self externally. If we have an affinity for
images, it is perhaps in part because we exist in images, and the model of the avatar suggests that
we not only take pleasure in viewing them, but that this affinity extends into a certain level of
identification.
In the mirror stage, the reflected body becomes desirable for its apparent wholeness, and
the state of fragmentation and longing for wholeness that emerge from the formation of
subjectivity during the mirror stage produce an oscillatory self that moves between subjective
consciousness and a symbolic, idealized other. Bob Rehak, in his psychoanalytic history of
videogames, conceives of this other as a ‘living avatar’, for “if the mirror stage initiates a
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lifelong split between self-as-observer and self-as-observed, and the video game exploits this
structure, then, in one sense, we already exist in an avatarial relation to ourselves.”7 The
popularity of videogames, he suggests, can be explained in part in the way they revisit the
mirror, and even provide an interface to it. Turning off the game and breaking the avatarial
connection allows the user to preserve a (false) sense of wholeness after having been subjectively
sundered while playing the game. The avatar becomes the reflexive ideal, and indeed our
videogame counterparts are frequently endowed with better moves and increased abilities, even
if the novice player might encounter frustration in fully engaging these bodies.
At the same time, the avatar should not be construed as simply an ideal, for gaming is a
play of power relations – including the relationship between user and avatar. The pleasures of the
avatar “seem amplified by the uncanny difference between reality and reflection: an alterity
enabling players both to embrace the avatar as an ideal and to reject it as an inferior other.”8
Videogame avatars, in their alterity, seem to invite sadism as the ontological distinction of the
self-image forms an illicitness that must be symbolically punished, destroyed, or powered off,
only to be resurrected again (and again).
Rehak’s application of Lacanian theory to videogames is insightful for problematizing
discourses of entering cyberspace. Ultimately, however, Rehak’s analysis preserves the tension
and need for identification that the mirror stage institutes. For Lacan, the condition of the mirror
demands an either/or approach (which, as Rehak points out, becomes oscillatory), as the subject
is torn between percieing self as either this incomplete sensory experience or that illusion of
completeness. Sherry Turkle, in her psychosocial work with players and avatars, analyzed player
attempts to modulate between these positions, as her subjects created alter egos with whom to
7

Bob Rehak, “Playing at Being: Psychoanalysis and the Avatar,” in The Video Game Theory Reader, eds. Mark J.
P. Wolf and Bernard Perron (New York: Routledge, 2003), 123.
8
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identify and which could be used to counter social alienation or negative self-image, or to
explore aspects of self-difference through gender play, for instance. However, here as well the
avatar is stuck in a circuit of fantasy and reality with the mirror used as a means to an end,
seeking the gestalt that never fully materializes. For Turkle, success was dependent on achieving
an altered self-image that persists once the computer is turned off; this proved elusive as avatar
identity came to be seen as less intertwined with real world identity than originally thought.
The controlled experiments of Nick Yee and Jeremy Bailenson imported the device of the
mirror into virtual space in order to measure behavioral change as a product of difference in
avatarial appearance. In one experiment, a first-person user would encounter his or her
‘reflection’ before engaging in a brief social interaction, followed by an interaction with another
avatar. As might be expected, participants were more assertive and confident when their avatars
were taller and more attractive, but Yee and Bailenson also highlighted the short duration in
which subjects had encountered themselves with avatarial modifications, looking into the virtual
mirror for only about a minute. The power of altered appearance on self-perception is evident,
even when one knows the alteration is limited, and this experiment is interesting for its literal use
of a mirror, even if Yee and Bailenson were only able to demonstrate its effects for short-term
use.9
I have mentioned these examples of avatarial mirroring, through videogames, virtual
worlds, and controlled experiments, to establish a sense of how avatars have been used and
theorized relative to the Lacanian mirror. Each produces variations on using what might be
thought of as the fragmentation intrinsic to the avatarial interface (a subjectively embodied self

9

More recently VR interfaces and virtual environments have been used in therapy for PTSD, acrophobia (fear of
heights), and other phobias and disorders. These uses are less concerned with social identity and more with
immersion in controlled trauma-inducing scenarios. While the practice is still young, early results are positive. See
Amanda Schaffer, “Not a Game: Simulation to Lessen War Trauma,” New York Times, August 28, 2007.
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here, an objective image body there) to confront (through reenactment) the fragmentation
postulated by Lacan in the mirror stage. I have noted ways in which they seem not to achieve
their implicit or stated aims of producing and sustaining some sort of idealized gestalt, but I am
less concerned here with their effectuality than I am with addressing the gestalts they suggest.
For Rehak, the psychology of videogaming falls squarely within a Lacanian definition of
fragmented subjectivity, while in the experiments conducted by Turkle, Yee, and Bailenson,
success was dependent on its persistence outside of the fragmentation of the interface. My aim in
this dissertation is to draw out, through the lens of contemporary new media theory and an
analysis of media texts that situate avatars and virtuality within digital culture, a
reconceptualization of the gestalt from Lacan’s use of the mirror in his theorization of
subjectivity that posits a relation between body and image.
An important aspect of these media texts is the way they position virtuality relative to the
‘real’. The avatar film Surrogates offers an iconoclastic reaction to what it presents as a cultural
fantasy of replacing one’s fragmented reality with an idealized self-image (Fig. 3). Set in the
near future, the film imagines a world in which most of the population lives vicariously through
androids, which they control avatarially from ‘stim chairs’. These surrogates usually appear as
younger and more attractive versions of their users, for whom they provide prophylactic safety
and a degree of social acceptance. An anti-surrogate faction, nicknamed ‘Dreads’ in an
overdetermined nod to their organic roots, have been sequestered on reservations where they
appear to live impoverished lives amidst junked cars and run-down mobile homes.
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Figure 3. Agent Peters (Radha Mitchell) views a cutaway demo of a surrogate
body in Surrogates.
The film begins with a murder, an attack with a secret weapon that kills an operator
through his surrogate – an inconceivable death in this society. During the investigation, Agent
Greer (Bruce Willis) confronts the menace to the surrogate lifestyle represented by the weapon,
as well as his deteriorating home life, as his wife Maggie (Rosamund Pike) has grown distant,
and refuses to appear even around the house without her surrogate. Bemoaning this loss of
intimacy and dealing with the loss of their son, Greer begins to wonder whether surrogate living
blunts reality too severely. As his investigation into the murder procedes, it turns out that the
creator of surrogate technology, whose sympathies have turned sharply against surrogates, is
planning to use the weapon to kill all surrogate users through a central network. In an attempt to
foil the investigation, Greer’s partner, Agent Peters (Radha Mitchell), is killed and her surrogate
co-opted, but Greer still manages to stop the genocide. However, now operating Peters’s
surrogate, Greer is presented with the opportunity to destroy only the surrogates. He does so, and
his action results in former surrogate users stumbling out of the apartments they haven’t left in
years, squinting in the sunlight, while Greer puts his arm around a contrite Maggie. Facing the
window, they look out on a new day.
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What this day will bring is not exactly clear, for there seems to be little investment by the
film in providing a real in which to return. However, the reality against which surrogacy is
opposed fits rather nicely within Baudrillard’s dystopic vision of the ‘desert of the real’) – the
age spots and crow’s feet on a balding Willis, the detritus and poverty of the Dread reservation,
and finally the banality and indetermination of the real world once surrogacy has ended. Greer
has destroyed the idols, but not the need, or at least the impulse to create them. The emptiness of
the film’s ending, littered with the photogenic corpses of decommissioned imagos, seems an
almost tacit acknowledgement that the surrogate within the operator remains. Avatar films like
Surrogates offer pop mythologies dealing with the crisis of being an avatar – an anxiety
conflatable with the crisis of becoming an image, even as images, in this film and in general,
serve as objects of desire. The iconoclastic move of killing one’s mirror image has rich
antecedents in the literary and psychoanalytical figure of the double or doppelgänger, which
wrestles with problems of dualism. Where the cyborg divides and integrates, the double
multiplies and separates, and we find these two antipodal but ultimately related points
intersecting in the avatar – the ‘incarnation of myself’10 – and in the related problem of being a
‘half’.

The Double That Hid in the Depths of You
The double in Romantic literature is a figure of projection and materialization, a
psychological state embodied, who then often haunts or helps a character from the outside. As a
second self, the double is a solipsism, an excess of self or the result of an inability to contain
some psychic element (such as overwhelming guilt) or dangerous impulse that forces a

10

This phrase, spoken by the character Ivan in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, is part of Ivan’s
defiant response when confronted with his double in the form of a sinister gentleman. However, while he detests the
double, he feels that he also knows him intimately, admitting “I only don’t know by what means I can destroy you.”
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manifestation of the hidden self – an ominous return of the repressed, which usually leads to a
(cathartic) confrontation and a fight to the death. Freud siezed on the notion of the double in his
essay “The Uncanny,” identifying it with the return of repressed material or regression to a
primitive state, and quoting at length his colleague Otto Rank, who developed the notion of the
double along psychoanalytical and anthropological lines. Fundamental to the presence of the
double, for Rank, is the relation of the self to the self, and he relies on the Freudian unconscious
to explain it, as well as resorting to aboriginal societies which were viewed as fossilized cultures
forming a sort of pre-consciousness to the advanced societies that followed. Belief in an
immortal soul and an impulse for self-preservation factor largely in his anthropological study, as
the atavistic view of the double is closely related to death. The uncanny double is a product of
the mind opposed to itself – which also prefigures the Lacanian subject always haunted by his
double in the mirror.
A key text for Rank’s understanding of the double is the 1913 film The Student of Prague
(Stellan Rye), in which Balduin (Paul Wegener), a poor student, strikes a deal with an evil
sorcerer: in exchange for wealth and success, the sorcerer will be allowed to remove one thing
from Balduin’s room. Balduin laughs at the terms, knowing the room contains nothing of value,
but after signing the contract stands aghast when the sorcerer draws his reflected image from the
large mirror in the room and leads it away (Fig. 4). Balduin’s doppelgänger returns periodically
to bedevil his attempts to woo the countess with whom he has become obsessed, eventually
driving him to the brink of suicide, when his double appears one last time. Balduin shoots it with
a pistol and it disappears, then he laughs with relief as he is finally able to again gaze at his
reflection in a hand mirror. In that same moment, however, he feels a pain in his chest and
realizes he has been shot – in striking the image, he has killed himself.
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Figure 4. Balduin, the sorcerer, and his reflection/double in The Student of
Prague.
Image and body are interestingly conflated in the double; in The Student of Prague, the
mirror image takes physical form and acts on its own, but never quite ceases to be a reflection or
image. Balduin becomes simultaneously overpresent to himself and alienated from himself, and
this oscillation produces ontological uncertainty as the character doubled to some extent becomes
a facsimile as well – one half of an unholy dyad. The horror of facing the double is at the same
time the horror of becoming the double, becoming aware of oneself as an ontological half or
‘image’ of oneself. This particular horror appears to be a masculine one, as the literary double is
almost exclusively a male phenomenon – a tendency perpetuated in avatar films.11 For the
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As noted in Rank, xxi, n.9. In contrast, films in which the double is female tend to take a different approach. The
Broken demonstrates that being the sinister double also has its emotional remifications and the potential for
sympathetic characterizations. In Krzysztof Kieslowski’s The Double Life of Véronique (1991), Véronique (Irène
Jacob) is filled with grief and longing when her double, whom she senses but never sees until she views a
photograph at the end of the film, dies during a choral performance. The connection between the two women is
intuitive, emotional, and loving, rather than the ocularcentric horror of the male double. Whereas with the male
double, as in the hypermasculine Fight Club (1999, David Fincher), the doppelgänger is a product of self-loathing
and repression, feminine doubling is more comfortable with its reflexivity and self-images. Notably, however, Maya
Deren’s 1943 film Meshes of the Afternoon uses the double to explore Freudian themes of the return of the repressed
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subject whose identity is forged in the illusion of unity, centeredness, and transcendence, the
doubled body is abhorrent.
In The Student of Prague, the image comes into play in more ways than one. Writing
about the film, Rank praises “the uniqueness of cinematography in visibly portraying
psychological events,” as well as cinema’s ability to render with clarity “the interesting and
meaningful problems of man’s relation to himself.”12 It is interesting that Rank focuses on the
cinematic capacity to produce the double, since of course it cannot except through visual trickery
in editing, camerawork and mise-en-scène (Balduin’s double appears to be a look-alike rather
than a double exposure) – after all, there may be two Balduins but there can only be one
Wegener. However, Rank seems more focused on the nature of the medium in something like a
surrealist vein, asserting that cinematography “reminds us of the dream-work, [and] can also
express certain psychological facts and relationships – which the writer is unable to describe with
verbal clarity – in such clear and conspicuous imagery that it facilitates our understanding of
them.”13 Rank’s privileging of an indexical medium to portray subjective states, while somewhat
ironic on its surface given his comparison to literature as a less adequate medium for
representing the mind, is perhaps best understood precisely within the indexicality of cinema –
that is, its capacity for disrupting its own photographic index. Cinema even in its naturalistic
mode shares something of the mischievous nature of the double with its play of presence and
absence, but in its capacity to image that of which no picture can be taken, as well as in the

and intrusions of the unconscious mind, challenging any masculine claim to the trauma of the double. I discuss
matters of gender realtive to the double of the avatar in Chapters 3 and 6, regarding masculinity and femininity,
respectively. Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, ed. and trans. Harry Tucker, Jr. (Durham: University
of North Carolina Press, 1971).
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visual presence understood to mimic the dream state, cinema seemed to Rank unrivaled.14 The
haunting moment in which Balduin’s reflection emerges from the mirror attains its particularly
eerie quality because of its occurrence on film, as to show the double is, to a certain extent, to see
the double. That is, we as viewers have also encountered a double which, while not so personal
for us as it is for Balduin, nevertheless ruptures the cinematic world which in so many ways
mirrors our own.
In contemporary films, such as the avatarial texts we are now prepared to engage, the
tricks of doubling and disrupting the index have become much more sophisticated; however, they
more often rely on the rather simple ‘trick’ of placing an actor in multiple roles. That is, rather
than two actors playing ‘Balduin’, we are more apt to find a single actor playing a character and
his or her avatar.15 What seems simple on the surface, however, becomes fertile ground for study
when we consider it in light of image production within digital culture and the relationship
between actors in images and characters with avatars – as well as the cultural and psychological
crisis of not only having an avatar, but being an avatar.

The Face in the Virtual Mirror
I concur that there is a split between the physical and virtual self. Furthermore, I believe
that it is a purpose – no, a duty – of virtual worlds to facilitate the reconciliation of these
selves.
Richard Bartle16
As co-creater the first MUD (multi-user dungeon) in which users adventured and
socialized in the shared online space of a text-only environment, Richard Bartle interestingly
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initially resisted the impulse to allow players to create character descriptions, arguing that
players could explore identity more freely if they weren’t “tied to some image.”17 Eventually,
however, Bartle came around to the possibilities of playing with textual images tied to the self,
and even produced a taxonomy of levels of engagement, from casual play to full-blown persona,
as a measure of users’ psychological and social integration with their self-representations. The
signification of these images, he argues, is a product of dissonance and consonance, as “[signs]
arise because of the difference between virtual world technology and the way reality works. . . .
immersion is accepting the signifier as the signified.”18 The reconciliation Bartle proposes seems
to be the solution to a split seemingly effected by the existence of the virtual environment itself –
one for which images initially seemed part of the problem, and later the means for integrating the
physical and virtual selves. The implicit question remains, however, of the role of virtual
environments relative to virtual selves, whether one of production, reconciliation, or dissonance
– or all three.
Films about avatars thematize the split and potential reconciliation between physical and
virtual selves, although not typically through presenting the virtual diegetically as a product of
digital technology. Rather, virtual selves tend to be represented through performance and in actor
bodies, or what might be thought of as ‘analog’ forms. Even the CG technologies used to
produce images of avatarial bodies often dissimulate their technological origins; digital effects in
Surrogates, for instance, are used more frequently to add subtle manipulations to actor bodies
(such as smoother skin) than to produce images of machine bodies.
Division and reconciliation are visually manifest in a particular trope within avatar films,
a contemplative moment in which a character comes face-to-face with the avatarial double. In
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Surrogates, which depicts a world in which people live through robotic avatar bodies, Greer’s
surrogate body (Bruce Willis plays both Greer and his surrogate) enters the bedroom where
Greer’s biological body lies inert, and as he sets down the glass of water he brought for it (or it
brought for him?), looks at this body with what seems to be a mix of pathos and disdain, an
existential ambivalence about having ‘beaten the meat’, as Sobchack puts it. Moving to the
charger, the surrogate docks and Greer disconnects from the interface, completing the face-toface look on his way out of the room with a glance at his surrogate. Because only one body at a
time can actively ‘look’, this exchange is completed through two looks, separated by a transfer of
active use from one body to the other.
In another example, the look between user and avatar is facilitated by a mirror. In Sleep
Dealer, Memo (Luis Fernando Peña) is a Mexican migrant laborer who works on a construction
site in San Diego, operating his robot avatar through a VR-type interface in Tijuana. Seeing what
the robot ‘sees’, Memo catches a glimpse of his avatarial self in the reflection produced in a
metal sheet. Memo looks in one place but sees in another, through contact lenses that place the
image display directly on the eye; he is ‘touched’ by images even as his sense of his own body is
decoupled. Attached to tubes and cables and wearing an oxygen mask, Memo is unable to emote,
and thus while his face is relatively blank, his emotions are projected onto the unfeeling visage
of the robot, which strangely seems to contemplate its own avatar ontology in this moment. In
Memo’s drained expression it appears that the image dominates him, and it seems that both
Greer’s and Memo’s face-to-face looks wrestle with seeing the self as a hollowed-out image, the
depersonalizing double that leaves each feeling only half human. One might find a desire for
wholeness or reconciliation in these looks, but to what wholeness can they aspire? How can one,
having been divided and encountering the image of oneself face-to-face, ever be whole again?
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While these looks imply concern about being avatarial, a comparable look in Avatar
moves more toward an implicit wholeness. When Jake Sully (Sam Worthington) initially sees his
avatar body, created originally for his deceased identical twin, the strangeness of its blue flesh
and large size are belied by its lithe athleticism, alien beauty, and humanoid appearance; indeed,
as the avatar contains his DNA and was designed with features of Worthington’s face, Jake
encounters himself in a strange mirror, but one filled with potential for the crippled protagonist
rather than the emasculation of the cosmeticized body (Surrogates) or mechanized laborer (Sleep
Dealer).19 The paraplegic Jake, already half a man, is primed to see himself in a different light,
and the foreignness of the avatar body is quickly overcome by what it offers him. Each of the
avatar bodies, these selves as images, are also framed as pictures of a sort: Greer’s surrogate in
the charger, Memo’s robot in the mirror, and Jake’s avatar in contained within the steel girders of
its tank. While the looks of Greer and Memo are shot in POV, however, Jake’s moment with his
avatarial image includes a moving shot with the camera positioned behind him, adopting the
perspective of the videogame (positioning him as avatar) that serves as an apt visual metaphor
for the particular form of the ‘reconciliation’ this body will afford him.
“The double,” writes Baudrillard of clones, while evoking the psychological double of
Romantic literature, “is precisely not a prosthesis: which, just like the soul, the shadow, the
mirror image, haunts the subject like his other. . . . when the double materializes, when it
becomes visible, it signifies imminent death.”20 The conundrum for the avatar user in these films
is determining when the avatar body moves from the status of useful prosthesis to ontologically
problematic self-other. Avatars, it seems, occupy a space somewhere in between, and in digital
19
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use different types of avatar bodies function differently: early avatars with their limited
expressivity are arguably closer to tools, while contemporary avatars seem to approach the
double. Greer, Memo, and Jake each deal with the problem of becoming too close to or too much
like their avatars (Jake’s conflict is externalized through his allegiance to Colonel Quaritch
[Steven Lang], who encourages Jake to use the body but maintain an emotional distance);
however, inherent in and even integral to the films is the sense that not only will these characters
find difficulty separating themselves from their avatar bodies, but that the characters are
ultimately, inseparably avatarial. Memo implicitly comes to accept his avatarial state as an
economic necessity, as Sleep Dealer ends with Memo staying in Tijuana and his job as an avatar
operator rather than returning to his family’s milpa; Surrogates ends with the destruction of the
avatar bodies, but the film fails to conceive of a world without them, removing the advantages
the surrogates afforded their operators (including pleasure, security, attractiveness, and
acceptance), and replacing them with a bright new day of mundanity and vulnerability; and
Avatar concludes with an embrace of Jake’s new body imbued with a prelapsarian wholeness
diegetically and a fundamental doubling imagistically – achieving wholeness, it seems, only
through the embrace of the double and fully ‘bonding’ with the avatar body. The problem faced
by the characters in each of these films thus seems less a matter of what to do with the avatar
body than how to face their own avatarial nature, which the avatar bodies bring into sharper
relief.
The conceptual move from the avatar body which gives rise to avatarial behavior, to an
avatarial quality within the user that prefigures the avatar, reflects the move from machines to
images as the theoretical point of intersection between the body and technology in contemporary
culture. Tom Boellstorff notes that “cyborg selfhood is predicated on a prosthetic continuity
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between human and machine. . . . In contrast, virtual embodiment is predicated on a
discontinuity, the gap between virtual and actual.”21 Prosthetic continuity in film is often
visualized as the integration of steel and flesh or the intelligent robot masquerading as human.
But how is the discontinuous gap visualized here? The avatars in Surrogates and Sleep Dealer
are mechanistic bodies, though not exactly robots; in an inverse of AI and the sentient robot,
these are ‘mindless’ mechanical bodies that require a human operator to function while
appearing autonomous (and often human). Rather than acting as vessels for replicated or
downloaded human consciousness, these bodies simply channel it, becoming the medium for
human engagement with the world on one respect or another. The absence of AI in these films
removes the threat of machine agency, but at the same time positions the prosthesis as selfdetermined by making it discontinuous with the human body, appearing to act as a body of its
own. In this way, these machine bodies are positioned as images, as reflections of their users: in
Surrogates, the appearance of the robots is tied to personal identity, and in Sleep Dealer the
robot operates as a clear metaphor for Memo’s political and ontological status as a part of the
machine, while at the same time precisely not a machine – in fact, having replaced machine AI in
a postindustrial world still reliant on infrastructural machinery and steel. The reflexive properties
of the avatar body in Avatar, exemplified diegetically in Jake’s genetic tie to the Na’vi body he
will ‘drive’, however, repositions the otherness of the avatar body within the construct of the
mirror, so that while the character can disconnect technologically, an ontological divestment is
impossible; Jake, once but no longer a twin, finds in this new body a way to become his own
twin, to become the image of himself.
These avatars at the same time function as disarticulated prostheses, connected to the
body from a distance, or rather in an ‘ensemble’ that incorporates distance as conditional for its
21
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use. Thus on the one hand avatar use is clearly subject to the amputation theorized by McLuhan
as a condition or result of the prosthetic extension; such amputation of experience is the central
theme of Surrogates, where Greer is vexed in his relationship with the ‘surrogate’ Maggie has
become. On the other hand, the disarticulated prosthesis takes on a certain life of its own in
projecting wholeness and existing as a type of body, ‘experiencing’ the world on behalf of its
user in online use (a phenomenological condition that is the subject of fantasy and anxiety in the
films). McLuhan’s exchange of extension for amputation is predicated upon the presumption of a
certain bodily integrity or original wholeness of the human that is diminished and supplemented.
The avatar on its surface implies fragmentation, but more essentially, perhaps, suggests
connection, as avatars only ‘work’ when connected, when engaged within a doubling relation.
Anxieties about the avatar in Surrogates and Sleep Dealer are ultimately not fears of hybridity
and displacement by technology, but enunciate rather the doubled condition of human
subjectivity and embodiment – an existence eventually embraced in Avatar on multiple diegetic,
thematic, and technological levels, in becoming, to invoke Baudrillard again, “the double that hid
in the depths of you.”22 The avatar body as a fragmentation that is perceived as a whole becomes
an analog to the human body also experientially fragmented that can only become whole by
merging with another whole – the double ‘outside of you’ that serves as a ludic materialization of
the double within.
The face-to-face encounters in these films never fall squarely within the horror of the
double in nineteenth century literature. Contrary to the literary double that spells death through
over-presence, dis-integrating the individual by presenting the subject back to himself, the
avatarial look accepts, to one degree or another, a counter-self that exists in images. The weary
familiarity present in Greer’s look, and the pathos evoked by the look Memo’s robot seemingly
22
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directs at itself, convey the characters’ resignation to a general condition rather than individual
fear or abjection – not certain death, but a reality of the double culturally ingrained, even if the
characters find it personally undesirable (within the world of Surrogates, Greer’s dissatisfaction,
along with the small Dread minority, is an exception in an avatarial society that is otherwise
quite satisfied with itself). But in Avatar, the face-to-face look turns to curiosity, fascination, and
possibility – the thrill of a body not just represented in images, but seemingly made of images.
The response to the avatarial double moves from futile rejection in Surrogates to begrudging
acceptance in Sleep Dealer, to the desirability of the spectacular digital body in Avatar.
The face-to-face look visualizes the way in which avatars have come into their own – not
in the way that AI did in the sentient machine, but rather in the way that they are neither sentient
nor simply tools or prostheses. Where the integration of the cyborg is too near, the avatar
produces distance within the human connection with technology, and thus the avatar not only
becomes the potential object for a look achieved at a distance, but also gives a face to the
technological extension, allowing the avatar to look back. In the mirror Memo sees not only
himself re-embodied, but also his robotic avatar looking back at him, with each body in service
of the other. The eyes of Jake’s avatar are closed while in the tank, containing its ‘look’, as the
avatar does not impose on him the anxiety of the double but moves the avatar back toward a
prosthesis he can become rather than a double that he already is.23
Surrogates offers another interesting facet of the avatar returning the look in what might
be called a ‘triangulated POV’, as Greer’s surrogate looks at the biological body while a nearby
monitor displays the first-person view of what the surrogate ‘sees’.24 The first person view
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belongs on the one hand to Greer, whose eyes are obscured by goggle displays, but on the other
hand to the surrogate, whose iris cameras provide the view which Greer sees, and whose body
makes possible this particular view of Greer from the outside. The POV collapses in on itself –
contained in a single shot and to a single character, relayed by two bodies and an extra screen –
in a self-gazing paradox.
This form of self-looking facilitated by the second body in the film can be related to the
online avatar which, while typically not returning the look face-to-face, is situated between its
user and interactions with other users, so that avatarial interaction with others is always partly a
solipsistic interaction within the user-avatar dyad: what they see when they look at ‘me’ is also
within my view, the same body I am seeing, and thus also a kind of mirror. The avatar in Second
Life does turn to face the user in an adjustment mode, when the user manipulates appearance in a
configuration that includes a certain amount of intimacy, as the avatar loses social functions in
this mode.25 Interestingly, however, the avatar is still on view to other users, who learn to
recognize this mode as a form of personal space and, as a matter of etiquette, keep their distance
until the modifications are complete and the avatar returns to being socially avatarial, rather than
personally avatarial. Also, in Second Life snapshots and portraiture, the face of the avatar is
generally turned toward the user, whose view is at this point disassociated with what the avatar
‘sees’ and instead occupies the place of other users in seeing the self-representation face-to-face.
The virtual camera captures the avatar as both a self-existing double with an ontology of its own,
and a perfect half, so to speak, cleft from the user to which its blank gaze now turns.
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Altered Egos
As simultaneously halves and doubles, avatars suggest a particular configuration for a
human existence situated between virtuality and materiality, encompassing both while unable to
fully be either – we are double in that our embodiment encompasses multiple experiential
aspects, and halves in that we can never simply exist as one of these aspects, material, discursive,
or imaginary. This dichotomy is explored in the work of Robbie Cooper, whose images of
avatars and users in his book Alter Ego in a certain way reproduce the avatarial relation, and thus
the book itself might be thought of as an avatarial work, as well as a book about avatars. A
diptych-like layout positions users and avatars on facing pages, in reflective compositions with
both user and avatar occupying similar size and position in the frame, and often sharing poses
and clothing styles. The juxtaposition of these images can be quite striking: a 25-year-old
stewardess-in-training from Seoul appears demure with her hand at the base of her neck, in
marked contrast with the confidence of her sleek male elf avatar and his multi-bladed swords; a
mother of three poses with her children while her sexy, raven-haired avatar shows off her assets
above text describing her appearances in virtual pin-up magazines; and a severely disabled man
is photographed with the oxygen mask that partly obscures his face, while his Boba Fett-like
avatar in the Star Wars Galaxies platform is, interestingly, also fully masked (Fig. 5). After
viewing these side-by-side images and reading about the personal relationships the individuals
have with their avatars (written by the users themselves), the gap between the two sides begins to
elide into two manifestations of something singular rather than divided, or even a single image or
entity produced in the connection of the two.
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Figure 5. A disabled user and his avatar, pictured in Alter Ego
Classical diptychs traditionally feature two related images, such as the Virgin Mary and
the angel Gabriel, on opposite panels, forming a single picture or scene in two frames. The
functional hinge of what was also called a ‘traveling icon’ allowed the pair of images to close in
on themselves to form a single body. Something similar can be seen in Cooper’s arrangement of
the pages, poses, and text that elide these side-by-side images in something more than a
meaningful connection (from user to avatar) or spatial configuration (such as in the shared space
between Gabriel and Mary at the annunciation) to a sort of haptic conflation; as the reader turns
pages, the two pictures are face-to-face within their paginated enclosure in a narcissistic kiss.
We take for granted, perhaps, that avatars always have users, and featuring them together
in the pages of a book or on the introductory page of the Second Life website seems a fairly
natural exercise. Typically, however, only one body at a time appears to others in avatar use, and
such a visual arrangement is integral to the notion of what an avatar is. Showing the two together
violates the avatarial arrangement in online use, and thus the book works doubly as both a
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thoughtful joining of what is typically asunder into coexisting images, and an iconoclastic exposé
that upsets the mystery and vitality of the avatar by revealing the second body.
Avatars and users are given equal ontological weight in the book, which raises the
question of which is designated the ‘alter ego’, the other I. Cooper’s pairs evoke both a Janus
that looks out at the viewer from two faces, and a Narcissus fascinated with the self-look. In the
book’s subtitle, Avatars and their Creators, Cooper plays with a semantic distinction between
the avatar and the user, notably granting ‘avatars’ the primary position and designating users as
‘creators’. The book can be read as a collection of avatars and their origin stories, so to speak, as
each avatar portrait includes thoughts by the ‘creator’ about why that particular avatarial form
was chosen. Users are associated with an act of creation rather than their continued or active use,
implying an act by which one body produces another. But who creates whom? The virtual
element in virtual technologies is not their digital format, their mimetic creations of bodies and
objects, or their interactive components, but rather the way they facilitate an understanding of
and certain experiential connections to the virtuality inherent in being human. Or, recalling
Boellstorff’s statement, “virtual worlds show us how, under our very noses, our ‘real’ lives have
been ‘virtual’ all along.” Virtual technologies have brought out the avatar in us and extended a
sense of our own virtuality, in concert with the theoretical formulations and cultural and
informational contexts that have made us aware of our status as virtual beings. Regarding avatars
and their creators, then, we must acknowledge the role of the informational and visual
technologies that bring out or reflect the avatarial in us, under the guise of unilateral control.
In later work, Cooper takes the imaging of the ‘avatar’ further by dividing the avatarial
halves, showing pictures of avatar users (this time children playing videogames) while removing
the avatar bodies from the picture. In the photo/video series “Immersion,” Cooper positions the
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camera at the level of the screen, so we see the children from the point of view of the avatar, so
to speak (Fig. 6).26 These are unusual images of telepresence, with the lens trained exclusively on
the physical world, alluding to the virtual world only through the responses it generates. The
children are focused and clearly engaged with something we can’t see, but at first glance this
could be any engrossing activity, and thus the pictures, at least initially, lack the visual thrust and
explicit connections of his Alter Ego series. But what is most interesting about the pictures is not
what they show, but what they don’t.
Knowing through Cooper’s introduction that the subjects are captured while immersed in
virtual environments, their eyes, half locked in concentration, half lost in a trance are distant and
difficult to read, even as they seem to be staring directly into the camera. The children are very
present in the images which, with blank backgrounds, feature little else, but at the same time they
are somehow missing, as if the camera captured their bodies but missed something of their
embodiment.27 In the SyFy series Caprica (2009-10), a character learning to move the avatar in
which he is embodied is instructed to ‘tell himself’ to walk, and bodily movement becomes a
cognitive action that is at the same time very much a proprioceptive and instinctive one; the
character initiates the movement through language, but once initiated walking comes naturally
and easily, clearly drawn from the lived body rather than progressing as a stultifyingly cognitive
exercise in putting one foot in front of the other. It is a similar dichotomy of active and passive
that seems evident in the photographs, as the kids’ senses are highly activated – they are running,
jumping, and battling with dexterous maneuvers that make use of the embodied experiences and
skills they have acquired in the physical world, even if the actual movements they make to
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accomplish this are not of the same type. The small movements and twitches that accompany the
button-pushing (particularly evident in new players unaccustomed to channeling their embodied
impulses) are indicative of the signals still reaching the muscles.

Figure 6. A girl locked in concentration while playing a videogame in Robbie
Cooper’s “Immersion” project.
The viewer is positioned by the camera in the place of the off-screen double, in the
position of the imagistic virtual environment and avatar bodies that captivate and invigorate the
player, while the players occupy the space in front of the screen. At the same time, however, the
engaged players are partly ‘here’, on the side of the viewer, while we are partly ‘there’, trying to
see through their eyes and imagine the virtual experiences they are having, and thus the images
have a highly liminal quality that invokes the virtual. While Cooper creates an avatarial work in
Alter Ego, “Immersion” suggests that the avatarial connection ultimately cannot be fully
captured in a single or even multiple images, only alluded to in various ways – or through
various bodies.
The “Immersion” project might be thought of as producing images of half-avatars; having
established the ‘avatar’ in Alter Ego as the physical and digital doubles juxtaposed, in
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“Immersion” he bifurcates this avatar by placing half of it off-screen. Thinking about the two
works together, we can see how Cooper actually moves closer to an image of the virtuality of the
human by rendering the digital counterpart implicit and drawing attention to the interstitial space
between. With “Immersion” in mind, it is an insightful exercise to manually cover up one or the
other of the diptych frames in Alter Ego to see pictures of avatars that represent not only a
person, but that person’s connection with various facets of their own virtuality, or, on the other
side, images of people who ‘picture’ themselves differently and engage their own virtual
embodiment in the avatarial double.
The missing double in the “Immersion” images recalls, to a certain extent, the absent
reflection in the mirror in The Student of Prague, a mirror that both reflects and doesn’t – “a
strange mirror, then, very like that of childhood, and very different. . . . because, like the child
again, we are prey to the imaginary, the double, and are so paradoxically through a real
perception.”28 Christian Metz’s well-known theorization of cinema as mirror produces a kind of a
half, as film “differs from the primordial mirror in one essential point: although . . . everything
may come to be projected, there is one thing and one thing only that is never reflected in it: the
spectator's own body. In a certain emplacement, the mirror suddenly becomes clear glass.”29
With the reflection missing, Metz’s spectator identifies instead with himself as a ‘pure act of
perception’ – much more a half than a double. From this vantage he becomes ‘all-perceiving’,
‘all-powerful’ – “it is I who make the film.”30
Of course, it is the player who also ‘makes the game’, albeit in a much more literal sense.
The cinematic apparatus offers valuable insight into the spatialization of perception and the
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materiality of media engagement, as I discuss later in this chapter, but thinking through Metz’s
classic application of Lacan to cinema, relative to the mirrors of the double and the gamer,
produces a discord that illuminates the half. The compensatory reaction to halfness within the
cinematic apparatus produces for Metz a sort of closed-circuit: evoking the psychology of the
mirror, cinema produces a specular absence, which the spectator then fills by identifying with
himself as perceiver – the one who looks rather than the image that appears. But the familiar
scenes of audiences watching films (especially horror films) depict the bodily reactions, the
absorption that belie the self-completing, all-powerful circuit of the apparatus. (It is hard to
‘picture’ Metz’s transcendent spectator, while the image of the gamer seems more compatible.)
The question of halves and doubles is common to both film and videogames. For Lacan,
the half is an enduring subjective state, which Metz resolves by making the half a whole in the
context of film viewing. The avatarial double presents two possibilities, both of which are
explored in this study. First, doubling produces halves, and a split between the medial and
material worlds which must be resolved by a return to the real and some claim on wholeness. We
have encountered this in Surrogates, with the incapacitation of the surrogate bodies and the
resumption of familial relations as an (unconvincing) claim on wholeness. Second, a
reconception of wholeness that only occurs through connection, spatialization, doubling, and a
kind of imaginal embodiment, which I develop in this study.31 The latter approach presumes a
postmodern fragmentation of self that must be conceptually reconciled and managed – rather
than becoming a half when confronted with the avatarial double, the avatar instead presumes that
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we are already fragmented halves seeking ways to connect the various ‘pieces’ of which we are
comprised.
Understanding the half then is important for conceptualizing the implications of the
avatar. While the two threads delineated above bifurcate in very different directions, they share
common ground in the half. In later chapters we will see the frequent avatar theme, growing out
of the cyborg mythology, in the journey toward wholeness and the return to the real, representing
the first approach, as well as a model for connective gestalt in accord with the second. For now I
turn my attention to three avatarial texts that explore the half by placing one or the other of the
fissured halves/doubles of characters ‘off-screen’ – that is, not simply out of the picture, but
connected to screens that are alluded to but not shown (The Guild), or in characters who only
appear on screens whose frames are off-screen, resulting in a conflation of diegetic and nondiegetic screens with a viewer that is heard but not seen (Thomas in Love) or only abstractly
implied (Molotov Alva).

Half a Double, Twice Removed
Avatar films explore the double in characters torn between two worlds, two lives, or two
bodies. Black Heaven (Gilles Marchand, 2010), for instance, is partly set in a virtual world that
is presented as a dark and dangerous lure, drawing the protagonist away from a healthy realworld relationship in pursuit of a virtual femme fatale (whose dark persona notably flourishes in
the virtual realm, while outside of it she is somber and broken). In the anime Summer Wars
(Mamoru Hosada, 2009) the real world has grown too dependent on and intertwined with the
virtual world, so when a villainous program hijacks the protagonist’s avatar and threatens global
infrastructure through its networks and virtual commons, the protagonist must reclaim his
avatarial double, and in doing so proves himself and redeems his character. But narratives of the
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double in avatar films are also narratives of the half, and certain films and web media adeptly
explore the avatarial connection from the standpoint of one half of the embodied dyad.
Molotov Alva and his Search for the Creator: A Second Life Odyssey purports to be the
online video diary of a Second Life user who has abandoned his mortal existence. The web
series, purchased by HBO Films, features the character Molotov Alva who, having left the real
world (and implicitly his user body) behind, starts a new virtual life within the world of Second
Life. The series begins with a notice of a missing user (identified by the same name) before
shifting to the dispatches of the digital Molotov. Having left what he curiously calls his ‘straightworld life’ behind, Molotov recounts how he has gradually lost his connections with the real
world: he builds a virtual house, but rejects it when he realizes it ties him too closely to real
world living; photographs imported from the real world are kept in a garden, but over time the
memories have faded away, so that the pictures become curiosities rather than referential or
nostalgic objects (Fig. 7); and while he understands that sensorial experiences, such as the sand
and water on a beach, are only accessible through his memories of experiencing such things
materially, he eventually settles into a sort of simulacral existentialism, content with his new
digital reality as the center of experience.

Figure 7. Molotov Alva in his garden of forgotten photos.

80

Somewhat paradoxically, at one point he declares his decision that in this new world, “at
least who I was [in the real world] would remain constant.” Molotov’s creation story, which
begins when he “falls from the heavens,” implies a pre-existence that is only acknowledged
within his growing agnosticism. His embodied memories from another life initially ground his
experience and material instincts, and he forms his avatar body into “a perfectly rendered digital
facsimile of my carbon-based self,” while simultaneously disavowing the avatarial connection,
i.e. that he has or was a user. The narrative becomes one of a clean bodily transition between the
material and virtual worlds, intentionally undertaken, the series later clarifies, as Molotov
“uploaded his entire life” into an online world. The user in this formulation is not missing, but
transformed – or so it seems. After finding himself in the virtual world, Molotov soon sets out to
find the ‘Creator’, determined to discover the ‘one’ who conceived of the virtual world and
brought it into existence. This missing element vexes him and provides the main dramatic thrust
of the series, and while he searches in vain amidst the varied communities and personalities to be
found in Second Life, his reenactment of religion’s central drama seems as if it would logically
point back to the material world of the user – the unseen creative force existing in the
metaphysical position relative to the virtual, and thus what Molotov seeks seems to be a metavirtual return to the physical. If the search for God is ultimately a search for self, then Molotov’s
search for his creator would essentially be an avatarial turn inward, to find the source of the
virtual elements dictating or influencing one’s existence.32
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the enormous set he lives in eventually provoke the creator (played by Ed Harris) to confront him with a
philosophical argument about the nature of truth and reality. Truman exits for the real world anyway, and Molotov
eventually does the same. Molotov’s quest differs from Truman’s in that the absence of a creator is set from the
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Users do not exist in this imaginary world. Even when Molotov finally gets his answer in
Episode 7 the disavowal of the user persists. According to the oracle he finds (a chimp lured with
a banana), there is not one creator, but many, and Molotov understands this to mean the virtual
denizens, rather than any external force. His satisfaction with this answer soon wanes, though,
and in an inventive reversal, Molotov finds his only satisfaction in a VR-type interface with 3D
photographic scenes of the real world, called “Back to Reality,” which he views from a
suspended virtual platform in the center of a spherical image space. He becomes addicted to this
virtual counterpart to the virtual (which doesn’t necessarily follow the logic of a double negative,
which would result in a return to the actual, for these still appear as images to him), hungry for
any shard of “organic reality” he can find after finally giving up on the virtual world. Narcotized
by these images of the real, he is only able to pull himself out when his inworld girlfriend comes
to tell him that she has found a way out, and is leaving. Molotov realizes that “while I’d gone off
searching for reality, Abigail [his girlfriend] remained the only real thing here,” and follows her
through the tunnel marked ‘Last Exit’. The series concludes with his long search for fulfillment
in the virtual world ending only by leaving it for the “new, uncertain reality” through the tunnel,
and thus his unresolved journey begins anew, back in the material world he once left, which
nevertheless remains ambiguous.
Molotov’s search for the creator and examination of his own life return him to a real
without users, in which one exists in one state or the other – in the real world longing to be
virtual, or in the virtual world searching for the real. The other Second Life denizens are cast as
permanent residents, not interlopers like Molotov, and also sans users, and so while there are
organic and digital worlds, the connection between them is on the level of Platonic forms,
beginning in his denial of the user. The only way to confront the creator is to confront the artifice of the film, but
actual creator Douglas Geyeton keeps the focus on the artifice of Second Life.
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necessitating transubstantiation for movement across the non-interface. Molotov Alva thus
presents a story of halves, where neither physical nor virtual existence feels complete to the
character, leaving him always searching for the other – an imaginary journey through the imago
that left him opining for the ‘real’ world he left behind. What Molotov is really missing,
however, is exactly the obvious missing element: the avatarial connection, the double that
resolves the half. As always one or the other, he has no way to reconcile virtuality and
materiality. Also, as machinima, the method of production is tied diegetically and thematically to
the series in a way that adds further dimensionality to the text. Produced using the Second Life
engine, movement and gestures are enacted in real time in performances that are virtually
‘filmed’ rather than the frame-by-frame incremental production of traditional animation practice,
and thus they rely on game mechanics rather than on the movement of the medium itself to
produce the movement of character bodies. Molotov Alva is an avatar that diegetically disavows
his connection with a user, and in production an avatar body disassociated from its user in that
the avatar ‘plays’ a character which exists in the virtual world.
Web series The Guild, created by Felicia Day, takes the opposite approach. The series
follows a group of MMO players who band together as a guild, and whose association with each
other is, at least initially, exclusively online, through avatars. The avatars, however, and the
game world in which they exist, remain unseen. Shots of the guild members frequently feature
them at their computers, typically wired in for voice chat, but their interactions play out through
cuts to their various apartments rather than transpiring in virtual space (Fig. 7). The visual device
of not showing avatars in a narrative about avatarial connections produces, as with Cooper’s
“Immersion” series, a sense of the half-avatar in that we are kept from the world that engrosses
and even consumes the lives of the characters. The series opens with Codex (Day) discussing her
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addiction to the generically termed “The Game” with her therapist, who tells Codex that she
can’t grow if she’s “still immersed in an imaginary social environment.” The implication of
Codex’s ‘problem’ of spending too much time in her virtual life and not enough in her real one is
that she, and by extension any serious gamer or avatar user, has become incomplete or
underequipped for the real world as a result of heavy avatar use – a social half in addition to a
virtual one.

Figure 8. Felicia Day as Codex at her computer in The Guild.
As we meet the other members of the motley guild, Day plays their geeked-out
involvement and social awkwardness for laughs. However, as these ‘incomplete’ characters
become sympathetic and relatable, their status as halves takes on a rather different quality: rather
than humans adjusting to life in a technological world, these are characters already firmly tied to
a technologically-facilitated mode of living, attempting to find their way in the analog world. In
their geekiness they become wise fools (or wise geeks), ones who see the world from the vantage
of (a supposed) incompleteness and in doing so see the truth. They are thus equipped because
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they have embraced their own virtual existences within an online virtual environment – they
know they are halves. Their status as such is further underscored as they leave their doubles
behind in the first face-to-face meeting of the guild to discuss the issue Codex is dealing with
when Zaboo (Sandeep Parikh), another member of the guild, shows up on her doorstep after
misreading her winking emoticons as flirting, and begins sleeping on her couch. The breakdown
of the spatial distance between Codex and Zaboo and then the guild as a whole produces a crisis
of the avatarial distance itself, as their avatarial relationships have been predicated on a certain
distance; over time, however, they find new ways to interface in person, and at the end of the
first season the guild reforms in the real world to wage battle in a local diner.
Interestingly, their opponent, whom they meet in the last episode, is Zaboo’s Indian
mother (thus implicitly pitting the Hindu tradition of the avatar against the digital). As the
conflict heats up, Zaboo’s mother is depicted with CG flames in her eyes and streaming blue
electricity flowing from her fingers, ‘melting’ Zaboo’s mind in her attempts to get him to return
to her after he has absconded to Codex’s apartment. She feels incomplete without him, but
Zaboo cannot become his own man (Codex later calls him a “starter character” in real life, who
needs to “level up”) within the force field of a possessive mother. The guild bands together in
this Oedipal conflict to help him overcome the physical bond of mother and child, enabling the
perpetuation of the virtual bond of user and avatar. If Zaboo is a starter character in real life, it is
because he has not been freed from the familial constraints that tie him to the real world
(humorously summarized in his revelation that he had been breast-fed until he was eleven); thus
the character cannot seem to escape the double/half ontology, but only find ways to make and
manage connections.
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While The Guild depicts users but not their avatars, and Molotov Alva narrativizes an
avatar without a user, Thomas in Love (Pierre-Paul Renders, 2000, Thomas est amoureux) is an
avatarial story which is centered on absence. The film takes place at the level of the screen, the
point of connection between characters that mediates all of their interaction, and also the point at
which the film ‘materializes’. Thomas Thomas (Benoît Verhaert), with a doubled name that
belies (or reveals?) his status as a half, is an agoraphobe who has not been out of his apartment in
eight years, nor has anyone been in. He does all of his communication through the computer,
although we never see the computer itself outside of what appears on the screen. The film opens
with a ‘shot’ of pixelated digital wallpaper (the type common on PC backgrounds in the nineties)
which gives way to a sexual simulation in which Thomas engages in virtual sex with a buxom
‘sextoon’ via a cybersex suit. During the lovemaking we see a phantom hand (the representation
of his hand via the cybersex suit) appear on the screen, fondling one of the digital breasts, and
this is the first and last we see of Thomas until the final shot of the film. The interim is filled
with Thomas’s (usually unsolicited) social interactions via the ‘visiophone’ with a grumpy
customer service agent, his mother (the maternal bond again), his therapist, matches in an online
dating service, and a prostitute with whom he makes a personal connection, and who in the end
convinces him to finally leave his apartment (Fig. 9). These are done in a web-cam aesthetic,
with characters talking to the cameras in their apartments and homes; the other characters see
Thomas but can’t come near him, while we occupy a position approximating his point of view
but never see him, only hearing his voice. As Thomas’s body is missing from the world outside
his apartment, so it is missing from the film as well, as if his fear of enclosed public spaces
extends also to the frame of the screen; footage of him on the beach as a child that his mother
shares with him makes him panic, ostensibly in seeing himself outside, but much more, it seems,
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to be present to himself in the image. When he does briefly appear in the last shot, finally leaving
his apartment through an outside door, he is washed away in the overexposed image, exiting the
Platonic cave into the bright daylight of video noise and exposure threshold. Notably, this is also
the first time in the film when Thomas is not viewing the screen with us, and there is at this
moment a strange and palpable sense of disembodiment – of the absent body finally departed
into the image, or perhaps the image ‘body’ finally made fully manifest.

Figure 9. A woman from the dating service in Thomas in Love.
The defining image of the film, or rather non-image, is the graphical wallpaper, a generic
pattern of pixels tiled across the screen forming something of a digital texture. Our induction into
the world of the film thus stops us short at the level of the screen, and the film returns to this
screen regularly between the visiophone calls. The wallpaper comes to stand in for or even
‘picture’ the screen, and the subtle shifts and twitches in the pattern create an oddly affecting
picture of a restive or agitated screen. The wallpaper of the GUI is both in front and behind, too
near and too far, the static curtain for the roiling information of the network just ‘behind’ it and
at the same time the eternally receding backdrop for any number of windows; the spatial depth
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that characterizes what Bolter and Grusin refer to as the immediacy of remediated perspectival
images (such as photographs or videos) was, in the era of digital wallpaper, framed by the flat
hypermediacy of the pixelated plane that awaits a window to see ‘through’ and is at the same
time the impermeable surface that remains always at the level of the screen.
With its enhanced liminality as the threshold for both character and viewers, the screen in
Thomas in Love supplants the missing body – Thomas is replaced by the screen, not incorporated
into the machine or consumed by the device. The virtuality of computer space coincides, on a
representative level, with the virtuality of Thomas himself. That is, what remains of him in the
sound of his voice and the address of other characters produce his trace, or the residue of his
missing body which is conflated with the pixelated screen in its most basic form, with visible
pixels and the basic shapes through which the pixels are made to represent ‘pixelation’.
Thomas’s trace is not found in the image of the body, which is implied early in the film in the
translucent, ghostly image of his arm touching the sextoon; rather, the representative presence of
the body in virtual space becomes something to depart from. Wallpaper and screen form the
constitutive body of the image displayed on a computer, while the missing body is seamlessly
conflated with the screen without being consumed. Thomas finally enters the image, and the real
world at the same time.
While I have discussed the ‘screen’ in Thomas in Love, the material screen is implicit,
attached to no visible device. Indeed, the argument can be made that we don’t see a screen per
se, as in a photographic image of the hardware that displays the video and computer content
which make up the film, but rather we seem to be seeing the video feed from the network and
CPU that is then displayed on the screen of the film’s viewing – at the cineplex, or, in the case of
this viewer, on a television set at home. The ‘materiality’ of this film comprised entirely of
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simulated environments and video streams from webcams is much more closely aligned with the
materiality of its exhibition than its diegetic objects. With the two screens conflated, my
television became a shared liminal point of access.
Thomas’s virtual sex, in which intercourse and interface are conflated in touching and
being touched by the digital virtual world, and later the teledildonic encounter he has with a
woman he meets on the dating site, ultimately prove unsatisfying for him. In a rather disturbing
moment, when he and the sextoon approach orgasm, the signal begins to break down, infusing
both analog video static and digital noise as a kind of sensuousness of the medium in reaction to
the sexual intensity. In the final moments the simulation enters the ‘bestial phase’, as the sextoon
turned wild-eyed beast thrusts her gaping mouth toward the screen – a Freudian representation of
consumption by media as vagina dentata. Thomas must overcome the ‘iconophobia’, it seems, in
which he fears the contamination of the image when applied to his own body rather than the
bodies of others. He is comfortable, if not entirely satisfied, with copulation with and through
images (the threat of consumption is ultimately allayed as another fantasy scenario) from which
he can withdraw. But his final exit from his apartment, and entry into the world of images (where
we finally see him) makes of the half a double, which points toward salvation in the blinding
light outside the cave.
Through these examples of halves I have hoped to lay groundwork for better
understanding the doubling of the avatar in terms of images and screens. In Surrogates, having a
double is taken for granted in a society that has not only acclimated to managing two bodies but
has become dependent on surrogate living – a marked contrast with The Terminator and
RoboCop in which the threat is contained in a single monstrous body. Greer’s concern however
is that he has become a half, that humanity suffers for its overreliance not just on technology, but
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precisely on the way in which technology has been humanized. We have seen that in the
mirrored subjectivity theorized by Lacan and the Freudian-inflected double in Romantic
literature that the double typically presumes or produces the half. And having sorted through the
dichotomous claims that there is no cyberspace or there is only cyberspace, we face the avatarial
question of whether avatars and virtuality are a departure from the real or material world, or
whether material reality can only be encountered through mediated experience, and the sense of
the virtual by which we engage these medial connections.
Moving forward, I turn to a closer inspection of the digital avatar as source material for
representations of avatars and the thematic issues they engender, as well as a basis for
approaching the theoretical possibilities the avatar offers. Continuing also with a consideration of
the mirror, I will return to the “spatial identification” that occurs during the mirror stage, as
Lacan refers to it, extending “from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality” – but less
for the space separating the subject and the imago than the space connecting them in what might
be thought of as an interfacial rather than specular approach to subjectivity.33 That is, thinking
avatarially, I am curious as to what extent the ‘gestalt’ might be positioned as part of or even as
the spatialized arrangement rather than as an unattainable image within it.

33

Lacan, Écrits, 4.
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CHAPTER 2
CORPUS AVATAR
The introduction page on the Second Life website features a photograph of a young
woman with a streak of red in her hair and a pair of headphones on her ears. Immediately next to
her is a picture of an avatar with the same headphones and red streak, a clear double (Fig. 10).
The promotional text reads “It’s you – only in 3D,” referring to the 3D virtual environment and
the opportunity for users to create self-representational avatars.1 The lure of the invitation works
doubly, promising the technological fantasy of 3D as well as a reassuring sense of familiarity,
but also raises the question of what it might mean for an embodied human in the material world
to become ‘3D’.
In its use in cinema and photography, 3D extends outward, seeming to break free of its
frame and burst into the off-screen world – or at least this has been the case as a novelty during
Hollywood cinema’s turf war with television in the fifties and in amusement parks today. On the
other hand, 3D can also draw inward, inviting viewers into the world of images with a greater
sense of visual immersion; Second Life and some of the more subtle uses of 3D in contemporary
films rely on this quality. Objects pictured in these spaces seem to be more discrete, more
tangible, less connected to the rest of the image. Discourse surrounding 3D presents it as a more
complete or even a purer mediation in contrast with traditional images in that it seems to retain
an additional element of the real world – its dimensionality ascertained by stereoscopic viewing
– while at the same time heightening the visual experience of its depictions; that is, 3D is
heralded as a more realistic form, but in practice is mostly relegated to fantasy.

1

This image and the attending copy were accessed from secondlife.com in 2010. The promotional text changes
periodically; at the time of this writing it reads: “Second Life is a 3D world where everyone you see is a real person
and every place you visit is built by people just like you.”
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The Second Life tag plays on this incongruity, however, implying that the you in a 3D
image world will be a little more exciting than the three-dimensional, physical you. We can see
in the subtle differences between the two promotional images – smoother skin, a narrowing of
the face, better symmetry, brighter highlights in the eyes – what in regular practice is often more
extreme, as Second Life is full of long, leggy avatars with thin waists and beefy biceps. In
Second Life, as in other virtual environments, dimensionality is produced through movement
within perspectival space and interaction with objects rather than stereoscopic illusion, but it is
designed to produce a similar immersive effect. Accessing it with an avatar not only permits
occasion for cosmetic modifications, but entry into a world of image objects as well, available
for interaction with image bodies.

Figure 10. “It’s You – Only in 3D.”
The irony of leaving three dimensions to become 3D might be understood in terms of the
trompe l’oeil of 3D, as a way for three-dimensional bodies and objects to exist in twodimensional images – 3D makes ‘space’ for the viewer. The perceived distinction of bodies and
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objects as discrete elements within 3D image space is consonant with the statement’s focus on
individuality in the implied assurance of remaining a unique entity – that is, no matter how
thorough the simulation or convincing the images it will still be ‘you’. The avatar is here
presented as the point of entry into the virtual world, positioned as an intermediary form between
the real and mediated environments that inducts the participant into image space through a
mediation of the self (in the form of a body), and thus might be understood to embody a way of
being within mediation. That is, if our world has become image-driven and experience has
become mediated, we are compelled to devise compatible spaces and bodies. The recourse to the
familiar ‘you’ privileges an enhancement of self through mediation over a loss of self in the
image world, as well as implying a certain compatibility of the embodied self with image-based
mediation. In other words, we adapt to our environment, and in this respect Second Life becomes
less an imaginal simulation of the material world than a model for the body’s entry into an
image-driven world.
In virtual environments, 3D demands inclusion of the avatar body, and the presence of
this body transforms the experience of the space.2 Such is the aesthetic and symbolic place of
3D, and I have considered it here for its propensity to both push the image world outward and
draw the viewer or user into the world of images. In the mirror stage, the reflected body is not an
isolated image, but one set within the imaginal space of the mirror; thus while the reflected body
is taken as a representation of wholeness, it is already set within and connected to the ‘virtual’
world on the other side, already part of the objects (the images) that surround it. The fantasy of
2

Tom Boellstorff reports that in its early stages Second Life avatars were originally conceived as floating eyeballs
rather than bodies. It is an interesting thought experiment to imagine how the Second Life environment would be
different if this strange panopticism had been adopted. One immediately thinks of the many houses and other
domiciles, dance clubs, and other buildings that would likely be absent, as well as the toll on the Second Life
economy, which revolves around fashion, real estate, and sex. For Second Life, as with many other virtual
environments, avatars are not simply a mode of access to an existing world, but in many ways the world exists for
avatarial engagement.
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the image body is organic to the imaginal space in which it is set, in “the relation between the
movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual
complex and the reality it reduplicates – the child’s own body, and the persons and things around
him.”3 The mirror as screen presents an object of fantasy, accessible only through desire and
misrecognition from a spectatorial distance (it is this defining quality that characterizes the
cinematic apparatus); the mirror as an optical instrument, a technology, however, has an inherent
materiality as it exists in, and only reflects, the real world. In this case it is the distance between
the body and its reflection that is misperceived or falsely appraised, as there can only be the
distance between body and mirror.
This chapter seeks to define the image body of the avatar in terms of the apparatus that
produces it, distinguishing between the cinematic apparatus and the interface for a virtual
environment in an attempt to better understand the relation between bodies and images within
digital culture. In addition, it is necessary to examine the constitution of the body available for
identification within the interface apparatus. Although avatar appearance can vary widely – from
conventional or consumerist notions of beauty through the gamut of creative, quirky, and
subversive bodies, all of which offer different affective and psychological interactions with their
users – my interest here is more on construction than appearance. I undertake a
phenomenological consideration of the avatar body as a body, laying groundwork for a better
understanding of the experiential relationship between user and avatar as one body to another.4

3

Lacan, Écrits, 1.
I don’t assume, of course, that an avatar body is materially similar to a physical, sensorial human body, but I take
this approach as much to demonstrate some of the ways in which physical embodiment and virtual bodies coincide
as I do to explore the construction of the avatar and digital imaging technologies in general. That is, when users
make phenomenological connections with avatars, I suggest that it is as much a result of a felt affinity with them as
being imaginally and multiply embodied as it is for their similarities to human bodies in the surface appearance.
4
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Iconic Evolutions
The inclination to insert representative bodies into computer-generated spaces can be
seen from the first videogames and social environments. Spacewar!, developed by MIT students
in 1962, was not the first computer game, but it is significant for its space age fantasy elements
that invited players into an imaginary scenario, despite the simplicity of its representative icons
(two blips, the oblong ‘needle’ and the triangular ‘wedge’).5 A decade later, ‘adventure’ games,
influenced by the recently published Dungeons & Dragons, produced textual geographies to be
explored subjectively by players in a ground-level version of the strategic map games that
preceded them. Graphical videogames from the early eighties and beyond followed the trend set
by Spacewar!, exhibiting a strong tendency to include a representative of the player within the
space of play. These iconic representations were at first a series of crude shapes, but gradually
employed more sophisticated imagery as the technology improved, coming to resemble the
vehicles, ships, creatures, and bodies they once pretended to be.6
These avatarial objects, or ‘player characters’ as they came to be called within gaming
jargon, display the player’s relation to other objects in the game – not only in regard to the
agentive (and often destructive) presence that is frequently discussed in writings on videogames,
but as much for the vulnerability these representations facilitate. The imperiling of the player
character contributes to the visceral thrill of the game for players, and connects it
proprioceptively to the player’s body as much as the agentive actions conducted by the player on

5

Games preceding Spacewar! include Alan Turing’s chess program (written for a computer that didn’t yet exist),
Alexander Douglas’s OXO (1952, a tic-tac-toe game), William Higinbotham’s Tennis for Two (1958, paddle game),
and other games developed at MIT just prior to Spacewar!, including Mouse in the Maze (where the mouse was
represented by a dot). These games prioritized strategy over fiction, and while Spacewar! was hardly immersive, it
was highly influential in initiating the trend of videogame production toward immersion, fantasy, and identification.
6
Some games, like Pac-Man, took aesthetic advantage of the primitive graphics available at the time, stripping
down design to a basic functional shape that became a cultural icon; outside of the chomping disc, however, the
tendency toward mimesis is still apparent in the game in the fruit and ghosts that players seek and avoid,
respectively.
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the space of the game. This condition becomes more pronounced with increasingly realistic
depictions of bodies, although at the same time producing an inverse effect by conflating the
body with disposability. In the historical development of avatar bodies, we can see these
conflicting pulls of dissonance and flow by which contact with virtual technologies is negotiated.
While the evolution of the avatar proceeded through many gradations and variations, a
few moments stand out as points of seminal transition. It is an occasional misconception that
text-based games preceded graphical games, but the textual genre didn’t develop until the midto late-seventies, some years after the advent of graphical games. One of the first text-based
games, Colossal Cave Adventure, inspired variations like the dungeon-crawl Zork (also called
Dungeon) and other adventure games – which several years later provided the basis for the first
MUD (multi-user dungeon). These second-person, interactive narratives immersed the player in
the world of the story and the map, but it was with the development of multiplayer versions and
networked capability that made the representation of self to other players, and not only the game,
a more integral aspect of play and the increasing possibilities for socialization. This was the
environment in which Roy Trubshaw began working on the first MUD, or what later became
known as MUD1, in 1978. Richard Bartle completed MUD1 in 1980, abiding by Trubshaw’s
desire to create a shared space within the interactive fiction. Other adventure games, such as
Orthanc “allowed players to meet and talk in the dungeon, but otherwise was a single-player
game.”7 MUD1 was designed to facilitate human interaction as much as interaction with the
computer, and this necessitated a greater role for representational bodies in the shared space.

7

Eric Hagstrom, quoted in Raph Koster, Raph Koster’s Website. Accessed April 19, 2009.
http://www.raphkoster.com/gaming/mudtimeline.shtml.
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Initially, Bartle resisted the impulse to allow players to create character descriptions,
arguing that players could explore identity more freely if they weren’t “tied to some image.”8
Before long, however, Bartle became enthusiastic about the possibilities of playing with textual
representations of self and character, and produced a taxonomy of levels of engagement from
casual play to full-blown persona as a measure of users’ psychological and social integration
with their self-representations. The signification of these ‘images’, he suggests, is a product of
both dissonance and consonance, as “[signs] arise because of the difference between virtual
world technology and the way reality works. . . . [where] immersion is accepting the signifier as
the signified.”9 The reconciliation Bartle proposes seems to be the solution to a split seemingly
effected by the existence of the virtual environment itself – one for which images initially
seemed part of the problem, and later the means for integrating the physical and virtual selves.
MUDs and adventure games were very conscious of space and subsequently bodies by
virtue of the fact that visual objects had to be described. Reading the text was conflated with
looking, as the short descriptions tended to include basic visual information, and as the social
element of MUDs became popular, descriptions of character became expressions of personality.
Due to this strong visual component, as well as the increasing popularity of console and then
home computer games in the early eighties, it is not surprising that the MUD went graphical.
Work on Habitat, “one of the first attempts to create a very large scale commercial multi-user
environment,” began in 1985, the same year Nintendo released the popular Super Mario
Brothers and only a year after an improved MUD1 was released commercially; the beta version
of Habitat was released the following year.10 Aesthetically, Habitat took a different direction than

8

Bartle, Designing Virtual Worlds, 184.
Ibid., 635.
10
Farmer, F. Randall and Morningstar, Chip. “The Lessons of Lucasfilm’s Habitat.” Presented at The First
International Conference on Cyberspace, May 1990. Accessed April 14, 2009.
9
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many of the text-based spaces and videogames of the period, minimizing fantasy content in favor
of a more quotidian environment. While quests could be undertaken, Habitat was conceived as a
place where users “can communicate, play games, go on adventures, fall in love, get married, get
divorced, start businesses, found religions, wage wars, protest against them, and experiment with
self-government.”11 Habitat was thus a precursor to contemporary social spaces like Second Life
and other MUVEs (multi-user virtual environments, as distinct from the more goal-driven
MMOs), as well as the domestic simulation game The Sims (2000, Electronic Arts).
Graphics for avatars in Habitat were rather rudimentary, but they did have
interchangeability, such as options for clothing, skin color, and a number of faces and body types
to choose from, which made them more expressive (Fig. 11). Even with the limited options
presented by the game, this was an important step in the development of the avatar body, as it
began to conflate sign and body. Pictures begin to act more like bodies not only when they move,
as the avatars in Habitat did (crudely), but when their modes of expression become more
nuanced. Bodies do not signify the same way that pictures do; the avatars in Habitat were simple,
two-dimensional, and rather cartoonish, but they could be distinguished from videogame
characters in the shift from signifying through what they were, such as Italian plumbers, to
signifying through what they wore, for instance, as clothing and hairstyles as the adornment of
the body started to become the primary signifiers of the human-like avatar.12 (The potent cultural
signifiers of skin color and gender are discussed more thoroughly below.)

http://www.fudco.com/chip/lessons.html. In denoting titles, I follow the common practice of italicizing game titles
and indicating shared online spaces in Roman.
11
Ibid.
12
Ken Hillis refers to avatars as ‘sign/bodies’, interpreting the iconic status of digital avatars as part of the
signifying discourse in which avatars are set, and thus accords them the status of meaningful images. While I don’t
disagree with his logic, to my mind the move toward the body is a move away from the clearer signification of
traditional images imported into virtual spaces, and thus I prefer the term ‘image bodies’ as a way of conceptualizing
their synthesis of high visibility and semantic ambiguity. Ken Hillis, Online a Lot of the Time: Ritual, Fetish, Sign
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).
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Figure 11. At home in Habitat.
A decade after Habitat, the differences between the trifurcation of videogames, graphical
MUVEs, and textual MUDs had increased, generating significant implications for the avatarial
body. In fact, the period of the mid-nineties represented perhaps the greatest range of possibility
for user representation in virtual spaces, with each alternative bearing different ramifications for
user experience. As I have noted, virtuality is contingent, and various forms of virtual
embodiment interact with human embodiment differently. Videogames had by this period
become increasingly popular, and while 3D games using vector graphics had been around for
some years, it was the release of id Software’s Wolfenstein 3D in 1992, followed the next year by
the extremely influential Doom, that established a new benchmark for gaming. The fast pace of
these dungeon crawls and the sense of immersion they engendered established a new era of
gaming, and cemented the place of the first-person shooter (FPS). In many ways the FPS
constituted the visual instantiation of the second-person adventure game, with the player at the
center of action instead of abstracted from a player character or avatar (the designative ‘you’,
which Bob Rehak refers to as a syntactical méconaissance, an interpellation effected when the
‘you’ of the descriptive text is conflated with the ‘I’ of the player). The avatar body in these
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games had become implicit – still vulnerable and, as multiplayer versions developed, visual to
other players, but otherwise absent, visually distilled in the phallic weapon jutting obliquely and
menacingly into frame.13
The violent, disembodied gaze of the FPS that removed the avatar visually from the space
of the game was antithetical to the emphasis on self-representation in the MUVEs, which were
themselves developing in different directions. The Palace was essentially a collection of pictorial
chat spaces, and while users could move their avatars across the screen or into a different room,
each room was simply a static 2D backdrop. Guests were given a yellow smiley face avatar, and
after registering the face would turn red and the user could attach custom images, which were
typically imported from scans or the internet. These picture avatars, while sometimes following
various trends, were quite diverse in comparison with the relatively limited modular bodies in
Habitat in that they could be pictures of anything. As such, the Palace avatars operated much
more clearly in a symbolic register, and less like the iconic and functional bodies developing in
other graphical worlds. AlphaWorld, on the other hand, might be called a prototype for Second
Life, where avatars were 3D and highly customizable, and building was a common activity. The
player’s view could be switched between first-person and a ‘god view’, which was somewhat
above and behind the avatar, and in distinction from the picture avatars of The Palace, the avatars
in AlphaWorld, while incorporating user preferences and designs, were relatively uniform
overall, thus eliding the wider disparity in signification that could characterize the more chaotic
Palace. The AlphaWorld avatars thus most clearly represented the trend toward realistic bodies
that were organic to their virtual environment.

13

Cutscenes introduce a cinematic identification that becomes an avatarial one for both first-person and third-person
games. A FPS player may only see his or her avatar during these interstitial, non-interactive scenes, and then ‘reinhabit’ the character once gameplay resumes.
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Worlds Chat was something of a combination of these two MUVEs. Set in 3D space but
permitting the importation of 2D images, Worlds Chat actually served as one of the more
interesting experiments in virtual embodiment with its motley combination of avatarial pictures
and dimensional game space (Fig. 12). Avatars could be scanned photographs of users, computer
art creatures, or any number of images culled from the web or otherwise created, appearing in
various scales and resolutions as they glided through the space station setting. For all of its visual
interest, however, the platform somewhat paradoxically employed a first-person view –
influenced, perhaps, by Doom’s popularity and immersiveness, but also interestingly granting a
‘view’ to the picture serving as an avatar.14

Figure 12. Heterogeneity in Worlds Chat.

The persistent popularity of MUDs and their variations throughout the nineties, despite
the surge of videogaming and the many MUVE options, attests to the particular opportunities
they afforded for the conceptualization of space and practices of embodied interaction. While
14

For a comprehensive overview of these and other virtual worlds of the period see Bruce Damer, Avatars!:
Exploring and Building Virtual Worlds on the Internet (Berkeley: Peachpit Press, 1998).
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socializing came to predominate over the exploratory aims of adventure games and early MUDs,
these spaces were distinct from chat rooms in that they included character and setting
descriptions, and their characters could be made to perform embodied actions through bits of
literary illustration. Characters were discursively produced with descriptions, while the user’s
presence was marked by a screen name, indicators of action or entry and exit into a room, and
any conversation made through the chat interface. Character descriptions actually only appeared
when another user executed a ‘look’ command, and so while situated quite distinctly as the
object of a look, without this look the character was invisible – and without a contribution to the
chat stream, the user is for the most part as well (a hovering that could make other users
uncomfortable, who often called out the ‘lurker’).
The informational composition of the character can range from a few words of
straightforward description to the lyrical passages Julian Dibbell recalls in his memoir of time
spent in LambdaMOO.15 Dibbell makes it clear that there were plenty of uninspired descriptions,
but his observations of the textual interactions amidst the literati collective he fell in with
illustrate a different intersection, between the descriptive image and the body. Well-written
passages could include information about attitude, history, and desire of the character (or the
user’s persona), or could be “essentially nothing but the details of their clothing and their
hairstyles, presented nonetheless with such precision and flair that they seemed almost the
distillation of a personality, the story of a character condensed, as it were, into the moment just
before its telling.”16 While these descriptions could be highly expressive, their presence could be
15

MOO is an acronym for MUD object-oriented, referring to MUDs in which users could build onto (or rather add
descriptions of) the virtual world and do more with objects. (Not to be confused with MMO, which refers to a
massively multiplayer online game.)
16
Julian Dibbell, My Tiny Life: Crime and Passion in a Virtual World (New York: Holt, 1998), 134. An example he
gives of a character description by user Niacin: “Having pissed away what was left of the family money and nothing
to show for it but an old red and black BSA motorbike that he keeps in perfect working order, he ended up in the
North Woods, where he does carpentry sometimes. He keeps his long, sandy hair tied back mostly. His eyes are a
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inconsistent in the shared virtual space. A graphical avatar remains on the screen, but a textual
character only appears with a ‘look’ command, and can slip quickly off-screen with the
cascading conversation. A user can speak in character or integrate visual descriptions into his or
her conversation in order to maintain a certain perceptual engagement, but sustained discourse of
this kind can be difficult.17
It is useful to note however, how the ‘informational’ body of the textual character
actually includes much more than the description, as every aspect of MUD users is expressed
verbally. This body of information includes screen name, the description, and any conversational
text contributed by the user. There are obvious parallels here with the construction of a character
in a book (and it is this literary aspect that Dibbell’s silver-tongued comrades exploited); the
distinction lies in what Ken Hillis calls “iconic indexicality or indexical iconicity,” which seems
to users to transmit “some material aspect of the geographically distinct individual to whom it
directly points.”18 For Hillis, avatars are indexical by virtue of their real-time technological
connection to the actions of a user; their iconicity is due to the resemblance to a body to at least
some extent, both in appearance and function. From a technological standpoint this is based in
the automatism of the interface – the avatar doesn’t move without a command, and so avatar
movement is a result of user activity. While the movements themselves may differ in form, as
wind and weathervane are (user pushes a key, the avatar waves), one produces the other.
The real-time performance and automatic processes distinguish this action from the hand
of the animator, for instance (after all, a painting does not have an indexical relation to the hand
pale blue, with flecks of gold in them and grey rings around the iris. High cheekbones, mouth quirked up in an ironic
grin. He’s wearing a black t-shirt tucked into a pair of tight, faded levis and black work boots. In the pocket of his
shirt, a pack of Lucky Strikes and the tooth of a wolf” (137).
17
Dibbell refers to lengthy encounters, sexual and otherwise, which were highly textural through their textuality.
However, Lori Kendall points out that while role-play was practiced in some virtual communities, in general its
influence and pervasiveness have been overblown. Long-term roles are difficult to maintain, and many descriptions
are less about producing character than giving a brief insight into personality.
18
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of the artist). Hillis is just as interested, however, in the phenomenological aspect of indexicality,
in the way in which avatars are experientially understood to transmit some material aspect, and
here he approaches the virtual. Mixed-media artist Lynne Heller captures it more lyrically when
she states “the most basic of human interaction with objects, particularly images, causes us to
necessarily invest them with spirit in order to understand, control, and dominate the ‘stuff’ of our
existence.”19 From a phenomenological standpoint we look for those human aspects (including
embodiment) transmitted through a network, reconstructed digitally, appearing in a form that
facilitates affective responses. Heller’s recourse to the spiritual in what she calls ‘virtualmateriality’ evokes the ephemerality of the virtual – that which perplexes and enchants within
the processes of framing digital information and images. The textual body is a very simple form
of what is done in other media transmissions with much more data (in photos or video chat, for
instance), and can be quite fascinating in its spartan reliance on verbal communication – on the
ways in which humans have encoded their interactions for millennia. Within these constraints
Dibbell addresses the “terminal paradox” of approaching a “wordless knowledge of another
person through a medium composed entirely of words,” as intimate verbal encounters produce
bodies of human data integrating the rhetorical and corporeal:
What had it truly been then, underneath the surface? . . . perhaps nothing else but what its
surface mutely insisted it be: an unresolved pastiche of possible bodies both real and
imagined, a moment of attraction suspended among the available categories of gendermarked desire like an image lost amid a house of mirrors, bounced endlessly from one to
another to the next and back until you knew that if you tried to find where the truth of it
stood you’d only end up equally as lost?20

19

Lynne Heller, “Fuzzy Precincts and Bleeding Edges: Feminist Theory and the Study of Virtual-Materiality”
(ISEA2011 Istanbul, The 17th International Symposium on Electronic Art, September 14-21, 2011, Keynote
address).
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This brings me to the final historical moment, which extends into the present. Second
Life launched in 2003, followed by World of Warcraft the next year. This period also marked the
sixth generation of videogame consoles, with the release of the still-popular PlayStation 2,
Microsoft’s introduction of the Xbox, and the waning of Sega and Atari, flagships of of erstwhile
generations of gaming. The graphical capabilities ushered in by these platforms gave rise to a
new breed of hyperrealistic game environments and avatar bodies that has continued with
seventh-generation consoles (PlayStation 3, Xbox 360, Nintendo Wii) and for the foreseeable
future. Second Life has more or less kept pace by crowdsourcing development, giving its users
increasingly powerful tools for rendering realistic bodies, clothing, and hair (although server
capacity and processing speeds occasionally prove insufficient for user ambitions).
The aesthetic of the hyperreal in virtual environments trends strongly toward the natural.
Verdant landscapes replete with diverse foliage, wooden bridges over babbling brooks,
moonlight shimmering on ocean vistas – such is also the trend of digital culture, away from
machine aesthetics and toward the imagistic. The design of bodies follows suit, eschewing
pixilation and classic videogame animations in an attempt to accurately simulate human
appearance and movement. These bodies seem to enter a different register of graphical
production, one that is closer to the photorealism of contemporary digital effects in cinema to
traditional notions of iconicity in virtual environments. This is not to say that avatars have
achieved such a level of realism – they haven’t – but the quest toward fidelity changes the
relationship between body and image, and thus the nature of the experiential opportunities they
afford relative to the virtual.

Virtual Materiality
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Definitions of the term ‘body’ reveal the dichotomy between holism and fragmentation in
the word itself. The concept of an “assemblage of parts, organs, and tissues that constitutes the
whole material organism” manifests the holistic view of parts that only become a body when
they form a whole, and a whole that is never simply one thing; another definition of a body as a
“collective mass” alludes to the utility of seeing atomized fragments as a whole, even though
they don’t constitute one per se.21 I have reviewed the development of the avatar in its most
popular form toward greater visual and functional complexity, away from iconicity and toward
corporeality, and here turn to a consideration of the avatar ‘body’ as a collection of multiple
informational elements held in layers of programs and data, images and simulations. This is more
than a ‘collection’, I suggest, which implies a grouping of distinct objects, but something like a
‘body’ – a single entity or gestalt arising from of disparate fragments.
Regarding the materiality implicit in the term ‘avatar’, Boellstorff notes that “while
‘avatar’ historically referred to incarnation – a movement from virtual to actual – with respect to
online worlds it connotes the opposite movement from actual to virtual, a decarnation or
invirtualization.”22 Shifts in materiality are inherent in the concept of the avatar, although in
contemporary avatar use there are two bodies, one biological and the other digital, meeting in the
plane of the virtual. I have endeavored thus far to demonstrate that the digital avatar is more than
just an image of a body, or a tool resembling a body, and with a bit of critical dissection I will
autopsy the avatar in a demonstration of its depth, systems, and layers, attempting to identify
those properties facilitating phenomenological connections.
This body is made up of a number of parts that cohere into the entity on the screen –
layers of information and programming concealed beneath a visual surface of skin, clothing, and

21
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"body, n.". OED Online, Oxford University Press (accessed July 10, 2012).
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hair. This layering is to a limited extent on display during instances of ‘lag’ (the delay in
rendering objects on screen due to server demands or connection speeds) as the user waits while
the environment and avatar body are assembled (in Second Life, this results in grayish coloring,
lack of clothing or hair, or a partial body). Manovich argues that in instances of lag the
artificiality and constructedness of virtual worlds and objects are brought to the fore, breaking
the user’s immersive experience. However, the temporal construction of the avatar body during
lag isn’t necessarily a negative, as it also, I suggest, contributes to an appreciation of the avatar
as a body. One might note for instance the popularity and near ubiquity of behind-the-scenes
appendices on DVDs that demonstrate CG production techniques; rather than simply breaking
the illusion of animated and visual effects, the peek behind the curtain can be understood as
adding a certain depth or dimension to images whose pro-filmic referent is absent or concealed,
grounding them in real-world technology and the work of animators and motion-capture
performances in addition to demonstrating the numerous layers that go into making a realistic
composite. Not only do these revelatory appendices not spoil the effect, but they seem to be part
of the overall fascination with CG imagery.
Theorist Bernadette Wegenstein writes that “the advent of new media has facilitated
enormously the move of the reunion between holism and fragmentation” – a holism manifested
in plurality that on the one hand evokes postmodern multiplicity, but on the other gestalt, in that
digital information can be encountered in embodied terms, producing virtual entities (such as
avatars) that are more than the sum of their parts, and that hold together experientially in a way
that acknowledges fragmentation.23 Against Manovich, I argue that the manifest constructedness
of the avatar actually contributes to the holism of the avatar, as it demonstrates that the avatar

23

Bernadette Wegenstein, Getting Under the Skin: The Body and Media Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 36.

107

body is more than just an image or surface, but a multi-layered entity whose embodiment
vaguely mirrors the ‘layers’ of human embodiment. As Alexander Galloway writes:
The disabling act . . . any type of gamic aggression or gamic deficiency that arrives from
outside the world of the game and infringes negatively on the game in some way,
[including] crashes, low polygon counts, bugs, slowdowns, temporary freezes, and
network lag, [can be irritating] but at the same time, they are often the most constitutive
category of game acts, for they have the ability to define the outer boundaries of
aesthetics in gaming, the degree zero for an entire medium.24
The disabling act is a defining act, and in avatar use can serve as an (all too frequent) reminder
that entire structures lie under the imaginal surfaces of environment and avatars.
Turning to the avatar body on the table, as it were, we first notice the clothing – an
interesting aspect of the virtual realm in which bodies are visually created and then partially
concealed. Virtual worlds researchers Jim Blascovich and Jeremy Bailenson refer to avatars as
‘worn’ by users, but we can see that even avatars wear things. Clothing is a bodily adornment,
expressive of taste and identity, something commonly purchased and frequently changed. As a
second surface, clothing to some extent reflects (and initially ‘adhered’ to) skins in Second Life,
which can also be expressive and exchanged, but trends in avatar fashion have moved toward
distinguishing clothing from the skin. In its basic form, as was the case in earlier virtual worlds,
virtual clothing is simply a ‘paint’ applied to the avatar body without altering its shape, but
contemporary fashion sits atop the skin and flows around the avatar body, accentuating its form
as a dimensional and social body in that the clothing is situated externally and complementary to
it.
We are now to the skin, that external organ which for humans acts as interface with the
world, and for avatars marks a bodily boundary in human interfacing with virtual objects and
24
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terrain. Skin is “always ambivalent: on the one hand, an endless surface without beginning or
end, similar to the Möbius strip, and, on the other hand, more than a wrapping for the body, but a
semantically productive expanse.”25 As with the human body, the visual surface of the avatar
cannot be viewed in its entirety all at once, as a picture can; it is always partly hidden, always
moving and changing in appearance depending on the angle from which it is viewed. From
robots to furries, avatar skin is certainly mutable in Second Life, but, as in CG cinema,
simulations of human skin have represented a holy grail for virtual bodies, and skin in many
ways has come to define the potential for avatarial embodiment. Increasing levels of realism in
virtual environments have invited ever greater associations with the human body, and skin is a
key element of what constitutes humanness in realms virtual (Fig. 13).

Figure 13. Skins for sale in Second Life.

Human-like figures (however cartoonish) have been a common fixture in virtual
environments long before contemporary technologies made realistic skins possible, but a fixation
with skin that has attended technological advances in graphical rendering toward unifying the
25
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modular avatar body – the more realistic the surface, the greater the sense of holism, as skin is
associated with the coherence and integrity of the body. With increasingly realistic skin textures,
facial appearance, and body shape, developers have produced highly affective bodies – though
not entirely escaping of the uncanny valley or uncanniness of the automaton.26 Uncanniness can
occur not only in the small disjunctures in appearance and movement, but in the subtler way that
these avatars seem to exhibit a degree of self-existence or belonging to themselves, in “the
illusion of avatars in that environment possessing souls and controlling their own destinies – a
virtual existence,” as Heller puts it.27 Skin carries ontological weight, and those in possession of
it within a virtual environment are of a different order, distinct from other objects. An encounter
with a finely rendered avatar necessitates a sort of ‘double consciousness’ in which the avatar is
understood as simultaneously inanimate and alive, belonging to users and at the same time
exhibiting its own bodily presence.28
Skins in Second Life are bought and sold, featured at in-world boutiques and online
websites, and given names – Melissa, Sam, Yvonne – in place of model numbers.29 Genitals and
nipples come attached with these models; for standard issue Second Life avatars, however, they
must be purchased separately. With skin comes sex, and graphical avatars in general preserve the
binarism that characterizes real world cultural definitions of the body – definitions, as Foucault
argues, that are inscribed on the body, producing its materiality discursively. The conformity of
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avatar bodies to sex designations despite the potential fluidity of gender play helps produce their
virtual materiality by appealing to normative ideas of what a body is, especially as the
relationship between virtual gender and real-world sex is easily troubled. Race as well becomes
an ironically stabilizing force in the face of perceived bodily instability, providing “familiar,
solid, and reassuring versions of race which other users can readily accept and understand,”
reifying the white, Western male subject by providing “the necessary contrast, the dark
background, against which the user can feel even more ‘himself’ than he did before.”30
Skin and its color, bodies and their shapes, become the virtually material substrates of
race and gender, and avatar bodies take part in this discursive inscription. This occurs on the one
hand through conventional signs – for instance, in the hair and clothing of a female avatar. But
such signs are to some extent available to, and widely used by, less nuanced figures in gaming
and virtual worlds, as in the gendering of Pac-Man with a bow and lipstick to create Ms. PacMan, adding signs of (female) gender to a basic shape. The gendering of more sophisticated
avatar bodies, while often employing similar forms of signification, at the same time resist
obvious signification through the naturalization of the body: while Ms. Pac-Man is female
because of the signs that code her so, a female avatar is styled femininely ‘because’ she is
female.
The face, the most expressive part of the body and as the part most often associated with
self, is also a well-equipped, affective ‘interface’ (Fig. 14). With its concentration of sensory
organs the face becomes the primary input mechanism for interfacing with the material world, as
well as for expression and communication with others. We commonly ‘read’ faces for
information about a person’s feelings or intent, and can keenly detect subtle shifts. Mark Hansen
sees the face as a potential catalyst for affective interfacing with computers, where it may offer
30
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“a promising alternative to the profoundly impoverished, yet currently dominant model of the
human-computer interface.”31 Relative to the face (or what he refers to in new media applications
as the ‘digital facial image’), icons and information insufficiently address the potential for more
human-compatible interfaces. Rather than a GUI that reduces “the wide bandwidth of embodied
human expressivity to a fixed repertoire of functions and icons,” he envisions an “open-ended,
positive feedback loop linking information to the entire affective register.”32 While avatars do not
generally constitute such a functional interface, they do prompt affective responses; such
responses contribute to one of the avatar’s visual paradoxes, in that one intuitively seeks
expression and reaction in the face, which is not there. However, developments in facial
recognition software are pushing toward fully mimetic avatars that will convey expression and
lip movement, while on the gaming front exploring the potential for the integration of player
expressions into gameplay.33 To a significant extent the face is situated as the next frontier for
human-computer interaction.
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Figure 14. The face as affective interface.

Beneath the skin we find the skeleton, the frame that moves the body and to which the
prims that shape the avatar are attached. The skeleton is that invisible part of the avatar body that
remains constant within the mutability of shape and appearance, and which, as the instrument for
movement, has a key role in the enactment of the avatar body as a body instead of an imagistic
object or bit of digital statuary. Movement occurs within the simulated physics of the virtual
environment, encompassing gravity, distance, solidity, and dimensionality, so that avatar bodies
are moved relative to other objects and within a spatiality that reinforces the sense of their
‘bodyness’. Avatars don’t need to walk or run in virtual environments, yet they typically do, on
legs that recall Katherine Hayles’s discussion of skeuomorphs – design features that were once
functional but, having lost their utility, are kept for aesthetic reasons. Movement through space is
a defining quality of virtual environments, and movement of an avatar body conflates entry into
virtual space with embodiment, allowing virtual environments to become spaces that are not
simply interactive and spatialized, but places for embodied engagement, places in which to be
enworlded.
We now put the avatar’s tissues under the microscope. In the skin and clothing we find
textures, those patterns and pictures either created in-world or, more often, derived from
photographs. Avatars wearing textures can thus literally be clothed in images, and much of their
virtual materiality is dependent on these textures which import and repurpose the materiality of
the photograph, taking advantage of both its depth (being able to see into the photograph) and its
superficiality (the way depth is rendered as surface). The use of images as digital flesh or
sartorial covering recalls new media theorist Alluquere Rosanne Stone’s description of putting
on “cybernetic space like a garment,” but relative to the fabrics and flesh of Second Life fashion
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and bodies, her sense, formulated within early computer graphics and text-based virtual
communities, comes off as ironic – more akin to putting on information and electronic pulses,
the no-space of cyberspace, a diaphanous digitality rather than virtual velvet.34
Examining the surface more closely, we note that the digital material of computerized
images is visually manifest on the display as arrangements of pixels, the basic unity of digital
imagery. Pixels are often thought of as informational bits, but in actuality are not ‘contained’ in
the image data except as a raster grid of integers; the pixel itself is the physical part of the
display whose color and shading is dictated by the data that define it, and thus pixels are the
point at which immaterial information stored materially on a drive is rematerialized (at sixty
hertz) in visual form. The materiality of the pixel operates as the point of contact between
embodied user and computer space, in a way distinct from the cinematic image where grain is
part of the film stock that is illuminated by a projector and reflected off a screen, and the
photographic print in which the grain is fixed: the materiality of the pixel is tied to the display
rather than the image, and is instantly mutable even while being physical.
Changing lenses, we go deeper, into software and code and the programs for movement
and appearance and the existence of the avatar body itself. It is here that the avatar body is
formed as a collection or ‘body’ of digital information, indirectly engaged when users want to
move their avatar or perform other actions. It is this programming that is added to or altered
when Second Life users script their own movements and poses, or purchase skins, hair, and
clothing, adding to or changing the body of the program and content of the database.
Programming in Second Life is tied to the larger platform, but is also an individual creation, a
part of the program for just the user; it is this program that reflects visually the choices and
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agency of the user, inhered in the avatar body. It is here that we also find the username, that bit
of information that becomes in many ways the essential part of any avatar; the avatar’s
appearance may change completely with the use of different skins, but the username is the
information that resides at the core of the avatar’s programming and identity within the system,
and also on the surface as information for users – in Second Life, hanging prominently above the
avatar’s head. In a rather abstract sense the username might be thought of as the ‘soul’ of the
avatar in that it becomes the signifier, as information attached and integral to the body, for the
underlying and invisible informational structures of the avatar body relative to the imaginal
presence of its visible overlay.
At the atomic level we find binary code, the fundamental dyadic form of digital
information in which all computer information is preserved. At this point it may seem that we
have thoroughly dematerialized the avatar body, but on the contrary it is at the level of computer
code that we have reached the physical instantiation of the avatar in which its information is
inscribed on hard drives. Of course, avatar bodies share this quality with everything else digital,
and in that sense are hardly unique, but what is compelling about the avatar is the way it presents
information – which, as Hayles reminds us, requires a body – in the actual form of a body.
Machine alterity comes to characterize the computer at the level of this language accessible only
to computers, that its creators can’t read except through the use of computers, and that is in itself
incomprehensible to the human mind – or perhaps, thinking again in metaphysical terms, rather
than alterity, spirituality.35 While resorting to metaphysical language does not make the avatar
any more a body in the same sense as the sensorial human body, the concept of there being
something inside a body, invisible and complex, that enlivens it and makes it more than it
35
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appears on its surface, is well-rooted in the cultural understanding of embodiment, and thus the
phenomenological experience of avatar bodies as bodies certainly allows for such associations.
Of course, the most obvious animating influence on the avatar body is the user, and in this
respect we become the spirit element enlivening the avatar body – and also a defining aspect of
its materiality.
Finally, the avatar body is linked to a virtual ‘camera’, a point in space that provides a
view of the avatar relative to the environment that is drawn around it in the moment of viewing.
The camera is the point of visual connection between user and avatar that facilitates a number of
other connections, functional, communicative, aesthetic, and experiential. That is, while the
visual is certainly primary, it is also primarily a facilitator for other forms of interaction beyond
the look, including the haptic connection through the controller, navigation of space, cognitive
puzzle-solving, chatting, building, etc.
Collectively, these layers of graphical, algorithmic, and informational layers comprise the
body of the avatar. We become aware of these layers through the lag that reveals constructed
elements, glitches that expose their programming, and the general knowledge that digital
imagery is numerically based. Composited together, they produce an image that “is not ‘one’, or
identical with itself,” as D. N. Rodowick writes of these images that have no “visible presence
for us or to us without the aid of a display.”36 Yet it appears as one, as a collection of systems,
information, and vivifying animation ‘contained’ within a virtual skin – an entity at the
intersection of the representational human body and a body of information, interfaced with an
embodied human who relates to each of these aspects differently. This brings us back to the
reflection, for what is the nature of the body in the mirror? It is an image, to be certain, but one
known to have an interior, even if making the connection between the subjective I and the
36
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objective image body can be perplexing. The mirror image has a depth, a presence that the
photograph does not, and while the picture of the exteriorized self the mirror returns is always
just out of reach, at the same time we are always present to it as it is to us, always connected.
“Identification is, from the beginning, a question of relation, of self to other, subject to object,
inside to outside.”37 The avatar reminds us however that the relation to self is not vectorial, but a
circuit. As a ‘virtual image’, the mirror reflection necessitates the presence of the object being
reflected – the mirror requires two. It pictures me, but I am its image as well.

Constitutive Mediation
Soft piano music over black, then two names appear in elegant script: Sunni Irvine and
Ocean Lane. The names dissolve into a long, gliding shot drifting toward an ethereal island
cathedral set amidst delicate white and blue trees. Dissolve again to the interior where a
bridesmaid begins her slow promenade down the aisle, flanked on either side by white and
burgundy pews and ornate flower arrangements. A singer’s voice joins the piano as the video
dissolves to a wide shot of the bride’s extravagant gown, then cutting to a closer shot and a slow
push on a well-tanned Sunni, resplendent in her garland, veil, and jewelry. The breeze tousles her
hair, and her big blue eyes gaze longingly down the aisle where Ocean awaits. This is their
wedding video.
Or the ultimate in digital fantasy – the machinima video of the Second Life wedding,
where simulacral layers stack as high as the cake: the opulence of the dream wedding, the union
of perfect bodies, and the video running through the clichéd conventions of slow dissolves,
romantic poses, and photos of their courtship (in Second Life) mingled with footage of the
ceremony, with the entire event taking place in a virtual world. But at the same time, its
37
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connections to the real world are plain. Weddings are typically designed to be fantasy affairs,
and ritual serves to reify the virtuality of cultural norms. And while kisses and handshakes in
Second Life lack physical contact and sensory stimulation, nevertheless the performance of such
actions serve as social interactions that are not only appreciated for their symbolic value, but can
also be ‘felt’ in the body through body memory and imagination. Anecdotes of such events,
including the comments attached to their video records, reflect the degree to which participants
frequently understand these events, and the bodies through which they are performed, as
experientially real.38
I have presented the case for the avatar as a body in certain ways mirroring our own from
a technological perspective, but affectively the avatar is also a body in that it is perceived as a
body, treated as a body, cared for as a body, used and abused as a body. Avatars draw the kinds
of looks and reactions that are associable with bodies, and they perform embodied actions on
behalf of their users, strolling through galleries, drinking virtual Coke, meditating in the Zen
garden, having virtual sex. A clear distinction can be drawn, for instance, in the difference in
behavior toward an avatar and a ‘bot’ or NPC (non-player character); the bodies are made of the
same stuff, but one performs a programmed series of actions while the other is performed by a
user. Bots look like avatars, and can interact with players or users to a limited extent (in social or
expeditionary situations they typically give the user information; in gaming, NPCs are often
killed by the player), but they are treated very differently, even with various forms of bodily
contact and emoting. It is clear that through all the layers that make up the avatar body, in order
to make it an ‘avatar’ in the full sense of the word, it requires a connection to a user – that is, to a
body. Operated by a user, the avatar responds to physical interfacial touch in a way distinct from
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the use of other media and information – rather than handling a tool or writing a word, using the
body to move and perform another body in a space that facilitates and encourages a particular
kind of phenomenological engagement, body to body.
The avatar body connected temporally, haptically, and through an experiential virtual
materiality to a human body produces a connective entity exhibiting “the body as constitutive
mediation,” as Bernadette Wegenstein writes in regard to new media artifacts that engage
embodiment in new ways: “what has previously been known as a medium has adopted the
characteristics of body within the techno- and new media sphere of the new millennium.”39
Digital media, whose visual components extend beyond the traditional definitions of images as
exemplified in the avatar body, and which are in a certain sense more proximate to the human
body in that they are subject to use, manipulation, and the touch of the interface, take on the
qualities of a body. The new media works analyzed by Wegenstein relate to human embodiment
in multiple ways, from proprioceptive interaction in VR displays that take shape according to the
movement of the participant’s body, to conceptual architecture incorporating biological and
organic design.
On the other hand, Wegenstein understands the human body as defined by its connections
and capacity for mediation, indeed as mediation itself, which can be understood as the condition
in which a person’s interaction with the world as well as with his or her own body is a product of
language, interpretation, projection, and imagination. Her conception, however, is not simply a
reiteration of the poststructuralist deconstruction of the subject, but a consideration of how
virtual technologies don’t simply contribute to the fragmentation of embodied experience but
rather how fragmentation can be understood as gestalt. If human subjectivity is inherently
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fragmented, understanding it as such doesn’t necessarily eliminate the possibility for holism if
holism is reconceived in terms of the connections between disparate material and experiential
elements. One might then think of the connection between the physical body of the user and a
visualized, interactive form of its virtuality in the avatar body, touching at the interface (which is
itself is materially immaterial, defined by connections, images, invisible processes) as a sort of
‘body’. The avatar, which can only be avatarial when connected to a user, and the user, who is in
certain ways virtual, incorporate at the interface to form a body defined by connection and
mediation – what might be designated an ‘avatar’.
This ‘avatar’ is unstable, temporary, and contingent – reflecting the virtuality of human
embodiment – but at the same time a compelling and even comfortable arrangement. I have
hitherto directed attention to the avatar body in order to distinguish it from the connection that
animates this body and produces it as an avatar, rather than as solely an avatar body (as when the
user is ‘afk’, away from keyboard) or a picture of an avatar as produced with a snapshot
function. Identifying the avatar body as an entity with depth and complexity and exuding selfexistence, I have sought to isolate it within the avatar relation; while accepted nomenclature
designates this entity as the ‘avatar’, I argue that the avatar body is not the avatar per se, but the
object that facilitates an avatarial connection within shared online space, and provides a digital
body connected to the physical one, facilitating a particular form for experiential virtuality. The
avatar body is avatarial when interfaced with another body, and thus the ‘avatar’ is composed of
these two bodies and the connection between them; this relation constitutes its body and its
materiality, including the two bodies and the interface at which they touch. In other words, we
are avatar in the fact that we use avatars – our materiality is theirs, our bodies avatarial.
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In this regard I follow Galloway’s approach to the gaming apparatus as including the
‘entire apparatus’ of machine and operator. “If photographs are images, and films are moving
images, then video games are actions,” he writes, “video games come into being when the
machine is powered up and the software is executed; they exist when enacted.”40 The operator
and machine play the videogame together, and for Galloway, “the two types of action [machine
action and operator action] are ontologically the same. In fact, in much of gameplay, the two
actions exist as a unified, single phenomenon, even if they are distinguishable for the purposes of
analysis.”41 Avatars are doubles; their ontology is connection, and they depend on their users for
action and being. Avatars are also halves – perhaps only halves, masquerading as doubles, and
the model of the ‘avatar’ suggests that our ontology shares something with theirs. The ‘avatar’
proposes a gestalt that is not inherent but established in the connections made through the virtual
– that is, not achieved subsequent to or separate from the connections, but precisely in the action
of making and utilizing connections.
This ontological model represents the figural potential of the avatar, to which I will later
return in considering its implications in regard to motion-capture and digital effects cinema. For
the moment, however, I turn my attention to the way in which connectivity is problematized in
avatar films. As with the cyborg, theoretical promise can run contrary to representation in
popular media, and in the next chapter I follow the question of agency relative to the avatar as
the source of certain tensions, tying it back to interactivity as problematic in itself. Echoes of the
cyborg resound as the malformed gestalt of human and technology is feared much more often
than embraced, but I also attempt in this chapter to move toward doubles, reflections, and
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images, and the discursive distinction between players and those played – an especially vexing
problem when one is playing oneself.
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CHAPTER 3
WHO’S PLAYING YOU?

Guard: Who aims – the player or the slayer?
Tillman: I’m the hand. Someone somewhere else is the eye.
Guard: That’s tripped out, man.
Tillman: Sometimes they take over completely. Move you around like a robot.
But that don’t work so good.
Guard: Why not?
Tillman: The delay.
Guard: Right, the ‘ping’. They talk about that. The time it takes for the slayer to
respond to the player’s commands.
Tillman: Whatever they call it, when you’re in the game, a slice of a second is the
difference between living and dying. When that trigger pulls . . . it’s just
me.
From Gamer
The tagline for the film Gamer is the deliberately provocative question “Who’s Playing
You?” which not only upends the conventional notion of control in gaming (as extending from
the player) but also situates the potential moviegoer in the position of the avatar – as an object of
control, devoid of agency. This bleak outlook on contemporary subjectivity as that of a
videogame character can be compared with the slogan for Kinect, Microsoft’s motion-sensing
input device for Xbox, which declares “You Are the Controller” (Fig. 15). Being the controller
rather than the controlled holds on its surface the promise of agentive fulfillment, but on closer
inspection the two slogans are more similar than dissimilar; in gaming the controller is,
traditionally at least, the plastic, tethered, utilitarian input device that is gripped and manipulated,
sometimes even pounded or thrown, in service of the more animated or complex movements of
the bodies on the screen. To be the ‘controller’ holds the double meaning of being the one in
control, as the player, as well as being the object of control – the hardware (or in this case
wetware) through which the game is played.
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Figure. 15. Advertisement for Kinect.

In this doubling we find the body circuitously implicated within the relationship between
player, machine, and code in gaming that Alexander Galloway identifies as “a singularity . . . an
undivided act wherein meaning and doing transpire in the same gamic gesture.”1 As previously
noted, rather than reading a text from a critical distance, as with traditional media forms,
Galloway avers that the player creates the gamic text in the moment of play by ‘doing’, in a
process that with practice becomes intuitive, producing a singularity. The Kinect sensor adds
somatic performance to this unifying process, as the player must precisely perform her own body
in order to succeed in the game – to play by ‘being’ the controller in both senses simultaneously.
In the game Dance Central (2010, Harmonix) the circuit of performance and control is clearly
manifest, as the player must follow the onscreen movements of the character while the Kinect
sensor records missteps and delays in keeping time with the rhythm – or lag, we might say,
recalling both the wait time for an overloaded network and the ‘ping’ in Gamer. In Dance
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Central, who is playing whom is ambiguous to say the least, as the best players are essentially
the best puppets. The game recalls a certain scene from Gamer in which protagonist John
Tillman (Gerard Butler), a death row convict and mind-controlled avatar in the lethal battle game
‘Slayers’, where his avatar handle is Kable, is made to dance by his seventeen-year-old controller
Simon (Logan Lerman) amidst gunfire and explosions; in this moment of ludic movement and
corporeal vulnerability, Tillman incarnates the film’s blood-spattered answer to the discourses of
disembodiment that once prevailed in the theorization of gaming and virtual technologies, as he
(as with Kinect) demonstrates that the body, rather than being disposable, is indispensable in the
engagement of virtual spaces, appropriated in the service of the game (Fig. 16).

Figure 16. The privileged Simon and his battle weary avatar Kable (Tillman) in
Gamer.
In both of these examples the body is aligned with the interface, with Kinect and the
“You Are the Controller” slogan positioning the body as game hardware, and “Who’s Playing
You?” and Gamer situating the human as software, as the avatar that represents the player in the
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virtual environment. Positing the body as interface carries multiple implications, from mirror
neurons and psychosomatics to phenomenological experience and gender constructivism, but the
technological interfaces for videogames and virtual environments insert a tangible and perceptual
apparatus between the player and the various modes of embodied engagement with the game
space. The controller and avatar are objects that not only exist between the physical and virtual
worlds, but which make the separation of these spaces within the gamic text possible. When the
avatar is seen as a primarily functional extension of self in game space, and the controller a tool
for access and manipulation, the interface position is utilitarian; but when the avatarial position is
inflected back on the user, and the body conscripted into the dance steps that make Dance
Central an entertaining party game (for the movement it imposes on real bodies), the interface
becomes symbolic of powerlessness. The menacing tone of “Who’s Playing You?” is not the
product of a suggestion of equally matched players meeting as opponents, but for its association
of the reader or moviegoer with the disempowered avatar – and further for its insinuation that
there is no existence outside of game space (or ‘gamespace’, as McKenzie Wark puts it). In
Gamer, as with Surrogates and The Matrix, avatar ontology serves as a model for ideological
and informational manipulation, in which autonomy is an illusion within a society of simulation
(The Matrix), ideologically suspect in a culture of vicarious living (Surrogates), or subject to the
machinations of a ubiquitous and perverse game culture (Gamer).
Steven Shaviro devotes an extensive essay to the latter film, performing a reading of
Gamer as a film about and existing within a control society, offering a ‘map’ (if not quite a
critique) of contemporary entertainment as postmodern gamespace and neoliberal capitalism as
the invisible hand making puppets of it subjects.2 Gamer’s videogame-derived aesthetics and
manic, impressionistic editing style (which Shaviro defines as ‘post-continuity’) operate in
2
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concert with the diegetic setting of a society consumed either by playing games with the bodies
of other people, or viewing the avatarial spectacle as reality television. In this chapter I ask not
only what it means to have an avatar, but to be an avatar in terms of the cultural and critical
discourse by which films that depict avatars and avatarial relationships participate in the
evolving conceptions of interactivity and virtual embodiment. Gamer’s figuring of postindustrial capitalism – and the way in which it ‘plays’ with its subjects in more ways than one, as
I discuss further below – contributes additional layers to the cultural understanding of what
avatars ‘mean’ and how they pertain to the increasing virtualization of embodiment through
multiple informational and imaging technologies. Our use and manipulation of, and desire for or
suspicion of a secondary order of bodies in the image of our own raises the question of how the
societal forces we feel (as well as enact) upon ourselves might be reflected, reenacted, or
repudiated in the bodies we create and control.
The 2007 game Assassin’s Creed (Ubisoft) bears mentioning here for its illustration of
the reiterative nature of avatarism. In the game, one plays what is essentially the avatar of an
avatar, as bartender Desmond Miles is abducted by a corporation determined to locate a number
of ancient artifacts by which it can exert mental control over people (a recurring theme in avatar
texts). The corporation forces Desmond to relive the genetic memories of his assassin forebears –
or, considering both the interface used by the player and the technology of the ‘Animus’ that
facilitates Desmond’s spatiotemporal entry into his ancestor Altaïr, to play the ‘memory’
encoded in his DNA. Success in the game is contingent upon successful reenactment, as players
are kept on task by a meter displaying the level of ‘synchronization’ between Desmond and his
avatar/ancestor, which of course is actually a measure of the player’s synchronization with the
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game. Between missions the game returns to Desmond’s incarceration, which the player
momentarily shares until linking again with Altaïr.
Desmond’s enforced sojourns into virtual reality recall the strange entertainment of the
Platonic cave, where prisoners exposed to a shadow reality came to prefer it to the blinding
world outside. Like Tillman, Desmond plays to be free, while their respective users (Simon, the
player) play for fun, and it in this compulsion the film and game are made. Desmond’s awareness
of his avatarial status is rare for a narrative-based game, while the player, though positioned to
identify with Desmond’s plight, essentially operates in the service of the corporation, playing
Desmond playing Altaïr in order to achieve its objectives; Altaïr, the (unaware) avatar of an
avatar, is the one upon whom multiple levels of control are exerted. Assassin’s Creed puts into
play a structure of control that is recursive and compulsory – theoretical territory wellestablished in Foucault’s writings on power and subjectivity. For Foucault subjectivity is
twofold, as one is both subject to discursive influence and the subject of its perpetuation in the
disciplining of behavior and the body, as can be seen in his concept of panopticism:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for
the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in
himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the
principle of his own subjection.3
For Foucault, the answer to the question of ‘who’s playing you?’ is you, as you are ultimately the
instrument for the inscription of power on yourself. Avatars are bodies subject, like our own, to
control and inscription, and in avatar films it is the avatar with which we are asked to identify –
sometimes literally, as with Gamer, and other times through sympathy for characters who are
victims of an avatarial culture, as in Surrogates, in which the protagonist peers through the
3
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ideological wool to find that the vicarious lifestyles which were meant to enhance the experience
of living have drained life of its meaning. While videogames make use of avatars, cinematic
depictions of avatars are more concerned with how we have become avatars, in narratives that
can be read in terms of Foucauldian subjection and discipline – or, as recent scholarship
suggests, relative to control society.
Critics of the political economy of gaming such as Shaviro and Galloway have turned
their attention from Foucault to the illusive utopianism of flexibility, which Galloway cites as
“one of the founding principles of global informatic control. It is to the control society what
discipline was to a previous one.”4 Deleuze outlines the ‘society of control’ in which control
operates as modulation in contrast with the mold of the enclosure theorized by Foucault in his
description of docile bodies. However, Foucault proves useful in his particular treatment of
power relative to the discipline of the (avatarial) body, as I demonstrate in a discussion of The
Matrix and Sleep Dealer. In the following section I turn my attention to two films, The
Lawnmower Man and eXistenZ that privilege modulation over the mold, and are thus most
productively approached with control society in mind.
Issues of gender undergird any discussion of agency in these films, as agentive action
primarily falls within the domain of the male protagonist. This in itself isn’t unexpected, as male
activity and female passivity within the films accord with Hollywood convention; however, the
association between masculinity and agency accrues additional significance in the context of the
disempowered avatar, as male characters contend against an encroaching virtuality that threatens
agency, while their female and raced counterparts, already understood as ‘closer’ to the avatarial
position and more familiar with the virtualization of the body, become facilitators for the medial
transitions of the white male, or characters in need of rescue from a virtuality that has consumed
4
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them. Galloway’s preference of the term ‘action-based media’ over ‘interactivity’ in his
theorization of gaming is particularly interesting relative to these cinematic depictions of
masculinity, as action implies a vector, power applied unidirectionally, while interactivity
implies greater possibility for bidirectional influence and exchange.5 Recent scholarship has
problematized conventional notions of interactivity, and the figure of the avatar occupies a
central place in manifestations of the question of who is playing whom, and when, if ever, we
can say “it’s just me.”

Re-working the Docile Body
Before Neo is Neo, he is Thomas Anderson, hacker and coppertop. The Matrix envisions
a world in which humans have become a power source for machine overlords; enclosed
physically in pods and mentally in the ‘neural-interactive simulation’ of the Matrix, humans circa
2199 are incarcerated in a world of Baudrillardian simulation, but also as exemplary (if
overdetermined) models of the docile body, which “may be subjected, used, transformed, and
improved,” as described by Foucault.6 Docile bodies are the bodies of individuals made to
conform to certain roles and performances through systems of discipline, generally involving an
‘enclosure’ (an institution or organization) which provides specialized, ideological education by
separating individuals out for training. With the pod and simulation enclosures facilitating
docility in the Matrix, the machines separate the physical and mental realms of the subject,
supplanting the physical body and world with an immersive virtual reality. Thus integral to the
Cartesian structure imposed by the machines is a form of virtual embodiment that engages the
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embodied mind so it should not miss its sleeping body. Emerging from the Matrix, then,
introduces the mind to its actual physical body. But Neo (Keanu Reeves) does not stay out for
long, as he soon re-enters the Matrix after working through training simulations in Matrix-like
virtual spaces. From our own embodied perspective, it is easy to think of his training as learning
to differentiate physical embodiment from virtual embodiment, but of course Neo had for most
of his life only experienced the latter, and had been physical only a few days. Thus his return was
not simply a transition from the physical to the virtual, but a return to the virtual with a new tool:
interactivity.
Christian Krug and Joachim Frenk note that interactivity was key for Neo’s break from
the simulation of the Matrix; initially freed by a hack, he then becomes a transcendent hacker
able to exert control over the Matrix. However, Krug and Frenk note that the tie-in videogame
Enter the Matrix (2003, Shiny Entertainment), which promised to extend the Matrix experience
and allow fans to enter and interact with the world presented in the films, was ironically linear
and restrictive, allowing only minimal interactivity outside accomplishing pre-designated tasks.
Philosophical declarations of determinism in the film extend quite literally to the structure of the
game, they write, as playing it only brings about story events that were always going to happen
anyway. The game thus becomes a tool for control, figuring as “just another extension of the
great game that is the Matrix.”7
Character-based videogames in general tend to follow a more or less predetermined
course through levels and tasks, and a geography that often only yields one correct (or even one
possible) course. “Video games are computer-and-monitor-supported activities that select a small
basketful out of all the possible ways that embodied brains may relate to worlds and other
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agents.”8 Interactivity in gaming (particularly the popular character-based adventure variety)
tends to offer a limited form of agency, as linearity predominates, and progression is tied to
compliance rather than innovation.9 Repetition comes to typify videogame experience as players
rehearse the same actions multiple times in an attempt to get them right rather than devising
different solutions to solve problems. “Not only are the conventional limits of the game itself
revealed at such moments,” writes Andrew Darley, “but so is its pre-programmed character: the
element of control and choice it seems to offer is revealed as illusory – just as predetermined as
most formulaic narrative.”10
Thus while interactivity within digital media has certainly changed media consumption
and continues to hold many promises, it is clear that interactivity cannot simply be conflated with
agency. Lev Manovich argues that in computer culture “authentic creation has been replaced by
selection from a menu,” and thus the mythos of interactivity must be interrogated to uncover the
form of agency it provides in any given context.11 Examining the forms that interactivity
assumes in videogames, we see that while games offer a variety of performative actions
(jumping, shooting, etc.), repetition is the action that most succinctly defines gameplay. Behavior
within the game world is disciplined through learning to execute certain actions in a particular
way, which allows the player to proceed to the next level and reach the (pre-determined, linear)
ending of the game. The disciplining of behavior is produced through a disciplining of bodies –
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the correct and precise movements of the player’s fingers and thumbs on the controller, and the
corresponding (though misaligned) movements of the character body in the game.12 Wii
controllers, which facilitate greater body movement, and the camera-based system of Kinect
require more involvement of the body and more analogous movement, and thus greater discipline
over the body of the player – even as these systems draw on a sense of naturalized movement as
the basis for their games (or ‘remediate’ analog movements, such as swinging a tennis racket).
Shira Chess writes that repetition in videogames is an example of the disciplinary tactics
that produce the pliable docile bodies described by Foucault: “the game’s controls and interface
create a system that both facilitates game mastery and produces an environment where players
can be easily taught.”13 Mastery over the game is thus ultimately connected to the player’s
complicity in being mastered by the game. This can be seen, as Chess points out, in the way that
certain game elements (like a map which directs the player where to go) “not only give the
player more control over their actions, but the game’s designers more control over the player.”14
Control and being controlled go hand in hand, and between these two points is the avatar body,
which is both the object of control and the representation of the controlling subject in the space
of the game.15
In contrast to videogames, virtual worlds offer a much less structured interactive
experience. For some this aspect makes virtual worlds unappealing (videogames remain
12
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exponentially more popular), but others are drawn to the relative freedom afforded by graphical
virtual worlds such as Second Life that function as social networks within an open-ended
environment. Since avatars in these spaces are generally highly customizable and social
interaction occurs through or with avatars, the early mythos of the avatar was centered on its
reflexivity. “Virtual worlds provide people with a mirror,” writes Richard Bartle, and virtual
world designers “get to make the mirror.”16 Avatar-enhanced communication prompted Sherry
Turkle’s experiments in identity play, which hinged on a two-way interactivity: the user designs
the avatar body, the appearance or manifestation of which then influences the behavior of the
user. While more recent scholarship has contested the degree to which identities can be
refashioned, anecdotal evidence abounds of users acting differently within avatar guises.17 This
impact on behavior does not on its surface seem to be the product of a deterministic design,
leading users along a certain path; but to the extent that virtual worlds (not just avatars) act as
mirrors, we must also question how experience is structured through the construction of virtual
spaces, bodies, and interfaces – and the particular nature of their reflections.
Idealized notions of interactivity, from avatar design to clicking through a website, imply
that the user is able to shape his or her experience with digital online media and also shape
aspects of the medium itself, choosing what links to click on and what options to engage. But
beyond the ways in which users shape computer space, Manovich is concerned with how the
computer shapes human experience. For instance, whereas reading a sentence once gave rise to
any number of associations the reader might make, a hyperlinked sentence feigns depth while in
fact restricting thought to “pre-programmed, objectively existing associations,” which Manovich
16
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aligns with Althusser’s concept of interpellation, in which “we are asked to mistake the structure
of somebody else’s mind for our own.” He continues:

This is a new kind of identification appropriate for the information age of cognitive labor.
The cultural technologies of an industrial society – cinema and fashion – asked us to
identify with someone else’s bodily image. Interactive media ask us to identify with
someone else’s mental structure. If the cinema viewer, male and female, lusted after and
tried to emulate the body of the movie star, the computer user is asked to follow the
mental trajectory of the new media designer.18

Graphical virtual worlds ask us to do both, as cognition and experiential embodiment intersect in
the representations of self within avatar bodies. Thus we can get a sense of the circuitry of
designer, user, and avatar, mediated through the technologies of virtual spaces. The designer
creates the parameters and possibilities of the world, the types of bodies it supports and permits,
the nature of the space in which virtual bodies exist, the amount and type of modifications the
user is able to make to bodies and space within the virtual environment, the way it appears to the
user and others, etc. Constrained by these possibilities, the user creates and/or controls a virtual
body while cognitively and affectively relating his or her own ‘bodily image’ (and sense of
embodiment) to the body on the screen and the space in which it exists. Beyond the
technological constraints are ideological concerns, such as capitalistic elements in Second Life:
functioning as a relatively free space which privileges user creation over owner design, the
Second Life model is yet founded on land ownership and development, and commerce, fashion,
and advertising are driving forces in Second Life activity – forces in which avatar bodies are
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caught up.19 (Ideological influences become additionally salient when we consider that virtual
worlds are increasingly popular with children.)20
Ideological hegemony functions in The Matrix as a means of control over the
unawakened humans, although the machines are less concerned with content than effects; their
aim is the exploitation of the physical body, and the Matrix in its various iterations (we learn that
earth life circa 1999 is the one that worked best) is put in place to keep the humans docile rather
than to instill any particular ideology (while the film itself critiques a cultural complicity with
simulational culture). The ideal form of the Matrix simulation, which results in the greatest
degree of control and fewest occurrences of rebellion, is one that not only places humans in the
‘shared hallucination’ of a large-scale persistent environment, but one that first of all situates
them in a form of virtual embodiment that they can accept as real. Thus when the awakened Neo
re-enters virtual space, his success there is dependent on learning to divorce his sense of reality
from the virtual body that he once simply ‘lived’ as Thomas Anderson and now must perform or
operate as an avatar. Neo applies a hacker ethic to the virtual body and its environment, figuring
out how to break through the ‘reality’ of gravity and physical space. “Do you think that’s air
you’re breathing?” Morpheus (Laurence Fishburne) asks Neo in the simulation, provoking him
to change his cognitive relationship with his avatar body through repetition and what James L.
Ford calls “a techno-cyber version of meditation.”21 Meditation is a means of ‘reprogramming’
the mind through the discipline of the body, held in quiet repose or the careful movements of
19
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martial arts. Following the download of the kung fu program, Neo must translate his computergenerated ‘knowledge’ to the virtual body that has never performed the movements he now
knows how to do, while we watch the computer-aided body of Keanu Reeves float across the
screen, transitioning from photographic body to what Andrew Shail refers to as the gravityirrespective ‘cinematic body’ that defines movement in the Matrix.22
The discipline of the mind through philosophy, meditation, and training works to
integrate Neo’s cognitive relation to his avatar body with the phenomenological experience of
his embodiment. It is not his physical body that learns kung fu (he doesn’t fight in the real world
like he does in the Matrix23), but his embodied mind, through the interactive embodiment which
controls his avatar or ‘residual self-image’ (an image that wasn’t really imported from the
physical world – otherwise it would be shorn and pale – but from another virtual space, where he
once performed his avatar body differently).
In The Matrix, hacking computers is visually translated to martial arts fighting, rejecting
the disembodying informational computer space that provides the menacing context for other
cyberspace texts in favor of the movement and mastery of the stylized body. David Gabbard
identifies a ‘double-enclosure’ in The Matrix that corresponds to Foucault’s definition of the
enclosures that produce docile bodies: the Matrix as a ‘prison of the mind’, but also the enclosure
of the body. The avatar gives form to the abstractions of embodiment, but also enables, restricts,
and colors embodiment through its particular modalities. Learning to use an avatar, whether in a
videogame or virtual world, means learning to be embodied in the new space and body, and
learning to use one’s own body to facilitate the new embodiment – the combination of buttons to
22
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jump and kick at the same time, for instance, or the best time to flick the Wii controller to adjust
for the slight delay in response. The bodies of jacked-in characters in The Matrix are for the most
part inert, and thus the step of moving one body to control the movement of another is
eliminated; however, Neo still moves with his residual ‘body’ – or residual sense of embodiment,
rather than simply the body image – which is then trained to become a powerful avatar.
In the film, humans are exploited in pods while their avatars are free to roam within the
virtual simulation – or in the ‘reality’ of this virtuality – free to work at their virtual jobs, for
avatar bosses who penalize for tardiness (even though no one has left the pod). This double
exploitation – of humans by machines, and humans by other humans – places bodies at the center
of ideological and systemic pulls, with the machines on one end and a capitalist system of labor
on the other, and human bodies and their avatars doing double work to sustain both. In their
docility these bodies become both “subjected and practised,” as

discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes
these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the
body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a ‘capacity’, which it seeks to
increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might
result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. If economic exploitation
separates the force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion
establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an
increased domination.24

In the avatarial relation, bodies are situated interstitially, as connecting links: between the
videogame player and the game designer, or between player and the game world to be
conquered; between social relationships among users in virtual worlds, the user and his or her
perception of self, and the user and the image culture that informs the construction of avatar
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bodies; and in avatar films often between character and diegetic growth or fulfillment, as a
facilitator or an obstacle, or both. In The Matrix, to assume the avatar from outside the pod is to
hack and re-work the docile body, converting it from anesthetized cubicle worker (a passive
power source) to a dynamic virtual agent of the user. Interestingly, it becomes the task of the
character to discipline his or her own body, as we see in Neo’s training. He has been fitted with
new knowledge, and is guided in his training by Morpheus, but Neo must do the final and most
personal work in disciplining the body, that it might operate at greatest capacity in the tasks for
which it has been enlisted.
Trinity becomes the mirror to his quest, intimately tied to him (and his double in
appearance), but never able to be the One, as her proficiency in the Matrix only makes her a
better ‘two’; her name alludes to the irresolvable assemblage of deity that is never quite one
because it is always also three. Neo’s white masculinity positions him as antagonistic to his
bifurcated avatarial position (a dilemma he shares with Cypher [Joe Pantoliano], who opts to
return to the false unity of ignorance in the Matrix), and his agency is directed toward
overcoming the virtuality of the Matrix by defeating its source and freeing the humans from their
enclosures. Trinity serves as helpmeet, furthering Neo’s trajectory toward transcendence and
unity – which we must note, however, he never fully achieves, his sacrifice instead resulting in
stasis.25
Sleep Dealer explores the utility of the docile body, and the exploitation not only of
bodies but of the avatarial relation itself. The film interweaves boundary transgression and
border crossing in a story about Mexican workers who are employed in the U.S. but never leave
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Mexico. With nodes implanted in their arms and necks they manipulate high-tech robots in the
U.S. from Tijuana factories – the ‘sleep dealers’, so-called for the tendency of workers to lose
themselves during long shifts and eventually collapse (Fig. 17). In the story, Memo (Luis
Fernando Peña) leaves his family’s milpa after the death of his father, which results when his
own amateur hacking attempts are picked up by authorities. He gets a job as a virtual
construction worker in San Diego and, standing in a long line of workers connected to cables and
oxygen masks, performs his labor by pantomime in a dark yet oddly beautiful dance of
particularly alien(ated) labor.

Figure 17. Telepresent labor in Sleep Dealer.

The film does not explain why the robots in this futuristic world do not work
autonomously, though one can infer that, in what seems to be a keen observation on the
economics of advanced technology, foreign workers remain cheaper than advanced AI. The work
is long and draining, producing a loss of essence or vitality: “sometimes you control the
machine, sometimes it controls you,” warns Luz (Leonor Varela), the young woman who gives
Memo his ‘node job’ – another feminine facilitator. The economic hold of the job over the
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worker is instantiated in the images of Memo’s labor, as the glowing interface cables that stream
from the ceiling to the arms and wrists of the workers form an image of strange marionettes,
puppets on vascular and neurological strings.
Indeed, the placement of the nodes on the body are situated to evoke manual labor, with
multiple points at the hand, arm, and shoulder rather than the Matrix-style single spike to the
brain (those freed from the pods actually have multiple nodes distributed across their bodies, but
these are neglected in their return to the Matrix). The spike produces a cerebral virtuality that
leaves the physical body inert, while the virtual movements in Sleep Dealer require an enactment
of the labor, its movements without its materials. Strapped to wires and limited in this way, the
virtual worker could scarcely perform, say, acrobatic kung fu, as in The Matrix; nor could he or
she, tethered to an assigned robot, live vicariously through a cosmetically ideal body, as in
Surrogates. In the movies not all virtualities are equal – a condition that parallels Jennifer
Gonzalez’s observation of historical cyborgism, wherein “those who had access to certain
machines were privileged, those who were expected to behave like certain machines were
subjugated.”26 Inequality is evident in the various interfaces employed by cinematic avatar users:
the prongs and sockets that mark the bodies in Sleep Dealer and The Matrix, the softer interface
that lays over the eyes in Surrogates or lightly on the face in Avatar, and the hypermedia womb
of the spoiled rich boy in Gamer. The marginalized and poor bear the marks and components of
technology and are subjected to the physical penetration of a hard connection; the consumer class
wears it gently on the skin while in repose; the privileged user, for whom the interface has
become purely a screen, doesn’t touch the equipment at all.27 The vascular cabling and multiple
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node sites in Sleep Dealer also illustrate the requirement of the worker to give not only time and
energy over to the labor of the avatar, but the vitality of the biological body as well. The contact
points embedded in the hand, arm, and shoulder reflect the role of these parts as embodied tools
of the worker – unusual in an avatar film, where the movements of one body are typically
divorced from the other (Fig. 18).

Figure 18. Vascuar cabling in Sleep Dealer.

The worker in Sleep Dealer is both puppet and puppeteer, virtual and embodied, alien
and alienated. In a Foucauldian diffusion of power the virtual laborer produces a miniaturized
enactment of the influences of power on his own body transferred onto another. Power is not
simply conveyed, however, as if Memo as the intermediary subject were merely a conduit, but it
becomes part of his subjectivity, so that in the instantiation of power the subject finds himself
alone – Memo is compelled to work the robot body as a condition of his employment, but the job
only creates the conditions for the intimate power he must exercise in the uncanny dance of the
connections. However, their appearance as revolutionaries of a sort in the end of the film suggests that they occupy a
marginalized position outside of the ExistenZ game.
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two bodies. In the economics of alienated labor, this exercise of power leaves him powerless
still. The film’s ending leaves him in Tijuana, presumably still employed at the sleep dealer,
having more or less accepted his (unjust) fate. Luz, who uses her own nodes to upload the
memories she sells to make a living, is portrayed by the film in a very different light – not as a
victim acquiescing to the reality of the virtualized economy, but as profiting from it (if only
marginally) as a ‘writer’ of sorts, much more in her place than the emasculated Memo.

Avatars of Technology
The virtualization of the economy occupies a central place in Deleuze’s description of the
society of control, where corporations exist as nebulous, fluid entities in contradistinction to the
rigidity of the factory. While Memo’s work is wired and futuristically telepresent, the setting for
labor perpetuates the model of the factory, even bolstering its Fordist capacities by conforming
mobile jobs such as picking fruit and driving a cab into an assembly line model. Race and
nationality clearly inform this vision of twenty-first century upgrades to a nineteenth century
system, as factory work in our present era is increasingly farmed out to third world countries for
lower wages. The corporation, which Deleuze refers to as a ‘spirit’ or a ‘gas’, floats above these
labor realities as an amorphous, flexible body disassociated from the physical body of the
worker.
Control society is also defined by its flexibility, as it modulates itself in response to
changing conditions rather than seeking to establish conformity. The machine of the control
society is the computer with its capacity for efficient alteration amidst the fluidity of informatics.
(It is notable that the dominating technology in both Sleep Dealer and The Matrix is robotic
hardware, which is itself rooted in the clockwork ideal emblematized by the automaton.)
Computers, VR interfaces, and avatars are the potent images in The Lawnmower Man, where
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virtual technologies are presented as promise turned pathogen, metastasizing through the
avatarial body. Jobe (Jeff Fahey) transforms from feminized simpleton to intelligent hard body
through the disciplinary regime imposed on him, but doesn’t stop there, growing cancerously
instead into an unfettered cyber-god. eXistenZ places its characters in a VR game with shifting
logic and biological hardware that makes it difficult to discern where agency and bodies begin
and end. While the direction of control in eXistenZ is clearly manifested in a one-to-one relation
between player and avatar (a relationship also particularly indexical, as the appearance of the
actors doesn’t change across the interface), the Cronenbergian horror of the game lies in its
iterative nature, as every player is also an avatar, and thus agentive control imposed on one’s
character may simply be a reflection of the control imposed on oneself.

Figure 19. Chimp POV in a training simulation in The Lawnmower Man.
The Lawnmower Man begins with a Foucauldian image of the soldier, which Foucault
uses to typify the docile body. Whereas men who demonstrated certain qualities were once
plucked from the populace to be soldiers, training regimens came to supplant selection with
production as soldiers were made rather than found. The Lawnmower Man opens with an
interesting play on the soldier made, as a VR interface and a game-like battle simulation are used
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to turn chimpanzees into killing machines (Fig. 19). The chimp successfully performs in the
simulation, but the VR training and psychotropic drugs have produced a surplus of aggression
and the chimp goes on a rampage, shooting guards and mounting a failed escape from the
laboratory compound where Dr. Angelo (Pierce Brosnan) conducts his experiments.
Although through this incident Angelo has recently witnessed the negative effects that
mind control can have on bodies, his first impulse upon getting to know the mentally
handicapped Jobe is to give him a similar treatment, with some adjustments to temper the
aggression (which ultimately fail). He promises Jobe that he can make him smarter while
bettering his social standing, preventing people from taking advantage of him. The training
begins with videogames, and while Jobe performs poorly in a computer-administered
intelligence test he does better in a flying game, where we see his first engagement with virtual
space through an avatar. Going deeper, Angelo introduces him to more advanced VR
applications which Angelo sees as “the key to the evolution of the human mind,” reflecting the
longstanding assumption that new ways of seeing and organizing space produce new
epistemological possibilities (which the film ultimately counters with the paranoia of information
technology producing new ways of being influenced and controlled). Jobe’s training progresses
with his acclimation to virtual space, and then to the sort of downloaded education that would
later appear in The Matrix – except for Jobe it brings pain rather than a rush.
Pain becomes a defining aspect of Jobe’s transformation, and it is pain he later
vindictively inflicts on others. The intense drug regimen and accelerated mental enhancement
seem to be literally restructuring his neural network, manifest in the torment and perspiration on
his face. The discipline of the mind exacts a toll on the body, and Jobe’s increasing mental power
is also marked with bodily shifts. Claudia Springer notes that initially Jobe is coded feminine,
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with his long hair and submissive personality, but after the VR treatments becomes
hypermasculine, with taut muscles and a cowboy’s swagger – thus rejecting the possibility that
biological gender might give way to more fluid definitions. His physical transformation thus
serves a compensatory role in re-establishing gender roles, and I would also add that it
compensates for the inertness of the body in front of the computer monitor – like Neo, Jobe is no
desk jockey. Rather than the power of information on a server or network, power is located in the
body, and the muscles signify his power (or the power enacted through him) corresponding to the
avatar bodies he assumes in the virtual world, which evolve in their iterations from innocuous to
menacing (Fig. 20). Virtual embodiment is what distinguishes his experience from more
conventional computer use, aligning the power of the computer and the locus of the embodied
self in a dangerous and unstable fusion. Eventually, virtual embodiment in the avatar is not
enough, and Jobe seeks a new body – a body of cables and computers and endless virtual space,
in the hardware and software of networked technology itself.
The training that Angelo institutes for Jobe thus reintroduces the problem encountered
earlier with the chimp: endowing the subject with greater capacity for self-determination results
in decreased control over the subject. But Jobe’s increased agency is not only a problem for
Angelo, it also brings difficulty for Jobe, whose transformation as a result of his use of VR is not
simply an IQ bump but a complete psychological and physiological change. Notably, it is not
until he becomes more aggressive as a result of the training and drugs that Jobe even begins to
assert himself within virtual space, as previously he was always guided by Angelo and subjected
to the technological re-education facilitated by the program. In the question of who is in control
and who is being controlled, Jobe never enjoys the sense of interactive control promised by the
technology until it has already exerted control over him, and thus the trajectory of his character
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from one of limited to ultimate agency is imbued with the technology that produces him – that is,
it is no longer Jobe’s story, it seems, but the story of the technology that forms the new Jobe,
instantiated in Jobe’s old body before it is finally shed.

Figure 20. Jobe’s avatars grow increasingly menacing in The Lawnmower Man.
Even as Jobe begins to exert his destructive power over other characters, he is yet a
victim, as Paul Young sees him – but a victim in that he (and we) are part of a society in which
information systems have thoroughly permeated contemporary life. Thus Jobe is a “victim of
VR’s encroachment on the real, rather than a victimizing hacker pure and simple,” who “turns
into a fascistic monster in part because he is too mentally immature to understand the
implications of the powers he wields” – a Frankenstein for the digital age.28 Young further points
out that the origin of the telepathic and telekinetic powers Jobe develops are given no
explanation other than being generally associated with his use of VR, and in this the film exudes
a paranoia of virtual technologies while at the same time granting them mystical powers – not
only for use in controlling others, but comprising forces that threaten to control the user as well.
The Lawnmower Man exemplifies what Young calls the ‘hacker myth’ (computers offer
28
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uncontrollable power to irresponsible subjects) and the ‘myth of total media’ (the fear that
computer media will completely penetrate reality) in that Jobe the hacked becomes Jobe the
hacker, who accesses minds and disintegrates bodies on his way to diffusing himself within the
network, taking over the global telecommunications system. However, the genesis of Jobe the
techno-god lies with Dr. Angelo and VR; since Angelo’s intentions were relatively good (if
misguided), the film places culpability on the technology itself, for “ultimately the technology
provides the conduit and powerfully determines its own use; human input is neither requested
nor desired.”29 The cinematic response of The Lawnmower Man to the competing technology of
computer media is to characterize interactivity as an unpredictable, mysterious force, where the
agency and control facilitated by interactive media threaten both the public and the individual.
VR in the popular imagination augurs a possible future modality for interactions with
computers and digital media that would be defined by senses of immersion and direct perception.
VR collapses the distance between users and the mediated images and information that are
presented for their ‘experience’, rather than simply for viewing. Ken Hillis argues that “virtual
technology achieves a new form of spatialized power, based on unseen computational abilities
with which my body is rendered complicit.”30 Whereas in embodied reality perception precedes
conception – I perceive my environment and base my comprehension on what I see or sense – in
VR the conception of the designer of a virtual space precedes the user’s perception, which
suggests “the loss of my perception’s primacy, and by extension, loss of self-reflexive
abilities.”31 The conjunction of a highly constructed media environment with a user position
(overly) near the medium, which prohibits or diminishes the ability to maintain a critical or
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thoughtful distance, produces the potential for ideological control (the same potential theorized
in the cinematic apparatus).32
The feminized Jobe is subsumed by the technology because he is unable to achieve an
objective distance, instead receiving its effects in his body as much as his mind.33 The more
intelligent Angelo is able to maintain a critical distance in his own use of VR, saving the full
treatment for his hapless subject in the Dr. Frankenstein role he assumes – recklessly playing god
(and creating one). Jobe’s inexperience with virtual technology makes him vulnerable, as his
adeptness with machines is limited to the mechanical, casting him as a machine age relic who is
unprepared for a technology that manifests itself in computer-generated images and
informational abstraction. Technology no longer appears as what it is, but dissimulates itself
behind screens as it channels information; Jobe, failing to discern the difference, flies too near.
Also, as with the cinematic apparatus, the sense of direct perception in VR is associated with a
subconscious level of reception: “The VR experience eludes cognitive defences and directly
stimulates the subconscious,” concludes one paper on VR and psychotherapy.34 In the film, direct
stimulation becomes a portal to the brain through which information can be transferred. As with
The Matrix, traditional learning is superseded by the download, but access to the mind leaves
marks on the body.
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In The Matrix the plug penetrates, but Jobe receives his information through the eyes in a
sort of inversive gaze, as he is penetrated ocularly by the VR interface that forces information
into his brain. It is interesting to note, then, that the first manifestation of his growing aggression
takes feminine form as he inflicts a version of the technological suffering he has endured,
repeating his victimization. His cybersexual encounter with Marnie (Jenny Wright) is initially
pictured as an ideal of cohesion and harmony as the two bodies become one, melding into a twoheaded dragonfly; after they have disjoined, however, he takes monstrous form and rapes her
mind, leaving her debilitated.35 No particular action by Marnie provokes this reaction, and so it
seems to come from somewhere deep inside him, from a place that he himself is not entirely
aware of. Springer describes his transmuted form as a “roaring monster from the id,” the “rage of
the patriarchal unconscious,” but overlooks the particularly vaginal shape of his monstrous
mouth.36 In a visual contrast to a penetrative characterization of cyberspace (such as that made
by Alluquere Rosanne Stone, attributed to an “inarticulate longing of the male for the female,”
Marnie (and the viewer) are swallowed up by an enveloping orifice.37 Situated as mouth the
orifice suggests incorporation, but its smoothness and roundness imply a different violence, of
being consumed by a (toothless) vagina dentata that surrounds and overwhelms rather than
penetrates. Jobe rapes by envelopment and subsumption, stealing Marnie’s mind into himself
while evoking the mental penetration enacted on him in his training, in which Angelo rapidly and
repeatedly forces information into Jobe’s brain; in other words, he rapes from the position of
victim.
Eventually, Jobe ‘becomes’ his avatar, leaving his physical body behind and existing only
in the virtual world or the body of the network, obliterating the avatarial relation between two
35
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bodies through the destruction of one of them. What is monstrous in The Lawnmower Man,
however, is triumphant in Avatar as Jake exchanges his human body for his avatar body, and a
life incomplete for one fulfilled. In each case the photographic physical body is traded for a
digital one, but whereas the aesthetic of Jake’s lithe new body is naturalistic and smooth, Jobe’s
avatar is caught up in the spectacle of itself as a digital effect, exuding an otherness that must be
diegetically contained and destroyed. The evolving Jobe considers his physical body restrictive
and his docility past its usefulness, and thus a new body is needed in order to accommodate his
increasing modulations.
Jobe’s transformation encompasses dual myths of disembodiment, as both a transcendent
victory over his handicapped, feminized body, and as a monstrous, dehumanized void.
Abstracted from his fleshy body, Jobe becomes dependent on the mainframe computer that
contains the essence of the self that he has withdrawn from his body. The fact that he is
threatened by the bombs that destroy the laboratory demonstrates that Jobe’s ‘body’ remains in
some sense physical – that he cannot simply become pure information. His escape into the
telecommunications network can thus be seen as the assumption of a new body, distributed and
dehumanized but still physical. Throughout the film, Jobe’s increasing presence in the virtual
world and his violations of physical law are consistently grounded in the material body – in his
muscles and sexuality, his pain and perspiration, and finally the body of the computer and
network. Jobe manages to escape the mainframe’s firewalls and execute his birth cry of making
every phone in the world ring simultaneously, but since we never return to his digital avatar
body, the ringing of the phones becomes the singular expression of the networked being; thus at
the conclusion of the film he is not quite an entity contained within a technological system, but
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one seemingly absorbed by it, the two becoming one – the technology that he has become, or that
has overcome him.
A disturbing nearness to technology also permeates David Cronenberg’s eXistenZ (1999)
in the biotechnologies that facilitate access to the game and resurface in its play. The organic
MetaFlesh game pod, made from mutated amphibian parts, connects to the player via a Bio-Port,
located at the base of the spine. The UmbyCord (as in ‘umbilical’, which it resembles) carries
game information from the pod to the user, but also the energy and emotion of the user back to
the pod (Fig. 21). The strange, organ-like flesh of the game pod makes the connection between
human and machine at some indeterminate animalistic point in between; when Donna Haraway
broke down boundaries between humans, animals, and machines, she perhaps could not have
anticipated this strange image of the conflation of all three.

Figure 21. Players linked in to the game eXistenZ via UmbyCords.
Not only are the players of the game eXistenZ situated biologically near their technology,
the technology is too intimate with them. Steve Keane writes of the MetaFlesh pod, “it plugs into
the players, rather than vice-versa,” interiorizing gamespace in the collective minds and bodies
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of the players.38 The game pod is an odd interface in that it does not feature buttons or other
traditional input devices for controlling the game, but is rather controlled by suggestive stroking
– a sort of pseudo-sexual coaxing – rather than concise input. The connection between body and
technology is thus mediated by an uncanny organism that incorporates aspects of each and yet
seems to be incomplete or malformed, while connecting to the game seems closer to a blood
transfusion than a download. When Pikul (Jude Law) expresses concern about having a hole put
in his body, Allegra (Jennifer Jason Leigh), the game’s designer who is in certain ways just as
lost in it as the neophyte Pikul, offers cold comfort by opening her mouth wide, doing less to
naturalize the new umbilicus than to serve as a reminder that mouths, too, are openings for
contagion. The implication is that as the pod (and by extension the game) becomes infected or
corrupted, so the body and mind of the player are at risk. As a quasi-living thing, the pod is not
an instrument but an entity, and to connect to the game is to give oneself over to it. Thus in
eXistenZ, as with The Matrix and The Lawnmower Man, immersion in virtual environments is
equated with “the psychosomatic nightmare of losing control of the body” – a theme which
characterizes much of Cronenberg’s other work as well.39
The loss of the body and the loss of reality run frequently on parallel planes, as we have
seen; the ability to control the virtual body is diegetically restorative, a means of dominating the
game environment and reasserting masculinity. Neo’s discipline allows him to use his avatar
body as a hack, operating not outside of the logic of the Matrix, but achieving virtuosity within it
and affecting its reality from the inside; Jobe on the other hand is from the outset lost in his
alienating graphical body, while his physical body acts as an interface or opening of sorts for the
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infection of the real world by the virtual. Jobe’s supernatural control is equated with a loss of
control – a lack of discipline. ExistenZ’s MetaFlesh controllers move control of the body to the
metonymic abstraction of an externalized organ, and succeeding in the game is in a certain
respect dependent on properly coaxing the pod and keeping it healthy while at the same time
being subject to its whims; control is circuitous and shared rather than vectorial, for both
gameplay with the pod and in the iterative game space in which there is no clear direction of
control (Fig. 22).

Figure 22. Controlling the game by subjecting oneself to the pod in eXistenZ.
The game space in eXistenZ is simultaneously transparent and opaque, as what appears at
first to be a clear logic of avatarial engagement has by the end become ambiguous; Pikul and
Allegra, having ascended through a game within a game, are at the end of the film faced with the
desperate question: “Are we still in the game?” Cronenberg creates this opacity precisely by
omitting the kinds of distinctions between the real and virtual worlds that we see in other avatar
films. As Pikul and Allegra occasionally enter and leave the game, their physical and virtual
bodies and the physical and virtual spaces are analogous – same actors, same appearance, with a
relatively similar palette in the visual look of the film on either side of the interface. Even when
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the characters find themselves in rather unusual settings, including a factory for the game pods
themselves (placing them for a moment on the production side of the pods they are presently
jacked into, as if the pod reflexively ponders its own malformed existence), Cronenberg’s
restrained, unvarnished treatment avoids the cues that in other films accompany moves across the
interface – the digital graphics in The Lawnmower Man, the green tint of the Matrix, the
airbrushed smoothness of the bodies in Surrogates. In this he disavows any sense of a computer
game in favor of a ubiquitous cinematic modality – cinema is the real, and the virtual too. The
bodies of the characters (and actors) thus become disguises in a bit of cinematic trickery, as the
audience is given no means for distinguishing between the physical and the virtual at the level of
the image; when Cronenberg pulls the rug out from under the diegetic logic that has separated
the various spaces, the uniformity of their visual mode becomes pronounced. Every player is the
avatar of another within a perpetual cinema that can only move up or down levels into more
cinema, which situates the film medium itself as a sort of interface between the virtual and the
real.
The answer here to the question of ‘who’s playing you’ seems again to be you, as the
characters seem to be playing themselves – but a you that you don’t know and can’t see, with an
agenda that is invisible to you. In addition, the characters seem to be played by the film in a
manner recalling Godard’s Weekend (1967), in which the beleaguered characters ask passersby
whether they are in reality or a film; discovering that they seem to be in the latter provides no
relief or escape however, as they are eventually captured (and eaten) by cannibalistic
revolutionaries, never able to overcome their subjection to the film. Cronenberg translates this
ethic to an age of virtual reality, and the film is interesting for its malefic imposition of film form
on the game, obliquely exposing the invisible hand of control that is here ‘played’ by the
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director. In the final scene of the film Pikul and Allegra shoot the designer of the game (a standin for Cronenberg, and the position held by Allegra within the other game iterations) for
deforming reality, but their fire misses the mark as Cronenberg has stepped aside, leaving the
audience in the position of the ‘player’, complicit in the manipulation of the characters on the
screen.

Playing the Player
Virtual reality theorist Michael Heim once diagnosed the sensory discord following the
use of a VR device as ‘Alternate World Syndrome’, a “technology sickness, a lag between the
natural and artificial environments” that shows “the human being merging, yet still out of phase,
with the machine.”40 Lag as pathology is reconfigured in Gamer as the ‘ping’, the infinitesimal
delay in (the inevitable) compliance to the voice of control, but the sickness is a societal
complicity with the mechanisms of a control that consumes and manipulates its subjects, moving
from a VR fantasy of imaginary worlds to a dystopian vision of play as sadism. The
schizophrenic Gamer comes across as a hypocritical didacticism, chastening videogame culture
with a cinema of exploitation and violence of the sort that provided the aesthetic foundation for
the kinds of games the film is critical of. The film generates sympathy for the avatar, but also,
like eXistenZ, places the audience in the player position as we must to a certain extent go along
with the way the directors play with their characters. Tillman is given the capacity to resist, but
Angie is trapped in her own body as a Society avatar played by a slovenly, obese man whose
enjoyment in debasing her is matched only by his bored disregard for her life. All of the Society
players are depicted as depraved and cruel, featured in anonymous close-ups as disembodied

40

Heim, “Design of Virtual Reality,” 68.

156

faces with lecherous expressions, but Angie’s player Gorge (Ramsey Moore) inspires the
greatest contempt (Fig. 23).

Figure 23. Angie’s player Gorge, in Gamer.
Here again the filmmaker seems to have a stand-in in the film – or rather two, in Simon
and Gorge, one for each co-director. The gleeful cynicism that permeates Gamer seems rooted in
the way that Neveldine and Taylor ‘play’ the film, from their renegade approach to editing to
their embrace of the portable Red One camera that allowed them to shoot action sequences on
rollerblades. The avatarial predicament of their characters puts the characters at the mercy of the
film via their players: the over-privileged gamer Simon who plays for sport, and the
reprehensible Gorge who delights in manipulation. Neveldine and Taylor combine the force of
the gaze with the power of the controller, subjecting their characters to eye and thumb while
subtly displacing their own sadism onto Simon and Gorge. That is, if Gamer operates as an
allegory of control as Shaviro asserts (and I agree that it does), its success in doing so appears
largely attributable to the pleasure of game-like control the filmmakers derive from its
production – a dark pleasure that saturates the film. The excessive repulsiveness of Gorge seems

157

designed to throw us off the scent, and shame us for enjoying Angie’s subjection as much as they
have.
As with the iconic images of cyborgs in cinema that helped constitute the discourse of
technology and the body in the popular imagination in an earlier era (as well as prefiguring some
of the technological developments to come), it is important to recognize the place of avatar films
as visual and narratological expressions of evolving conceptions of virtuality – and particularly
as it is instantiated in a filmic medium that is redefining itself in the digital era. These films
thematize darker counterparts to the liberatory rhetoric promulgated in the marketing and
technophilia surrounding interactive technologies. Relative to these allegories of discipline and
control, you are player, controller, and avatar all at once, raising not only the question of who’s
playing you, but also, given the recursivity of discipline and control, and the materialization of
gamespace in our wireless, entertainment-driven society, who are you playing?
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CHAPTER 4
VIRTUAL MORTALITY
The greatest thing in the world is to know how to belong to oneself.
Michel de Montaigne
The existential anxiety of the double is to some extent a matter of possession – the secrets
a character possesses and hides from himself (or herself), which come in the end to possess him.
When one has an avatar, what exactly does one possess? At what point does self-difference bleed
over into self-possession, and what is the difference between encountering the double and
possessing it? The cinema itself is a mechanism of the double: reproducing the world, forming a
temporalized copy of events, displaying the image of the actor who is no longer there. The
double in cinema makes this implicit doubling explicit as film’s indexical relation to the real
world is troubled by the illusion of correspondence. In avatar films this plays out slightly
differently, as the condition of diegetic doubling is typically assumed at the outset, with societies
already caught up in or at least accepting of avatarial doubling, and thus characters must contend
with ideological aspects of the double as much as technological or ontological ones. The
disruption of the index in avatar films is then figured not simply in the appearance of the double,
but as a problem of lost reality, of characters’ inability to see the double for the disruption it is.
While doubles are taken for granted, however, the body remains the scene of contention over
indexicality as the body stands in for the index, and the index is grounded in the body. That is,
avatar films frequently rely on the body of the actor as an indexical point of contact with the real
world in order to sustain their fictions of indexical rupture.
Of course, this fundamental mechanism has been called into question since the advent of
cinema, as Mélìes popped off his head, disappeared and reappeared, and produced a half-dozen
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copies of himself using spatial and temporal disruptions of the body (it was most often the body
that was transient and severed, as the majority of his tricks relied on a static backdrop and a
minimum of visible cuts). But while Mélìes’ iterations used the body to demonstrate the unique
capacity of cinema, avatar films use the doubling capacity of the cinema to investigate the
interative aspects of the body. These texts straddle the varied aspects of a digital culture,
engaging not only information technology and futuristic machines, but also and especially a
return to the body (the body as surplus) and its ontology within a proliferation of images. The
Matrix trilogy stands astride this juncture at points oppositional as well as transitional, between
film and digital, body and embodiment, machine/technology and image. The Wachowskis
formulate these dichotomies as equations, and within the equations Neo represents balance,
which he must accomplish by balancing his own schismatic embodiment – a balance ultimately
achieved in his mortal transition, as passage. Also, Neo’s positioning as what Andrew Shail
refers to as a ‘cinematic body’ – a body whose movement concords with cinematic movement, as
through the film’s visual effects work the body is at points essentially played by the film as much
as the actor – serves as an intermediary point between the analog avatar played by an actor in
two ‘roles’ and the CG character which is played from ‘within’ the image body superimposed
upon the actor.

A Spectatorship of Death
It is no longer a question of survival after death, but of a larger concept, the creation of an
ideal world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny.
André Bazin1
The Charlie Kaufman-penned, self-referential twin film Adaptation (2002, Spike Jonze)
includes a dedication to Kaufman’s fictional co-writer, Donald Kaufman, who in the film is the
1
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Hollywood sell-out doppelgänger to the character Charlie Kaufman (both played by Nicholas
Cage), which reads “In loving memory of Donald Kaufman.” The passing of the double –
Donald dies in the film – whom the Hollywood-averse, real-life Kaufman never wants to be,
seems an exorcism of sorts; the character Charlie, standing in for Kaufman, envies Donald’s
success, even, to his shame, entreating celebrity screenwriting guru Robert McKee in order to
become more like Donald. Donald’s death removes the double, clearing the way for Charlie to
find success and become his own man – but of course Charlie is already (and inseparably)
Kaufman’s double, even if he doesn’t know it, and thus the film becomes a play of the
recursivity of postmodern doubling and simulacra (no longer original and copy, but a series of
copies or variations) as well as a game of façades, as Cage plays each of Kaufman’s
doppelgängers.
Kaufman’s fascination with the avatarial is even more pronounced in his first feature,
Being John Malkovich (1999, Jonze), in which Malkovich, playing himself, is manipulated by a
series of characters, including failed puppeteer Craig (John Cusack), who enter a portal into his
mind located in a back room of an office building. Eventually, Craig takes over Malkovich
completely, controlling him as one of his puppets on his way to becoming a revered puppeteer.
By making the avatarial object an actor, and a famous theatrical one at that, Kaufman again
critiques the entertainment establishment. Cusack plays Craig, who plays Malkovich – while
Malkovich the actor plays Cusack/Craig playing his body, with Kaufman’s presence permeating
the whole self-loathing charade. The actor in a Kaufman film occupies a surreally avatarial
position, as if played by the character, rather than vice versa.
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Figure 24. A pair of doubles in Synecdoche, New York.
In Kaufman’s most recent work, Synecdoche, New York (2008, Kaufman), character
plays out recursively across multiple bodies, and indeed it seems that character is infinitely larger
than any single actor. Caden Cotard (an allusion to the Cotard delusion, a mental disorder in
which people believe they are dead or do not exist), played by Philip Seymour Hoffman, creates
an expansive, fractal theatrical piece that mirrors the world outside the enormous warehouse in
which it is staged, and in smaller iterations repeats the simulation as the play becomes
increasingly self-referential. Caden enlists an actor to play him, and eventually Caden’s double
also enlists a double in order to better inhabit the (already doubled) character of ‘Caden’ (Fig.
24). In one sense, then, Kaufman produces iterations, but in a more profound sense,
instantiations. Caden in the end is not the original to the copies, for he cannot even locate
himself, does not possess himself. The duplicates seem to imply that the abstract character of
‘Caden’ is greater than Caden the individual, and thus the theatrical setting of the film is apt, as it
is in the theatre that character is never fixed in a single body or performance, but lives eternally
through the many bodies that play it, never fully possessed. As the film progresses Caden
becomes increasingly dispensable, yielding both his directorial position and the role of ‘Caden’
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to the actors who now comprise the population of his world. From the new director, with whom
he exchanges roles, he takes his cues as the cleaning lady for the model of his estranged wife’s
apartment (the Lacanian-monikered Adele Lack), leading up to his final direction, “Die.”
Kaufman offers a collision of theatrical tradition and postmodern desperation in exploring the
roles perpetuated by the system, and the fragile mortality of those who play (or are played by)
them. Caden dies, but the collection of neuroses and dispossession which comprise ‘Caden’ does
not.
In “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” André Bazin conflates photography with
death – with ‘time embalmed’, rescued from its ‘proper corruption’ as it is relegated to another.
One of Bazin’s most vivid comparisons appears in a footnote in which he mentions the automatic
process of the death mask, to which photography bears some relation in its impressions of light;
Bazin’s characterization is not simply one of disappearance, of course, but of immortality
through preservation, for death and immortality are closely linked.2 The metaphor of the death
mask is illustrative in its juxtaposition of the active decomposition of the body and the fixity of
the quick-drying plaster, as well as in its particular manner of preserving death in an impression
of a body that is already a shade of its former animated self. D. N. Rodowick also sees quietus in
the film medium, albeit from the perspective of the impermanence of film itself, stating that “one
may say that the material basis of film is a chemically encoded process of entropy. This is one of
many ways in which watching film is literally a spectatorship of death.” The virtuality of the
cinematic image can be most poignantly found, he suggests, in “in the sense that what it
documents is the disappearance of its object” – not only the temporal absence of its subjects, but
its own mortality as a medium.3

2
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Thus when Rodowick remarks that “while film may disappear, cinema nonetheless
persists,” we must ask, in what form, what substrate?4 While in the digital era we have become
more keenly aware of the active decay of film stock and photo paper – the active decomposition
of the picture in which time is embalmed – digital images, with their (mostly) lossless
duplication and their (seemingly) immaterial form, have been perceived as a sort of solution to
the entropic effects plaguing photographic images – many of which have been scanned into
digital format for preservation. However, the susceptibility of digital formats has come
increasingly to light as digital photography enters its third decade and digital elements in movie
production and distribution have proliferated, with preservation becoming a pressing issue.5
However, digital imagery, with its crispness and eminent flexibility, a novelty kept fresh by
regular advances demonstrated with sleek devices and dazzling effects, and a close association
with computer technologies that are increasingly characterized by screens and media, is
positioned in the cultural imagination as something like a vital alternative to the death drive of
the photographic.6
Rodowick argues that the digital image is not a record of the past but an object of the
present, while Mark Hansen defines the digital image as as “a processual and necessarily
embodied entity,” stating that “the image can no longer be restricted to the level of surface
appearance, but must be extended to encompass the entire process by which information is made
perceivable through embodied experience.”7 Digital images are always in process, ever subject to
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remaking and thus never complete. Situated always in the present, vivified on electronic
displays, digital images are culturally positioned counter to the demise of film.8
It is perhaps no coincidence then that Avatar, the highest grossing film to date, presents
the digital in the form of abundant life – pointedly antagonistic, it seems, to the photographic
media increasingly positioned as relics of another era, having preserved their own ‘death’. The
desolation of the real in the Matrix trilogy, on the other hand, while perhaps fostering a hope in
renewal at the end of the series, in fact presages only death. Why Neo dies and the Matrix
persists, and how this relates to cinema and avatars and the death of the photographic, are the
subjects of this chapter’s postmortem. Much of this has to do with the way in which the
electronic image is not ‘one’ with itself, as Rodowick puts it, and the troubling of the index
brought about by the double, from Balduin to Donald and Caden, and here to Neo, the ‘One’ in
whose dying body the avatarial dyad balances itself out.
Chapter 2 began with a slogan from promotional materials for Second Life, and here I
add another: “Become Your Avatar.” As with the first, we see two pictures juxtaposed in the
style of before-and-after photos, the young woman (they are usually women) and the avatar she
has ‘become’. The text goes further than the ludic engagement of the slogan for Sony’s
PlayStation – ”Live in Your World, Play in Ours” – to the more ontological implications of
becoming. While the Second Life site promotes in-world activities and places to visit, the
campaign is centered on the avatar, fashion-driven notions of beauty, and an ethic of becoming.
In contrast with avatar texts that begin with characters already in an avatarial state, The Matrix
and Avatar are also about becoming. Neo progresses through four identifiable stages on his way
to becoming avatar: the initial acceptance of an avatarial state (achieved with some difficulty),
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learning to skillfully use the avatar, acquiring a greater understanding of what it means to be
truly avatarial, and making a final transformation in accordance with this new knowledge. Jake
moves through the same four stages on his way to becoming, but while his transition is
imaginally transformative (at least according to Cameron’s own myth of a total digital cinema),
in The Matrix, balance is paramount – the double cancels itself out, and Neo must die.

End Program
This illusion of unity, in which a human being is always looking forward to self-mastery,
entails a constant danger of sliding back again into the chaos from which he started; it
hangs over the abyss of a dizzy Ascent in which one can perhaps see the very essence of
Anxiety.
Jacques Lacan9
The ubiquitous simulation of the Matrix doesn’t produce an ideal world, but rather the
fantasy of our world as game space with cinematic bodies that float balletically and violently in
slow-motion, undergirded by a machine logic that at least makes some sense of the chaos.
Instead of characters entering an idealized space, as is common in fantasy films, The Matrix
shifts idealization to the body and its performative capacity as a cinematic ideal within a world
that looks for the most part like our own. In a dystopian future of machine dominance, to be an
avatar is to survive, either in captivity, blissfully ignorant of the terrible reality in which humans
have become sources of electricity for the machines, or by fully embracing and utilizing one’s
avatarial capacities to combat the machines from inside the Matrix, as Morpheus (Laurence
Fishburne) and his crew do.
Neo looks with eyes closed, enters by sitting still. He jacks in for the same reason audiences
are drawn to the movie, to enter the heightened cinematic space of the Matrix. In what seems to

9

Jacques Lacan, “Some Reflections on the Ego,” The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 34: 11-19 (1953).

166

be a reproduction of classic cinema spectatorship, Neo sits quietly, individuated, and engrossed –
on the one hand acting in the avatar body, but on the other a spectator, even standing in for us,
entering for us. The videogame logic imposed on this mode of spectatorship, with Neo
controlling his avatarial self with his mind through a form of direct, first-person, proprioceptive
mental action, does not of course turn our experience of the film into interactive entertainment,
but rather appropriates interactive media within the conventions of classical spectatorship. Paul
Young sees such appropriations as a dual reaction from the Hollywood establishment, as both an
apprehension toward the encroachment of interactive technologies into the mode of classical
spectatorship (hence interactive technologies have often been demonized), while at the same
time capitalizing on the new media culture that studios have already invested in and to which
many popular titles are tied. Neo at the interface becomes the picture of a cinema of experience.
With eyes shut, he enters a new cinema no longer reliant simply on the look.10 This is cinema
playing the ‘real’ with the logic of the game.
The final confrontation that such logic dictates ends more or less in a stalemate, with
neither the machines conquered nor the Matrix abolished, as Neo’s personal battle with Agent
Smith (Hugo Weaving) and his agreement with Deus ex Machina, the ‘face’ of the machines,11
produce only a ceasefire and the promise that those who want out of the Matrix will be released –
which one can assume isn’t many, as the psychological difficulty of emerging from the Matrix is
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evident in Neo’s transition. The preservation of the Matrix in the final film of the trilogy is an
unexpected ending and, I suggest, a percipient narrative choice by the Wachowskis that helps
redeem the series from its descension into its own clichés of philosophical obfuscation and CG
action, for the persistence of the Matrix represents the endurance of avatarial existence. Reading
the Matrix trilogy in terms of the avatar, the ending is significant for understanding its multiple
avatarial levels as we observe how Neo fully becomes his avatar – especially as his character
trajectory moves toward non-image (death) in contrast with Jake’s imaginal embodiment and
digital ressurection in Avatar.
As a battalion of sentinels storm the subterranean enclave of Zion in the final act of The
Matrix Revolutions, Neo and Trinity are on their way to the Machine City. Slipping above the
cloud layer to avoid the sentinels, they plummet into the inky, lifeless metropolis. Trinity
perishes in the crash landing, while Neo is brought to Deus ex Machina, where he offers to rid
the Matrix of the viral Smith who has overtaken it, in exchange for peace. The machine entity
accepts his terms and connects him, and Neo appears amidst endless iterations of Smith, who has
taken over every body in the Matrix. One emerges, declaring that he has seen the end – a
provocation that recalls the Oracle (Alice Kay), whom he has assimilated – and the highly
physical battle between Smith and Neo commences. The impacts are bigger and more
spectacular than those previously in the series, often resembling atom-smashing more than two
bodies contending with one another. In the process Neo is overcome, reaching his nadir while
lying nearly unconscious in an impact crater pooling with green water. To Smith’s exasperation,
however, he rises again.
“Why keep fighting?” Smith demands to know, and launches into a diatribe about the
purposelessness and artificiality of human existence. Neo’s reply, “Because I choose to,” seems
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well-situated within conventional affirmations of agency in Hollywood cinema, but the nature of
this choice begs closer scrutiny within the contest of Neo’s destiny and Smith’s inevitability. The
fight resumes, with Smith again gaining the upper hand, but at the decisive moment the
premonitory sense he acquired from the Oracle kicks in, replacing Smith’s typical
pronouncements with an unsettling bit of déjà vu: “Wait, I’ve seen this,” he begins, and then
repeats something the Oracle had earlier told Neo: “Everything that has a beginning has an end,
Neo.” Smith the virus becomes aware that he himself has been momentarily hacked, but shirks it
off and again lunges for Neo, who, struck by the Oracle’s words, allows himself to be
assimilated.
In this moment, it becomes unclear for the first time whether Smith has absorbed the
Oracle, or whether the Oracle is playing Smith. Withdrawing his stiff-handed plug from Neo’s
torso, another iteration of Smith appears, a clean (digital) copy relative to the embattled Smith
who, dirty, wet, and without his sunglasses, now appears more human and desperate than ever.
But this iteration doesn’t last long, and as the Neo in the Machine City is injected with energy,
light bursts out of the eyes and mouths of both Neo and his Smith, tearing the Smith apart. The
remaining Smiths follow suit until the last one disintegrates, and in the Machine City the Deus ex
Machina proclaims “It is finished,” after which Neo’s lifeless body is carried away. The Oracle
wakes in the crater from which Smith disappeared, released from his forcible subsumption, and
in the final scene rests on a park bench on what seems like a pleasant summer morning in the
Matrix. The Architect (Helmut Bakaitis) approaches and they share a testy exchange in which he
asks how long she thinks the peace will last, letting her know that she has “made a very
dangerous game,” while the young Sati (Tanveer K. Atwal), a program ‘born’ in the Matrix, has
made a beautiful sunrise for Neo.
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The typically subtle, cryptic intervention of the Oracle into the destinies of the human
rebels is in the final battle replaced by a more direct intercession as she works avatarially from
the inside of Smith, who had already taken over the avatar bodies of everyone in the Matrix
(Smith in this sense operates more like a biological virus that seeks host cells for replication
rather than a digital virus that can copy itself indiscriminately). In turn, the illegitimate player,
Smith, is played by the Oracle, so that Neo, who is at that moment fighting on behalf of the
machines, sacrificing himself for the humans (in similitude of Christ, the avatar of God), and
fulfilling his destiny as the One, can relinquish himself to assimilation by the Oracle-played
Smith. Through the conduit of Neo’s physical and virtual bodies, the ungovernable program
Smith is deleted by the machines, and in the process Neo expires as well. In Zion the humans
celebrate, but the triumph is not really theirs; they have only managed to survive, and in their
better moments believed in something bigger than themselves that they hoped would save them.
On the contrary, the final moments of the film belong to the real players: the Oracle, the
Architect, Deus ex Machina, and, more abstractly, the intangible (virtual) force of the One. At
this moment it becomes fully clear that the characters we have followed as protagonists have
been pawns in a larger game, while the Matrix as the instrument of mass control through which
people exist as avatars of themselves, remains in place.
In other words, the avatar Neo had was only ever a reflection of the avatar Neo was, even
though his ‘player’, the One, is an abstraction. Neo’s declaration of agency, “Because I choose
to,” is further complicated in light of what he and we learn earlier from the Architect, that Neo
has been preceded by not one, but five Ones – that, like Smith, he is an iteration. It’s not clear if
there have been five Thomas Andersons, or if Thomas Anderson is simply the latest avatar for
the One, but in either case Neo’s choice to fight must be contextualized within his multiply
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avatarial status, and relative to the contest between the meta-figures of the Oracle and the
Architect as echoing the inter-Pantheon squabbles of an earlier epoch, which often made pawns
of men. Who exactly is doing the choosing, and how is this choice enacted?
Interestingly, it is with the body that Neo (the machines, the One) finally defeats Smith –
not by overpowering him, for Neo has failed at that, but through the sacrifice of the body.
Having been freed from the Matrix mentally and the harvesting fields physically, his trajectory
moves through self-fulfillment in his obtaining of a spectacular avatar body, finding love, and
accepting his role of savior; in the end, however, he faces Deus ex Machina physically, having
lost his love, and realizing that his fate will require his own destruction. The cinematic kung fu
skirmishes by which hackers and programs do battle in the Matrix no longer proves effective for
Neo as Smith becomes the firewall he can’t hack. After offering himself to the machines, then,
he finally uses a similar tactic in the Matrix, only defeating Smith by allowing himself to be
taken over. His assertion of will in the crater actually becomes moments later an abnegation of
agency, as he gives himself over bodily to the unstable aggregate of Smith-Oracle-Machine-One
and then bursts apart. I suggest that at this moment Neo fully accepts his avatarial status and
stops fighting, stops resisting – and that becomes his strength. The realization of his destiny, the
fulfillment of his character, and the resolution of the main tension carrying across the trilogy are
contingent precisely upon the disappearance of character and the destruction of the body. Having
become fully avatar, he faces an avatar’s fate: disconnection.
The meta-figures in the film are also avatarial in a sense: the Architect is the face of the
machines, and the Oracle takes on different shells.12 The One, however, sustained by belief,
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manifest in various bodies or iterations, is the most metaphysical and abstract of the metacharacters, and the most difficult to distinguish from its instantiation in Neo. The One is also the
anomalous (and absent) singularity in a film that is all about the dyadic. Neo becomes the One
when he stops being two – or rather when the two (or more) become one in a multiplicity that
problematizes Neo’s individualistic destiny (is it his destiny to become the One, or his destiny to
lose himself to the One? is there a difference?). The singular path he takes, if it ever was so,
comes to an end when he is assimilated by Smith, whom the Oracle has informed Neo “is you,
your opposite, your negative,” his exact other. In the conjunction of Neo’s self and his other, is
the sum zero, or One? The other is that necessary alterity for the existence of self, the “mark of
self-difference, opening up a space for the self to relate to itself as a self, a self that is perpetually
other.”13 Smith is the zero to Neo’s One, the off to his on, the multiplicity that will complement,
diffuse, and ultimately complete Neo’s/the One’s singularity (by canceling out the binary).
As the anagrammatic prolepsis implies, and although it perhaps it does not fully occur
until his death, Neo becomes One. In this he can be distinguished from the free-born Tank and
Dozer who have never known what it is to be two and thus can never ascend to a multiplanar
unity, and from Cypher’s wish to escape into the false singularity of illusion. Neo is One in the
way he is performed by one, as Keanu Reeves plays Neo’s avatar and Neo as an avatar, the
doubting Thomas Anderson and the One who makes a whole of recursivity. On a practical level,
the One exists at the same time across different cinematic modalities, sliding between the digital
and the analog, operating on multiple layers at once as is is both a body in cinema (an actor
filmed) and a cinematic body (the body performed ‘by’ cinema, and digital cinema in particular),
while at the same time produced offscreen as a virtuality, never appearing directly, but obliquely
through various forms of doubling and a play of images and bodies. That this is transacted across
13
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an interface works as a demonstration of the fundamental multiplicity of the One, as Neo learns
not only to navigate multiple planes of existence, but synergizes them so that ability in one
(stopping bullets, seeing the Matrix) translates to the other (stopping sentinels, seeing the golden
glow of the Source). Where Jobe’s abilities in the physical world implied infection or corruption
in The Lawnmower Man, Neo’s suggest convergence; where Jobe chooses one bodily form over
another, the death of Neo’s physical body is not the result of divestiture, but the detritus of the
fusion between user and avatar. The singularity of the One is then ultimately a myth; in this
world of the dyad, to become one is not to become whole but to disappear.
Neo’s transformation into a fully digital character during two brief moments in the trilogy
serves as a visual counterpoint to his death. Both occur during battles with Smith (the ‘Burly
Brawl’ in Reloaded and the ‘Super Burly Brawl’ in Revolutions), in which Keanu Reeves is
replaced by a digital recreation, which Dan North refers to as his ‘avatar’.14 In my own viewing I
found these moments initially bothersome, as the rendering was unconvincing and artificial. But
the transitions into and out of this digital version are so smooth and seamless that, in the context
of everything the One represents in the dyadic film, these moments seem to contribute an
additional layer of connectivity. As both occurrences take place during moments of intense
combat, it seems almost as if in cinematic climax this body operating in a digital, imaginal world
takes on the digital image in an ephemeral transubstantiation, as the two modes are compressed
into one – adding yet another dimension to the Reeves-Anderson-Neo-One complex. While the
digital rendering, subject to the technological limitations of the time, is ultimately unconvincing,
in the transitions one can find something of the virtual, another embodied correspondence
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between the two states of analog and digital that are already mulitply connected and opposed
within the series.
Incidentally, the digital body has a technological affiliation with the digital avatars of the
three games ancillary to the films in the Matrix franchise. These games (Enter the Matrix, The
Matrix: Path of Neo, and The Matrix Online), with material filmed or captured during the
production of the latter two films and featuring movements and performances from several
actors, make the characters, as well as the signature body movements of their actors, available
for fans to play in another iterative manifestation of players and avatars. In Path of Neo (2005,
Shiny Entertainment), in which the player controls Neo on his way to becoming the One, the
sense of the ‘true’ One as an abstracted force controlling Neo’s destiny echoes unambiguously
through the game – the One as the Player, misperceiving him- or herself as ‘one’ within a dyadic
world, ‘creating’ the game in the moment of conjunction with the machines (the game
technology) that ultimately produce and control it (Fig. 25). The game in this sense becomes the
final site for avatarial understanding, where unity can be understood as multiplicity – or,
alternately, where the hidden insights of the films are lost to the logic of the game which
‘redeems gamespace’, recalling McKenzie Wark’s juxtaposition of games to the postmodern
world of gamespace as those constructs that impose an illusionary order (and, implicitly, an
illusionary unity) on the chaos and fragmentation of real world subjectivity. That is, the site
where we understand ourselves to be already avatarial, or where we once again turn off the game
and return to our delusions of wholeness.
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Figure 25. Neo the avatar in The Matrix: Path of Neo.
In its movement from avatar antitheses in Thomas Anderson and Neo to the avatarial
synthesis of the multiple ‘One’, the Matrix trilogy demonstrates a further move into new media
paradigms, from connectivity to compositing. In practice, compositing involves the digital
combination of photographic elements either with each other (for instance, a photographed
background with actors filmed in front of a green screen), or with CG elements which are
blended into the photographic material in such a way that the shot seems to be all of a piece.
Compositing also refers the layering process whereby CG imagery is rendered with more nuance
and complexity or made to look photorealistic. “Throughout the production process, elements
retain their separate identities,” writes Lev Manovich, but “when the object is complete, it can be
‘output’ as a single ‘stream’ in which separate elements are no longer accessible.”15 Manovich
understands compositing not only as a characteristic practice within digital media, but a key
aesthetic component in the evolution of digital culture. In the eighties, he notes, postmodernist
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productions emphasized the boundaries between disparate elements, but in the nineties
compositing “supports a different aesthetic characterized by smoothness and continuity.
Elements are now blended together, and boundaries erased rather than emphasized.”16
This doesn’t necessarily mean that we take the composited image for a whole, however,
even as we neither perceive it in pieces. With Photoshop and contemporary Hollywood
techniques, we have grown accustomed to seeing composited images, but how do we receive
them? North argues that rather than taking these images at face value, we find pleasure in
locating the ‘seam’ between digital and analog components. While this is certainly possible, I
argue that the greater experiential or even phenomenological impact of composited images is in
the ambiguity of their boundaries, the semi-opacity of their layers. Thus while the pleasure of
‘seeing’ an object or creature we know to be impossible in the real world can be deflating (once
it appears on the screen it becomes too visible, removed from registers of imagination and
suggestion), the well-rendered image itself, in which digital impossibility integrates seamlessly
with photographic indexicality, becomes the more potent enchantment. We perceive the layers
not visually but experientially or even bodily, as images are framed according to our experience
of the materiality of pictures and the world. We take pleasure in the confusion of boundaries, but
at the same time in the smoothness and seamlessness of their integration; in the final product
boundaries no longer exist except through our cognitive efforts to reproduce them (to make
connections), even though we know we’ll never be able to catch them all. Using a cinematic
device as metaphor, one might think of this sort of production and reception in terms of
superimposition, in which viewers are presented with a surface that is known to have greater
‘depth’, comprising not only various images but also very different imaging technologies in the
formation of a unified ‘picture’.
16
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Two Wholes Don’t Make a Half
In superimposition, one image is laid over another so that both are visible at the same
time, in contrast with the implicit opacity of superposition, in which one element covers another.
Superimposition, as I relate it here to the image bodies of avatars and CG characters, is as an
imaging practice is counterposed to the ethic of the cyborg, for instance, which relies on a
prosthetic hybridity of contiguous or juxtaposed human and machine parts, or superposed figures
in which either the human or machine element covers the other, as in the Terminator’s synthetic
skin and human appearance concealing the robot underneath, or the seemingly human
consciousness trapped in a robot body, as in Isaac Asimov’s novelette The Bicentennial Man and
film of the same name (Chris Columbus, 1999). Superimposition is a way of thinking about
physical and virtual aspects, particularly as pertaining to the body, as coexisting and
simultaneous, even if not quite always in view – the difference, perhaps, between seeing and
perceiving when it comes to the human processing of digital images.
The Matrix trilogy, like The Thirteenth Floor, demands such a way of ‘seeing’ character,
necessitating an active perception of multiple character instantiations in a single body. (I also
address a more technological implication of superimpositional perception in the motion-capture
CG character in Chapter 6.) As an illustration of this notion of superimposition, I have found in
the music video for Björk’s 1996 single “Hyperballad,” directed by Michel Gondry, a short
avatarial text that refracts hidden layers or ‘selves’ beneath the surface through the
superimposition of contrasting image technologies. With this strategy, “Hyperballad” produces a
dialectic of materiality and virtuality, splitting the representation of the body into different
planes, media, and performances overlaid so that they are all present in a single ‘picture’ of the
body (Fig. 26).
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Figure 26. The videographic Björk superimposed on the filmic Björk in
“Hyperballad”.
In the video, Björk lies slumbering in a miniature, fabricated mountain range. As the
camera moves around her she is enveloped in blue and green video static that appears on a plane
that seems to be behind her, and for a moment in front of her as well, but is disconnected from
the uneven ground on which she lays. A face is superimposed over hers, which in fact is her own
face in a washed out, high-contrast video image that differs sharply from the warm skin tones of
what might be referred to as her ‘filmic’ body, as the ‘videogaphic’ Björk begins singing the
song.17 The superimposition aligns the faces vertically, even as they are out of sync laterally and
performatively – the videographic face is active and expressive while the filmic body remains in
slumber. The ghostly effect fades in and out as the motion-controlled camera rocks from side to
side, following a steady half-arc over the body that reveals the different planes in which the two
bodies exist – the three-dimensional space of the filmic body (and the camera) contrasted with
17
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her lack of movement – a further contrast with the ethereal video body.
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the two-dimensional plane of the video image, seemingly hovering just over the filmic body so
that the image is foreshortened as the camera approaches a profile of the filmic body. These
dimensions, however, are not so clear cut, as one bears in mind that the filmic image is also
materially two-dimensional, while the video image is a flat projection of an image in threedimensional space. The different planes, media, and actions of the two bodies bisect the ‘Björk’
in the picture into two bodies, while the motion-controlled camera keeps them unified in space.
It is not insignificant that the camera that shot this video was controlled by a computer,
and equally pertinent to note that Gondry produced the superimposition in-camera, on a single
400’ roll of film. The old-school technique of rolling back the film is simple enough, but the
dimensional effect of the bodies in different planes could only be produced through a computerfacilitated practice of precise frame control and camera movement that is today commonly
associated with digital production – particularly in the compositing of analog images and digital
effects. The separate image planes can be thought of as a way to visualize embodiment as
superimpositional and planar, existing in the different ‘mediations’ of biological flesh, visual
media, digital culture, discursive formations, the experiential imaginary, etc. The computer
allows the planes to be simultaneously separate and together, facilitating the coincidence and
overlay of images. In avatar use it is the computer that links cinematic seeing, the informational
avatar body, and the organic body of the user in an experience that produces the encounter with
the virtual. In the video, the ethereal abstraction of the video image floats above the filmic body,
which also stands in for the body of the film – a seemingly bodiless image superimposed on (and
simultaneously captured in) the image body. One sleeps while the other cries out, one is
naturalized while the other is obviously mediated, the filmic body is flesh to the videographed
spirit.
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Eventually escaping this bifurcation, Björk enters another. Morphing into a coarsely
pixelated avatar who dodges transmission towers produced with vector graphics, she has been
transformed into a digital avatar body and inserted into a videogame. The vulnerability of the
avatar is on full view here, as she desperately runs before finally tumbling off a cliff and
shattering at the bottom. Here we return to the filmic body – the real body, or real ‘image’, for
which the avatar body was a digitized other (or is the filmic body other to it?). The sleeping
Björk opens her eyes, and the video ends with increasing levels of superimposition applied to the
now alert filmic body until it finally disappears under a cascade of video layers.
“Hyperballad” is a song about a double life, and the ritual performance of a virtual
suicide each morning before the lover awakes in which she throws objects off a cliff and
imagines her body in their place, so “I can be happier / To be safe up here with you.” The video
reinterprets this doubling as a contrast between mediating forms that are overlaid, producing
tension between the half and double. Björk’s later single “All is Full of Love” (1998), in
comparison, is a song about disconnect and the inability to experience the love “all around you”
because “your phone is off the hook.” Chris Cunningham’s video for the song takes a cyborg
approach with a robot Björk being repaired or assembled when an identical robot joins in her
melancholy tune. The two robots are then fixed in a mostly static but seemingly tender kiss,
accompanied by gentle caresses while the robotic arms continue work on their bodies (Fig. 27).
This attention to the body in the form of robot love attends a doubling that, even in a selfembrace, is disconnected still; the ‘touches’ of the robot arms doing the repairing are as sensuous
and intimate (if not more so) as the cold kiss.
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Figure 27. Clone embrace in “All is Full of Love”.
Cyborg doubling here takes place in the form of replication, in the recursive production
of multiple bodies; the demonstration of self-love through the kissing robot clones becomes an
indication of the failure of the replicated bodies to reunite into a single entity, for there is no half
in the equation. In contrast, the half-man, half-robot hybrid body in RoboCop represents an
attempt at joining two incompatible halves into a whole, with no double for the singular
amalgamation. Murphy/RoboCop (Peter Weller) is neither a fully functioning robot nor a fully
functioning man, but an assemblage of halves into an uncomfortable, bifurcated entity – “a
fragmented collection of disconnected parts that achieve the illusion of coherence only through
their display as spectacle,” as Nigel Clark notes.18 The cyborg faces the problem of material
difference and incompatibility, while the avatar reframes the difference of the virtual and
material as two halves of the same thing, which is only destabilized when one is superposed over
the other or they are understood as existing separately.19
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The tension of the cyborg with itself is thus partly attributable to its instantiations as
doubles without halves, and halves without doubles; “Hyperballad” represents the conflation of
the half and the double in a multi-plane whole. Katherine Hayles argues that “by adopting a
double vision that looks simultaneously at the power of simulation and at the materialities that
produce it, we can better understand the implications of articulating posthuman constructions
together with embodied actualities.”20 Joining the virtual and material is largely a matter of
perception, a way of seeing the the virtuality of the material and the materialization of the virtual,
in order to see how halves and doubles interconnect. Hayles draws a lengthy comparison
between the posthuman and the liberal humanist subject, that Cartesian figure long regarded as
exemplary of human being. The Cartesian subject is a Platonic creature of halves – mind and
body, spirit and flesh – in which one half is privileged over the other, and this ‘immaterial’ half
conceptualized as an idealized whole. The posthuman for Hayles is a figure that embraces the
disappearance of its own body into information, and thus it has a (relatively) ‘immaterial’ aspect
which on the one hand offers the potential for the disruption of discourses of embodiment that
emphasize the flesh, but on the other is subject to the idealization of the half; the posthuman
“shares with its predecessor [the liberal humanist subject] an emphasis on cognition rather than
embodiment,” writes Hayles, and thus “to the extent that the posthuman constructs embodiment
as the instantiation of thought/information, it continues the liberal tradition rather than disrupts
it.”21 Hayles’s image of the posthuman thus also faces the problem of halves without doubles.
Superimposition proposes an integration between the virtual and material selves to
produce a kind of unity achieved not through disavowal, but by having multiple planes of
seeking her, desiring to fuse with her in order to reproduce. When she asks why it doesn’t simply replicate itself, the
Puppetmaster indicates that while replication increases numbers, it doesn’t advance the species; in order to evolve, it
must breed in difference. Kusanagi agrees, and when she wakes up in a new body (her previous one having been
mostly destroyed), her consciousness has also transformed.
20
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existence ‘in view’ at once. “Hyperballad” lends itself to the conception of an avatarial
‘embodiment’ of the text, incorporating bodies, images, and the materiality of the medium into a
representative form that is not only self-reflexive regarding its media, but this reflexivity is also
tied to the image of the body. When the filmic Björk fades out under the superimposed layers
that conclude the video, she seems to dissolve into the body of the film (the medium) itself. The
filmic body is closest to the physical body by virtue of its celluloid materiality, photochemical
inscription, and analogical images, and thus this ending corresponds with a tendency within
avatarial texts to tie the representation of the human body to the body of the image in which it is
instantiated, that each sustains the (disappearing) materiality of the other.
Superimposition as a device for seeing in multiple planes simultaneously not only has a
long cinematic history, but is also a key component of contemporary mobile technologies that
produce a layered view of the material world – what might be thought of as a sort of
phenomenological informatics. Superimposition can be found in augmented reality (AR)
applications available for smartphones and tablets, devices that bring together cameras, displays,
and computers in single handheld units that can be positioned between the viewer and the world
– that is, made part of the immediately perceivable world of the viewer – or even reflecting
images of the viewer back to him or herself. The AR feature on the Blue Mars augmented reality
app (Avatar Reality), for instance, allows the user to ‘place’ his or her avatar from the Blue Mars
virtual environment into material space, as viewed through the tablet screen, where it might
dance on the table or stand on a street corner. Another app, “Skinvaders” (Total Immersion),
places cartoonish blotches on players’ faces that become game elements; losing rounds result in
the face marked with virtual features such as bulging eyes or big ears – features that stay
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‘connected’ to the body as it is reproduced on the screen as the tablet follows the body
movements of the user.
AR serves as an effective device, both visually and technologically, for conceptualizing
the intersection between the physical and virtual aspects of space, and particularly in the way the
program makes use of images that appear to be ‘disembodied’. AR refers specifically to the
overlay of images or information on physical space through a mobile device. In an article on AR,
Manovich points out that architectural spaces have long been covered with information, from
cave paintings to frescoes to contemporary signage, but AR gives the information fluidity, so that
it might change for different users or be updated as needed. In this, AR superimposes rather than
superposes, so that virtual content retains the phenomenological and technological quality of
being virtual; that is, information on a storefront or cathedral could be considered virtual in that
it is a cultural or linguistic signifier and thus more than its materials, but it is also part of the
materiality of the space itself, whereas AR applications are not. Virtual content within the live
image seems to be part of the space, however, and in this way graphics and information appear to
be present within the space being viewed in a live image, rather than simply appearing on the
screen.22
As the product of the camera view, the geospatial location of the device, networked
information, computer processes, and the gyroscopic sensors and recognition software that
‘attach’ images and information to space, these graphical bits are divorced from any traditional
medium and not containable in any one aspect of the technologies that produce them, and thus
they seem to float interstitially, existing in the connections between material and virtual space,
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embodiment, and technology, rather than localizable within any one of these multiple elements.
The mobile device becomes an informational interface to the physical world. An augmented
reality tour guide program, for instance, makes use of existing structures and locations to which
virtual information and images are attached, allowing tourists to see both at the same time and
experience a vision of the history of a place (although a history made representational and
informational). Users thus encounter at the same time the presence of the space or object, its
image in the mobile device, the informational overlay, and the presence of the device itself.
Manovich asks, “Do these layers add up to a single phenomenological gestalt or are they
processed as separate layers?”23 The answer is to a certain extent a matter of individual
experience, but it is important to note that AR not only brings digital information and images to
physical space but, perhaps more saliently, provides a way of seeing physical space with virtual
elements that appear already to be there.
At the same time, the intermediary device imposes its own presence on the scene. In our
example of the AR-facilitated tour, for example, one might be viewing historical information on
a window in a century-old mansion; the space within view includes both the window and the
smartphone, representing two very different ways of seeing the world that, at the same time,
share a number of similarities. Anne Friedberg’s work on windows as functional and
architectural devices for light and vision, and metaphorical applications in the design of
graphical user interfaces, traces the shift from the singular perspective in Alberti’s window to the
multiple-screen and virtual ‘windows’ through which “we now see the world in spatially and
temporally fractured frames.”24 The functionality of windows moved from the simple facilitation
of light and ventilation to the architectural window that served to construct subjectivity by
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framing the outside world, structuring perception not only through the delimited exterior but also
through the juxtaposition of interior and exterior spaces. With AR the device is superposed over
the view of the space the user wants to see virtually, obstructing it so that the superimposed
image can be obtained through the screen; rather than multiple windows and a fractured viewing
experience, virtuality is overlaid in a composite (non-)image that might be thought of as planar,
with multiple planes of informational possibilities within a single view rather than multiple
windows which separate photographic and virtual imagery. The device becomes a mobile
window for seeing what is (presumably) ‘already there’ – just as the architectural window does
not produce the external scene that is the object of the view, but only provides the frame. But
what is already there is fluid and contingent, and indeed not inherent but projected – it is not the
specific information of an object or space that coexists with it, but the informational derivatives
and projections that produce, to recall Hayles, the notion that the material world is
‘interpenetrated by information patterns’. The overlaid information is clearly recognizable as
existing on a separate (visual) plane from the photographic image, and thus the closer encounter
with virtuality might be effected when the user moves the mobile device out of view and looks at
the object with a more specific conception of its informational possibilities.
While Hayles understands virtuality in terms of information, I have used AR and
superimposition as a way of thinking about a virtuality encountered in images. These are not the
representational images delineated by Friedberg, but rather conceptual images, the afterimages
and oblique sensations generated in the phenomenological reception of pictures, media
transmissions, and interfaces. Digital imagery becomes spiritual or ephemeral relative to the
physicality of the film or photographic image; as they do not exist the same way in historical and
material instantiations, digital images can, in a sense, never ‘die’. A digital print becomes a
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record of the image information at a particular moment within a history of modifications, rather
than at the moment of capture, as digital images ‘live’ on screens – while their (quickly fading)
prints become so many disposable corpses.
The complex layering of digital imagery, the activity under the surface, the electricity
that powers it – the vivification of the digital stems in large part from its many interlinking
processes and its presence on a display. Time is not embalmed, but preserved behind glass –
dormant, perhaps, but stirred at a mouseclick. It is in fact the quality of these images not being
‘one’ (dependent on the device, with no body of their own) that at the same time brings them to
life. Traditional images consolidate time and space within a single material instantiation, whereas
our phenomenological experience of time and space is multiple, in present moments and memory
of the past, and in subjective experience and objective views. The digital, while in a sense
‘disembodied’, lends itself to human experience in its multiplicity and superimpositional
layering; while it must be ‘framed’, as Hansen argues, in these ways the digital is already nearer
human experience, while the erstwhile, mortal ‘body’ of the photograph finds its analogue in the
human body subject to increasing virtualization, smothered by images.
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CHAPTER 5
DIGITAL ALTERITY

Find a cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to the body. Use it to express the
unmediated participation of the flesh in the image (whether ‘natural’ or mass-mediated).
Find a logic for the corporeal (body and image) that does not oppose it to the virtual. Find
a logic for the virtual (imageless and potential) that does not remove it from the real; for
example by equating it with the imaginary. Dis-sever, instead, the imageless from the
Ideal.
Brian Massumi1
“In cryo you don’t dream,” Jake says at the beginning of Avatar as he emerges from
hypersleep in a coffin-like cylindrical pod. On Pandora – the verdant, digital biosphere created
by James Cameron’s creative team and Weta engineers – Jake will have different dreams. Lying
in a different cylinder, his eyes closed but active as in REM sleep, Jake sleeps in one place and
awakens in another – sleeps in one body, and ‘drives’ a different one, an avatar body designed
for infiltration of the indigenous Na’vi population. Pandora itself becomes the dream, a fantasy
of digital creation and inhabitation realized in 3D. While The Lawnmower Man took the camera
‘inside’ the computer, putting the otherness of computer space on display, and The Matrix shifted
cyberspace to the world outside the computer, to the space of everyday life, albeit one with a
green tint and a Baudrillardian uncanniness, Avatar inverts cyberspace completely – the
electronic world is now the natural world, and the new cinematic bodies are not simply
manipulated by visual effects techniques, they have become visual effects.
Digital effects cinema in general is highly liminal, often combining and compositing
digital and photographic elements in a way that makes their distinction difficult or even
impossible. When the effects are pronounced, the technological virtuosity involved in combining
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them becomes part of the spectacle, and their liminality a source of spectatorial pleasure.2 Liveaction footage becomes just one component in the many elements of digital cinema, as Lev
Manovich notes, and thus while the camera continues to exist ‘virtually’ within the dominant
mode of photographic seeing, the presence of the physical camera becomes ambiguous.3 The
camera typically retains, however, a certain relation to the body, in that the human form, and
particularly the face, have been the most difficult for digital technologies to reproduce
accurately. This is not to say that human bodies are not digitally produced or altered in cinema,
as in the highly realistic CG animation in films such as the videogame-inspired Final Fantasy:
The Spirits Within (2001, Hironobu Sakaguchi), the digital retouching in Surrogates, which
made actors more plastic for the surrogate bodies and added blemishes to the organic bodies, and
digital suture that attaches a new face to a body, as in the young Jeff Bridges constructed and
composited for Tron: Legacy (2010, Joseph Kosinsky). However, the difficulty and expense in
producing CG bodies that are indiscernible from photographed ones has been prohibitive enough
that the body of the actor has an added ontological connection to the physical presence of a
camera. The face in particular becomes affective evidence: the poetry of the close-up, which
Balázs described as the “most subjective and individual of human manifestations,” becomes
another manifestation of the objective device of the camera.4 It is the digital faces, however, blue
and therianthropic as they are, that drive the love story and provide the emotional anchor in
Avatar.
What are these faces, exactly? Who, or what, do we see when we view a motion-capture
CG character? They are not simply animated figures, which can be discerned in the bodily
2
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movements and facial expressions that accord with our experience of real-world human activity,
but they are also certainly images created rather than recorded. The semi-faithful resemblance of
the avatar faces to their drivers/actors in Avatar further underscores the liminality of these bodies
that are neither solely photographic or computer-generated. The film is structured around
oppositions that emanate from the avatar bodies in the contests of nature and machine, alien and
human, the digital and the photographic, following Jake in its oscillations between them. Avatars
are not only a diegetic element in the film, but also functional devices for crossing thresholds of
the body and the image. In The Lawnmower Man such oscillations proved untenable, with the
anxiety of cyberspace threatening not only a loss of subjectivity, but also, as Paul Young argues,
presented as a threat to cinematic form. Avatar, however, delights in lingering at the threshold,
exchanging alterity for redemption and love in grand cinematic fashion. By the time Jake crosses
over for the last time, the anxiety of the threshold has been nullified, the alterity of the digital
rendered familiar, organic, beautiful. The troubling of the index is presented in this context as a
source of pleasure in itself – both in its ambiguous but compelling relationship with the body,
and in a ‘liberation’ of the image in its generative and visual potential to fully display, through
the capacity of the digital. Cameron offers Avatar as the wellspring of a technological and visual
modality in which film becomes other to the digital, and the digital presents itself as the
fulfillment of the cinematic dream.

Contested Territories
Characters who are incomplete in some way are a cinematic staple, but in avatar texts the
incompleteness of the characters tends to be tied to an encroaching sense of virtuality. Characters
pass through an avatarial state, which they come to accept, manage to escape, or succeed in
destroying as remedies for their self-alienation and attempts to find or regain wholeness. While
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many of these characters are in one way or another trying to reconnect with themselves, the
mentally disabled Jobe is, in comparison, already too close to himself (a generally feminine
problem), incapable of abstract thought or dissimulation – a condition that has some interesting
parallels with the Na’vi, who lack the objectivity of the human scientists and the emotional
detachment of the soldiers. While Jobe is particularly susceptible within the avatarial state,
however, failing to maintain a separation from his virtual self and thus ‘becoming’ his avatar, the
Na’vi are framed as antidotal to the avatarial condition, helping Jake find his true or evolved self
through avatarial fulfillment. In Avatar, Jake’s alienation from himself is strongly rooted in the
body, and particularly the disabled body – an external manifestation of the body set against the
will, and one that, not coincidentally, lends itself to a resolution through images (of a capable
body replacing the broken one). Disability for Jake is not only the outward sign of physical
incapacity but also the root for his emotional ruin, and the film uses the contrast in images of the
disabled and avatar bodies as the backbone of its affective allegorization of competing imaging
technologies.
The disabled Jake, we might say, still has ‘legs’ in him, as the film works as a kind of
visualization of phantom limb syndrome: through the avatar body he is able to ‘realize’ the
missing part of his own body in a way that completes his character arc. In the beginning of the
film, Jake is incomplete, a half, his former life as an able-bodied Marine at odds with his present
crippled condition; the tension inherent in his disabled state in relation to what his body once was
(and what it will be again) is summed up in the scornful reaction of one of the mercenary soldiers
who, upon seeing Jake come off the transport in a wheelchair, remarks, “Now that’s just wrong.”
As a particularly body-based occupation, the soldier’s primary tool or weapon is the body, with
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the goal of destroying other bodies while preserving one’s own.5 Jake’s disability not only sets
the stage for his new body, but it also carries some interesting implications within media theory,
as the broken spine recalls McLuhan’s writings on media relative to the body and nervous
system, in which overstimulation in modern society impels the amputation of the ‘disabled’
sensorial capability so that it might be extended artificially. Jake’s avatarial extension of himself
allows him to incorporate a degree of mediation, in both the form of the avatar as well as the
digital, and he meets his new body with exultant liberation, running out of the lab in his johnny
to try out his new legs.6 Legs on online and videogame avatars are also what Katherine Hayles
might call ‘skeuomorphs’ – design features persisting even when no longer needed functionally –
as walking and running through virtual space are phenomenologically-driven rather than
technologically necessary. Jake’s disability factors large in his assimilation into both a new
culture and a new form of images.
Jake is brought to Pandora not for the training or intelligence his twin brother had
attained, but because his bodily information, his DNA, is compatible with the avatar body; his
biological code becomes the access key for his entry into the digital biology of Pandora. At the
same time, Jake’s avatar body and eventual transformation are counterposed by the prosthetic
AMP suit (short for Amplified Mobility Platform) used by Colonel Quaritch (Stephen Lang)
(Fig. 28). Visually and kinesthetically, the anthropomorphic exoskeleton driven by Quaritch
5
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corresponds to the body movements of its user through a mimetic master-slave interface, rather
than the mental or oneiric interface used by the avatar drivers in repose, as demonstrated by a bit
of shadow boxing Quaritch does when we see him first enter the suit. However, the AMP
prosthesis remains distinct from the body, mimetic rather than integrated sensorially as the avatar
body is, and thus can never produce the closeness to nature and the body that Jake experiences.7

Figure 28. Quaritch in the mimetic, anthropomorphic AMP suit.
Quaritch and his machine are alien to this world, not suited for it, as the AMP ultimately
cannot protect him from Pandora, and his own status as a half remains unresolved by the
machinic ‘double’ he inhabits. Jake’s strength is ultimately that he is able to move beyond the
cyborg relation and become unified with his new body rather than existing at odds with it. Not

7
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only has his sense of embodiment aligned with the new body, but his ‘virtual’ side – the
unrealized wholeness within him that found expression through the avatar – is incomplete
without it, as implicit in the disabled Marine body. When Quaritch attacks the pod that holds
Jake’s dormant human body toward the end of the film, he endangers Jake specifically by
violently projecting upon Jake his own weakness, the disjuncture of body and technology, which
is manfiest as Jake tumbles out of his interface, gasping for breath. But by this point Jake has
already transcended cyborg embodiment in every respect except the final physical transition,
with which the film concludes. Abandoning the wheelchair and the promise of fixing his legs
through medical technology, he returns to nature – a move away from the machine that is
simultaneously regressive and forward-looking, anti-technology and fully embracing the digital
image.
Even as their depiction is largely dependent on the same CG imagery that produces the
exotic flora and fauna in the film, machines are framed as part of a different technological era,
relics of a Machine Age past relative to an idealized future of both ecological harmony and
pristine digital imagery. Machines are ominous and antagonistic in the film, as excavators, battle
vehicles, and AMP suits become exaggerated displays of the machine as destructive element,
opposed to nature – and, implicitly, the feminine, as can be seen in Neytiri (Zoë Saldanda) as the
main Na’vi character and the feminization of Jake as avatarial, imaginal, and close to nature.
Jake’s wheelchair, in contrast, is a simple prosthetic machine minimized in form and function – a
relatively primitive technology, and ultimately one easily detached and discarded. In addition to
outsized machinery, the human interlopers also rely on virtual technologies in the command
center, as seen in holographic displays of the Pandora terrain and Home Tree, and an image of
Jake’s brain that can be manually ‘swiped’ from a large glass display to a mobile one.
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Representations of a softer machine technology are more the domain of Grace’s (Sigourney
Weaver) team, however, and the objects present in these images are those most closely
associated with the virtual elements in the film: the natural landscape of Pandora and home of the
Na’vi, and the organ with which Jake connects phenomenologically to the avatar body through
the interface. His brain, along with the rest of his body, is eventually abandoned, while his
‘virtual’ body, his embodiment, is essentially downloaded; as Hayles points out, the body may
disappear, but embodiment persists, and thus this image of Jake’s brain early in the film comes to
foreshadow the embodied mind (not just the consciousness, as it is his brain that is imaged) that
will be transplanted into the new body already partly designed in his (that is, his twin brother’s)
image.
Machines and virtuality are parallel fascinations for Cameron, from his obsession with
recreating the Titanic to his script for the Kathryn Bigelow-directed Strange Days (1995) in
which virtual experiences are bought and sold on the black market, to the invasion of a hulking
submarine base by a watery CG tendril that mimes the facial expression of a crew member in
The Abyss (1989), and most notably in his juxtaposition of cyborgian hardware and fluid
virtuality in Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991). The liquid metal man in the latter, ostensibly
an advanced machine, is perhaps better viewed as a progressive image form: his quicksilver
machinic state is essentially a CG interstice between the performances of various actors, an
amorphous image body through which one (photographic) body transitions into another.
Although Schwarzenegger’s hard cyborg eventually triumphs, he must also be terminated, and in
this film Cameron prefigures the demise of the on-screen machine in favor of the production
technologies that would produce spectacles of biological life, as exemplified in Spielberg’s
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Jurassic Park two years later.8 In Avatar the coffin-like chambers in which the avatar drivers lie
presage the death of the physical/photographic bodies of both Grace, who is unable to transition
to the imaginal/digital body, and Jake, who is. Grace and Quaritch are casualties of the border
war between analog machine and digital body, and only Jake, who as a half is able to fully
integrate with his virtual double by embracing his own virtuality, comes through successfully.
Dana Fore, writing about representations of disability in Avatar, points out the way in
which images of disability relate to fantasies of bodily control. Jake, through his courage and
determination, fulfills the stereotype of what Jack A. Nelsen calls the ‘Supercrip’, in which
disability is overcome by willpower and strength of character, and thus “what was once a
prosthetic device [the avatar] is magically transformed into flesh and blood, leaving Jake
unmarked and ‘normal’ in the larger society.”9 One can follow, as Fore does, the shift in
emphasis from avatar as utility, with the avatar as an advanced biological tool for sociological
integration and environmental adaptation (the latter sense actually somewhat analogous to
Clynes and Kline’s conception of the cyborg), to a change in Jake’s sense of being, the body
having become more than just a tool. Also, within Cameron’s allegory of competing imaging
technologies, Jake’s disabled body is aligned with the photographic world of the humans, and his
able avatar body with the digital world, and thus concerns about the physical body of the once
strong marine coincide with unease about the disappearing materiality of film. What is ‘normal’
in Pandora is, at the level of the image, the all-encompassing digital, and thus the question can be
posed: to what extent might the film itself be working to overcome its own photographic
‘disability’?
8
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Part of the mystique that surrounded the production of Avatar was its long delay; slated
to follow Titanic (1997), Cameron pushed the film back because he didn’t feel the technology
was available to tell the story. As has been demonstrated by fan-produced homages and parodies,
along with several porn knockoffs, painting people blue and filming in a forest is certainly one
way. What Cameron felt he couldn’t do with make-up, prosthetics, matte paintings or digital
backgrounds, not to mention the visual effects capabilities he had just used to recreate the
Titanic, implies that the story, as he conceived it, was not simply one with high technological
demands (ground which had been well-traversed in the analog era with Star Wars and Blade
Runner) or requiring elaborate fantasy elements (Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings trilogy would
have been contemporary with Avatar had it not been delayed). Cameron seems to have had in
mind a new era of filmmaking, which he indeed has helped usher in – an era that is to an extent
opposed to the photographic image. As D. N. Rodowick observes, from Jurassic Park onward

the major creative forces in the industry began to think of the photographic process as an
obstacle to creativity, as something to be overcome, rather than as the very medium of
cinematic creation. In a previous era of cinematic creation, the physical world both
inspired and resisted the imagination; in the age of digital synthesis, physical reality has
entirely yielded to the imagination.10

Avatar, perhaps more than any other recent film, embodies the logic Rodowick puts forward,
creating antagonism between the photographic and digital on multiple levels. In what amounts to
an allegory of competing imaging technologies, the conflict between the humans and the Na’vi
pits one world against another: the photographic humans from a dying planet, who come with
machines to plunder the resources of Pandora, and the proliferative abundance of the digital
world, which offers unlimited possibilities – including the creation, it would seem, of life itself.
10
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Besides improving 3D technology, developing a virtual camera system, and advancing motioncapture and digital rendering techniques, Cameron and his many collaborators also meticulously
developed a world of flora and fauna designed to be as biologically rich as their visual
production – and indeed, the two seem to go hand in hand, as Cameron seems not so much
focused on producing films about an imaginary world, but rather on creating an imaginary world
in which films can then be made.
The technology that created Pandora and the Na’vi bodies is rooted in the digital
processes Cameron helped develop for Terminator 2, but the results are quite the opposite of the
lifeless future and mechanical men portrayed in that film, for in Avatar Cameron’s project is the
creation of life, and life in excess. The final vestiges of the photographic process, seen in the
human desperation for Pandora’s ‘unobtanium’, poses a symbolic threat to the imaginative
possibilities and digital vibrancy of the CG world – and the very future of cinema, if we follow
Cameron into his mythical floating mountains. Here the dying photographic world makes one
last push, “as if cinema were fighting for its very aesthetic existence. . . . wherein cinema
struggles to reassert or redefine its identity in the face of a new representational technology that
threatens to overwhelm it.” Rodowick is referring to films like The Thirteenth Floor and The
Matrix, in which “the digital versus the analog was the heart of narrative conflict,” but it is
important to note that in these films it is the digital that is positioned antagonistically to the
photographic, whereas Avatar reverses the tension, making photographic encroachment the
menacing element.11
The final battle waged between the humans and the Na’vi, the photographic and the
digital, collapses the geospatial and screen spaces that had for most of the film remained
separate, producing the violent confrontation between the two worlds and imaging processes that
11
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had formerly been bridged avatarially.12 Films like Jurassic Park keep the digital contained, as a
spectacle in a cage that will thrillingly threaten to escape, but, as we all know, will ultimately be
kept in its place as something for the photographic humans in the film (and the real humans in
the audience) to subject to a fascinated and curious gaze. The military establishment on Pandora
is positioned as the conservative center to the digital otherness of the Na’vi, and while we have
grown accustomed to seeing digital characters in animation, digital bodies and elements in liveaction film are indexically destabilizing. Quaritch and his mercenaries fail to see what Cameron
demonstrates for the audience – that the digital can be affective, sensuous, and vital.
The avatar becomes the bridge between the two worlds, Cameron’s method for inducting
us into a digital that is not simply ancillary to the photographic or an other to be destroyed, but
an all-consuming digital that augurs the future of cinematic possibility. CG imagery is ‘safe’, as
a fascination, when it is positioned as other, whether that be in its relation to photographic
elements in a live-action film, or in animation, which as a genre has been typically assigned
secondary status to live-action filmmaking. When it moves to the forefront, however, with CG
characters as protagonists who not only defeat their photographic counterparts but also develop a
sweeping romance, the digital becomes threatening; Cameron’s task is not only to counter the
otherness of the digital, but to make it an acceptable and even desirable form of cinematic
pleasure relative to the photographic, which Cameron facilitates with the avatar interface and
eventually avatarial transformation. In order to contextualize these moves and establish a
theoretical and practical basis for CG characters, I will briefly examine their role in a few other
films that situate CG and animated characters within live-action settings, to one extent or another
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opposed to live actors. The tensions between these different kinds of images expose the implicit
hierarchy of images that posits animated and CG imagery as other to the photographic.

Native Images
Animated characters, in their origins within and ontological attachment to the filmic and
digital media which construct them, might be thought of, in certain ways, as native. With their
profilmic existence instantiated on paper, glass, and screen, they are formed in the media of their
production but are not in the conventional sense mediated, for they come to life in the very
process of mediation. Spatially, they are residents of screens, confined to its borders – always
elsewhere, but in some sense always in their place; temporally, they are products of the
movement of film in a way distinct from that of live action filmmaking, as cinematic motion
produces their respiring anima – not captured images reinvigorated after the passing of the
original moment, but each time a birth, a nativity.
In their location and movement, animated images are other to the photographic, and
further removed from the real world. In that they are other, they are also often othered in ways
that produce cultural difference in tandem with the difference in imaging practices. This othering
can happen diegetically and in performance in the way that animation has historically drawn on
caricatures of race, class, and gender, but this is a case of one otherness coinciding with another,
the difference of race and gender superimposed on the difference of animation from the
photographic.13 Animated characters, these native bodies, are othered lest they encroach too far
into the realm of the photographic. The ‘looniness’ typical of many cartoons becomes a sort of
racial or classist quality in that it typifies the manner, appearance, and hierarchical place of
13
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bodies that fall into a certain category of images. The plastic cartoon body itself becomes a
location for this otherness, and is compelled to accept and endure certain abuse as it is mashed,
battered, and stretched to capacity – like the body in pornography, punished for being an image
(or too much of one) in a playfully sadistic pseudo-iconoclasm. Even the ‘illusion of life’
aesthetic which came to dominate the Disney animated features almost invariably included
elements of the monstrous, the grotesque, the gigantic and the miniature, in addition to inanimate
objects, as embodiments of difference. Thus in looniness the othered image performs its
otherness, often within the familiar discourses of racial, classist, and gendered difference, and is
comically punished for being other.
Films that mix animation and live action underscore the way that the native figures of
animation are generally contained in their own spaces, hermetically preserved within particular
imaging techniques and the visual and narrative strategies that form their otherness. J.P Telotte
shows how these films that combine cel animation and photographic cinema often reflect
difference and separation diegetically. For instance, Disney’s The Three Caballeros (1945),
featuring Donald Duck and live actors in South American locales, and The Song of the South
(1946), with Uncle Remus (James Baskett) and Br’er Rabbit, play with borders and fences,
cultural difference and racial prejudice, in ways that draw from and problematize the difference
and separation between humans and cartoons. Similarly, if rather innocuously, in Warner Bros.’
You Ought to Be in Pictures (1940), Porky Pig, having had a difficult time on the Warners studio
lot, “seems to find [its] reality a bit too much for him and rushes back to the relative safety – and
visual simplicity – of his cartoon world.”14 The contrast between animation and photographic
cinema brings the differences between classes of images into starker relief, and their
juxtaposition in the same frame provides opportunities for an analysis of the tensions between
14
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them; when the screens that keep these worlds are breached, the defining differences between
images are troubled.
W. J. T. Mitchell writes: “If pictures are persons, then, they are colored or marked
persons” – and, I suggest, within the gradations of such stratification, animated images are
hierarchically subordinate to the photographic.15 In Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988, Robert
Zemeckis), the photographic and animated worlds are physically separated by brick and mortar.
There exists an enduring tension between the two worlds and a certain amount of prejudice
toward the Toons, who are rarely taken seriously and are often undone by their own looniness.
Telotte notes that the Toons are cast as a racial underclass: ghettoized in the human-owned
Toontown, performing in the segregated Ink and Paint Club, and subject to an unfair disciplinary
system which grants them fewer rights than humans. Telotte connects the lower social position
of the Toons to their animated status, borrowing Jessica Rabbit’s line to suggest that they are
‘drawn that way,’ as they are created to serve and entertain humans – their raison d’etre. The
film begins with a studio set and the amusing conceit that Toons ‘act’ in cartoons, playing roles
instead of being themselves, but the humor here is drawn from the absurdity of the idea that
‘character’ can be abstracted from ‘cartoon character’.16 In animation, body and character are
inextricable – another defining aspect of native figures which posits them as excessively close to
themselves, unable to achieve an intellectual distance from their own embodiment and the loony
world they inhabit (and a correlation with Mitchell’s theory that pictures are also gendered
female, in addition to being raced).

15
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When animated figures breach the boundaries of their native spaces and enter the
photographic world, they also often take monstrous form, and particularly as monsters existing to
be slain by live actors. A cursory review of legendary visual effects creator Ray Harryhausen’s
filmography is illuminating: in his fairy tale works which are entirely animated, such as The
Story of King Midas (1953), the sympathetic animated characters exhibit human qualities; in his
work creating visual effects for live action films, such as Jason and the Argonauts (1963, Don
Chaffey) or Clash of the Titans (1981, Desmond Davis), his creations are mostly monstrous
creatures who threaten and are eventually destroyed by the humans. It is no coincidence that the
voyage to mysterious lands and islands is a common trope in these films, diegetically preserving
the sense of separate spaces for the photographic and the animated, and the place of native
images beyond the vitreous boundaries of sea, air, space – and screen.
Darkness and the grotesque characterize the chaotic, semi-animated locales of Cool
World (1992, Ralph Bakshi). The Cool World is presented as a sort of dismal underside of Las
Vegas (as if it needed one), its apparent counterpart in the Real World, but it seems more a droll
nightmare from someone’s troubled unconscious. Where the Toons were preoccupied with their
looniness, the grotesque ‘Doodles’ who inhabit the Cool World are consumed with relentless,
senseless violence. An exaggerated parody of the already quite brutal antics of Wile E. Coyote
and Tom and Jerry, the outright barbarism of the Doodles removes any sympathy for the
characters and emphasizes the plasticity of the indestructible cartoon body through its continued
abuse. The contempt for the Doodle body in general is countered by the fetishization of sexy
Holli Would, voiced by Kim Basinger (Fig. 29). Her constant, sensual dancing draws the
drooling, eye-popping gazes of everyone around her; she is clearly a Doodle of a different stripe,
as her rotoscoped movement and realistic stylization set her apart from the other denizens of the
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Cool World, in an “ill-fitting conglomeration of images that consistently proves both fascinating
and puzzling, attractive and even repulsive,” as Telotte writes.17 Even within the animated Cool
World, characters are othered differently, from Holli’s smooth gyrations, to the pliable grotesque
of the cast of secondary Doodle characters, to the crude charcoal ‘ghosts’ that float periodically
across the screen, not fully rendered.

Figure 29. Holli Would and Frank (Brad Pitt) in Cool World.
Telotte notes that Holli’s desire ‘to be real’ is an appropriate one, given her realistic
styling. We might go further, though, and note that in the style of her animation she is uniquely
positioned to ‘pass’ as human, should she make the transition into the other world. Her sense of
her own body and her seeming ability to mimic the human form make her embodiment nearly
compatible with the bodies of the Real World. With the exception of some curiosity from the
similarly-styled Lonette, she is the only character who desires to enter the normative,
photographic ‘real’. She seems keenly aware of her otherness, of the social position Doodles
inhabit relative to the Real World, and has aspirations for upward mobilization. This desire is
17
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manifest in an interesting reversal of conventional spectatorship, as film footage of Marilyn
Monroe is projected on the wall of her apartment – the native figure idealizing a photographic
(and yet still largely constructed) ‘reality’.
The ‘oldest law of Cool World’ – no sex between Doodles and Noids (humans) – is a
prevention against miscegenation, enforced by noirish human detective Frank Harris (Brad Pitt).
The unthinkable result of such an affair is a breakdown of the physical (that is, cultural)
boundary that separates Doodles and Noids, allowing Doodles to enter the Real World and
become human. (Although humans are somewhat out of place in the Cool World, there is no
equivalent prohibition against their entry, which further establishes the lower class status of
animated characters.) Holli seduces Jack (Gabriel Byrne), the artist whom she has summoned
into the Cool World, into having sex with her, and she transforms into a human (that is, into Kim
Basinger, already ‘contained’ in Holli). They travel back to the Real World, but soon find their
transition to live-action to be false or incomplete – as if the photographic had been inadequately
superposed on their animated forms – in a curse of bastardization that disallows them from
entering the photographic ‘real’. Jack's hands turn into puffy cartoon hands, causing him to
nearly crash his car, and Holli flashes with increasing frequency into a buffoonish clown – a very
different image from her original form which proves that while she may have been queen of the
Doodles, she is a Doodle still, and among humans her Doodle-nature manifests in the grotesque
body.
Holli seeks to obtain the Spike of Power in order to fully join the real world (placing her
hope in a particularly clichéd fiction and overdetermined phallic image), but instead it releases
the Doodles into the human world en masse, turning Holli, Jack, and a number of casino
denizens into Doodles, and infecting the photographic world with baser behavior and bodies
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(though hardly a step down for the barely sentient beings at the slot machines). Once the Spike is
returned, forcing the Doodles back to the Cool World, forbidden desires that once crossed
imaging technologies are resolved by downgrading the status of the Cool World humans (Frank
and Jack both become Doodles), while returning the rest of the Doodles to their place.
That the denizens of the Cool World consider the human world the ‘real’ demonstrates
their acceptance of their othered status in a hegemonic consciousness drawn directly into their
character-bodies. Their abjection positions the animated Cool World as the other that the
photographic Real World needs to constitute its place as subject and center of the imagistic
universe. Characters and bodies of a certain disposition and plasticity are required to fulfill the
call to bear the violence of images – that is, the violence directed toward images for being
images. These whipping boys (or ducks, coyotes, dogs, cats, mice, bears, hunters, sailors, and
park rangers – though almost always ‘boys’) of the golden age of cartoons, and their
contemporary counterparts in SpongeBob, Ren and Stimpy, and the like, seem positioned as the
dark shadow of photographic imagery. “The image is usually spoiled of its own existence as
image, devoted to a shameful complicity with the real,” writes Baudrillard in his essay “The
Violence of the Image.”18 Animated characters, and cartoon characters in particular, can be seen
as the scapegoats for this complicity which both too nearly touches the real and simultaneously
threatens to replace it. Confined within the otherness of the screen, as ink-dipped ghosts with no
earthly referent, they are available for this violence, and their bodies designed for the violence
they are called to sustain. The second class status of animated images not only protects the
privileged status of the photographic, but also masks or tempers anxieties surrounding the
photographic replacement of the real by offering up living images less real and more imagistic –
18

Jean Baudrillard, “The Violence of the Image,” presented at the International Symposium attached to ‘mediacity’, Seoul’s 2002 Biennial. European Graduate School website, 2002 (accessed January 2011).
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a relation that helps preserve notions of the photographic as part of reality rather than its
replacement, reinforcing the index through difference.

Bodies Colonized
CG images are not othered the same way that animated images are, as their otherness
tends more toward the hyperreal and fantastic. The combination of cel animation and live action
filmmaking, while not entirely unusual, is somewhat rare; CG imagery, however, has widely
permeated live-action filmmaking as a visual effects component. Although CG effects are
commonly used ‘invisibly’ to produce backgrounds, remove unwanted elements, and enhance
visual style, it is the spectacle of their visible presence that sells tickets and most saliently
pertains to issues of contemporary representation. Sympathetic CG characters, who can be
differentiated from the digital monsters and creatures that fulfill roles of subjugation and
difference, represent the new frontier of CG technology. Though often discussed primarily in
terms of technological achievement, CG characters are intriguing and problematic in their fusion
of imaging technology, character elements, actor contributions (such as voice and movement),
and visual styling. These figures in many ways embody the anxiety and fantasy surrounding our
fascination and identification with imageness, as they so neatly reproduce the human body as an
image within the technological body of the image.
In Gollum can be found a figure of the other who also functions as a creature of fantasy.
Multiple tensions and conflicts exist within his emaciated body: in addition to his troubled
psyche and his existence on the margins, he is a hybrid figure existing between the photographic
and non-photographic worlds, a body in which two spheres of production are restlessly joined,
reflected in his strangely split personality. It is the One Ring that holds him together, that forms
his identity within the structure of his single-minded desire for the Ring itself. The influence of
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the Ring is strong – those upon whom it has exacted the greatest toll become digital figures,
while those whom it begins to influence are implicitly threatened with the same fate. Frodo’s
(Elijah Wood) attempts to resist the power of the Ring are attempts to keep the digital at bay, lest
the protagonist himself be infected (as Wikus is in District 9, discussed below), as have been
Gollum, the Ringwraiths, and the evil Sauron. Tom Gunning, in his comparison of Gollum and
the Golem, sees the runes on the Ring as analogous to the mythical combination of letters and
numbers that bring the Golem into existence, and the equivalent of modern computer code in “an
allegory for the ultimate in technological control . . . equating magic with previously unseen
degrees of technological development.”19 It is the Ring that disembodied Sauron, and which he
seeks for the formation of a new body; the flaming vaginal eye – all that is left of him – makes
visually potent the look within his lack, the privileging of the eye relative to the absence of the
body.
As CG imagery has become capable of producing photorealistic bodies, the ‘presence of
an absence’ dichotomy that characterizes the film image is inverted. Gollum, a fantasy creature
produced using motion-capture technology, marks the presence of something that never was,
hung on an actual body we can’t see. Rather than the conventional arrangement of a presence (an
actor before the camera) which became an absence (in the image), Gollum is an absence (an
unreal creature, a missing actor) manifest in a presence (the photorealistic body on the screen).20
Presence and absence play out on the screen as a drama of images, and CG is used to visually
create diegetic transformations of a drastic sort – not only from one appearance to a very
different one, but from one image state to another. Ultimately these narratives are a
19
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dramatization of the transformative capacity of digital effects, to not only transform bodies but
also filmmaking or the film image as a whole.
Gollum’s transformation from photographic to digital takes place in a flashback at the
beginning of The Return of the King (2003). In an idyllic scene we find Andy Serkis
(photographically) as Sméagol, who kills his cousin Déagol and retreats into seclusion, becoming
increasingly malformed and greyish before finally turning into the figure of Gollum we have
come to know. The short sequence of transformation is accomplished mostly with make-up
effects, which are distinctly unimpressive relative to the striking visual image of the digital
Gollum. The last stage in the transformation is accomplished with a morph effect, in a close-up
of his face, that marks the final transition into his digital form. The close shot on the face makes
the change personal and intimate – both for Gollum in his becoming, and for us in our experience
of this transformation.21
The brevity of the transformation sequence (compared especially to the hundreds of years
implied in the books) emphasizes visual alteration over character transformation, with the latter
reduced to a minimum. The gap between make-up and digital effects is also notably bridged by a
morph effect, which was one of the most visible early manifestations of CG imaging, and which
itself visualized the transformative power of digital effects. For the few moments that Gollum is
a product of latex and paint, he is part of a history of visual effects that echoes back through the
annals of cinema, and which still constitutes the primary method for producing Orcs in the Lord
of the Rings trilogy (at least in close and medium shots – in the large battle sequences they are
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CG-driven film.
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mostly digital). Gollum's body provides a stark point of contrast with actors in make-up, who
appear in comparison as, well, actors in make-up. As Mark Wolf writes,

when we see the orc characters, we know that they are just actors in costume; but when
we see Gollum, or the Balrog, it is just the character we are seeing, not an actor playing a
character. The digital character exists on a separate plane, but it exists wholly on that
plane, rather than being one kind of being attempting to be another, as in the case of the
costumed actor.22

The difference between Gollum’s body and those of the Orcs engenders the threat of replacement
in the particular way that Gollum’s body is a point-for-point (or joint-for-joint) visual
replacement of a human body, and the fantasy of replacement in the superiority of CG over
traditional make-up effects in its transformation of the body, in merging body and character, and
in representing the body digital.
Wolf’s observation ties CG characters to traditional animation, situating them as screen
natives. While the aesthetic lineage of the CG character has its roots in animation, there is
perhaps more to ‘see’ than only the digital image on the surface. “Gollum is Gollum,” as Cynthia
Fuchs writes about his lack of place and self-awareness, but he is also Andy Serkis and Weta
Digital.23 The motion-captured movements and facial performances of Serkis that were converted
to data, as well as the rotoscoped scenes from which Serkis was ‘painted out’, imply a referential
relationship in which the ‘trace’ of Serkis’s performance can be seen in Gollum’s movements.
An implicit indexicality informs this process, but it should be remembered that motion-capture is
never purely or simply indexical. Dan North points out that motion-captured figures “are
frequently pieced together from attributes gleaned from a variety of human referents – the
22
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motion capture data of one performer, the voice of another, facial features based on aggregates of
beauty or anatomical studies, for example,” in addition to the ways in which the original motioncapture data is manipulated by the animators in the final collaborative ‘performance’.24 The
‘stick figure’ produced by motion-capture becomes the skeleton for the animated figure, but this
trace can be easily molded and reworked into altered performances, existing as it does as data no
longer inextricably tied to the body that produced it or the datastreams in which it was captured.
The trace is hidden, masked by layers of digital frameworks and textural skin, and often
augmented with key frame animation (as Gollum’s face was, drawing from facial reference
material provided by Serkis).
Serkis’s invisibility in a sense undermined the work of the studio to promote him as a
performer, for Gollum was not only a hybrid of digital and performative techniques, but Serkis
effectively disappears within Gollum through the ambiguity of the indexical connection – he is
there somewhere, but where does he begin and end? North writes “What is more interesting [than
how Serkis was taken out of the frame] is what remains of Serkis in the finished film, and the
lengths taken to ensure that the horrors of a digital character are tempered by an injection of
‘humanity.’” North identifies these remains in a list of Serkis’s contributions, but, interestingly,
in a way that disarticulates Serkis in terms of his ‘input’ into Gollum,“providing motion capture
information, lending Gollum some of his motile inflections, leaving traces of some of his
features.”25 Serkis himself becomes the input, the raw data then recombined into a new body, a
new entity comprised partially of elements of Serkis. The ‘humanity’ which Serkis injects into
Gollum is not simply a person or performance per se, but an abstract human element that is the
product of the human as information.

24
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Animated and CG characters in live-action films are commonly relegated to the positions
of either fantasy creatures (who often also serve as helpers to the human characters) or
monstrous others to be destroyed, which make their existence permissible within the realm of the
photographic.26 Gollum moves at different points into both positions in his personas as the
malformed Gollum and the erstwhile hobbit Sméagol. Gollum resists easy classification, and
when he cannot be easily classified as either a fantastic or monstrous other, his ambiguity
becomes further pronounced, shifting him toward the center, closer to the human protagonists
that anchor the film. In the end, however, he is unable to complete the transformation, and,
chasing the Ring, falls into a pit of CG lava – the final destruction of his monstrous form,
dissolved in the molten digital sea from which the One Ring (the one technology) to ‘rule them
all’ was formed.
The ‘horrors’ of the digital character are partly located in the consuming aspect of
motion-capture, in the swallowing up of an actor into the character so that we get a hint that the
actor was once there and might be vaguely discerned, but has been replaced to the extent that the
actor disappears. We know that Serkis is the basis for Gollum, but this knowledge fails to fully
account for either the body of Gollum or the character tied to this body (another way in which
Gollum is Gollum). Gollum as a native figure is a body colonized, moved from the inside by a
now invisible body and its ambiguous, even ghostly, trace. Motion-capture acutely typifies an
anxiety of bodies replaced by images because of its closeness to the human body that animates it.
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Whereas the traditional animator keeps the native body at a distance, the body in motion-capture
is subsumed – not simply ‘captured’ after all (for only its motions and information are, its place
on a grid, the expressions it can make), but extracted, processed, composited, manipulated,
painted over, animated, degraded with film grain and blur, and finally presented as a photograph
that isn’t one.27

Fantasizing the Other
Transformation – both the horror of it, and the fantasy – is central to District 9 (2009,
Neill Blomkamp), as it is also to Avatar. The interspecies transformation depicted in District 9
presents the horror of trans-image mutation couched in an alien invasion film which combines
live-action with CG characters. Released four months before Avatar, Blomkamp’s sci-fi allegory
of xenophobia and racism depicts a refugee alien population confined to a shantytown in South
Africa. Wikus van de Merwe (Sharlto Copley), an Afrikaner administrator, is charged with
facilitating the relocation of the aliens to a government camp further from the city (Fig. 30).
While serving eviction notices he becomes infected with an alien substance, which begins his
transformation into an alien – or ‘prawn’, as the aliens are derisively called in the film.
Blomkamp uses a documentary style for the film, underscoring its agenda as a thinly veiled
allegory of apartheid South Africa, while at the same time increasing the tension between the
realistic filming style and the CG aliens that populate the film.
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Figure 30. Wikus and a prawn in District 9.
Wikus’s transformation begins with illness and black fluid leaking from his nose,
signaling the internal effects of the alien matter. Externally, the transformation is manifest in his
hand, which had sustained a previous injury and is thus more vulnerable to being overtaken; the
transformation is mostly limited to the hand until the final shot of the film, when we see that
Wikus has become a prawn (or at least it is implied that the prawn we see is, or was, Wikus). The
alien appendage acts as a metaphor of sorts for our interaction with other digital bodies that stand
in for our own, in the form of avatars and videogame characters for which the hand is the point
of connection at the keyboard or game controller. In the film the hand enables Wikus to operate
alien technology that is only compatible with alien DNA, making him very valuable to both the
corporation that has been exploiting the aliens and the Nigerian gang that operates a crime ring in
District 9. Wikus’s alien hand is thus both enabling and stigmatizing, though for most of the film
he is focused on the latter aspect – the rejection by his wife, the corporeal transformation into the
thing he hates, and his mulatto status (which, in a smear campaign, is attributed to infection from
interspecies sex).
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The isolation of the mutation to the hand allows Wikus, and the audience, to keep it at
somewhat of a distance – literally at arm’s length, as self but not self (“if thy hand offend thee,
cut it off” is the Biblical advice, which Wikus attempts, but only manages to remove the tip of
what seems to be his thumb). His mental faculties remain human; it is the body that threatens
him, the otherness of both the alien and the visual effect, which has begun overtaking him. At the
end of the film he is shown making small flowers for his wife out of junk as an indication of
some lingering humanity, but it is not exactly clear what is left of Wikus. This final shot of him
semi-hunched amidst the garbage and refuse, exhibiting the vaguely animalistic quality that
characterizes the aliens, is ominous in its indeterminable association of the colonized body and
the embodied consciousness that is produced in the body colonized – as if this chapter in the life
of the organism formerly known as Wikus is too dark and inaccessible to show because he is
now an alien, an other, and no longer a character.
Whereas Gollum is mostly presented post-transformation, with the character transition
and CG morph shown only in brief flashback, Wikus’s metamorphosis is diegetically central to
District 9. The horror of the transformation is intensified by the fact that once his hand has
changed, Wikus can only find refuge in the alien slum, emphasizing his place as an outsider even
as the alterations to his body only affect a small percentage of it, and evoking historical formulas
for determining the status of mixed-race individuals. However, the transformation is also
tempered by Wikus’s and the film’s growing sympathy for a certain alien, Christopher Johnson
(Jason Cope, who also plays one of the minor human characters), who is the rare parent of an
alien child and is presented as smarter and more capable than the others. The irony of the name
‘Christopher Johnson’ applied to an inhuman creature clearly recalls colonial and slaveholder
naming practices, which work to remove history and culture from the colonial subject in the
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application of a name that itself becomes ahistorical and generic in the process. In a sense, the
name brings to light the CG body’s lack of history and culture, even perhaps an ‘unconscious’, as
Barbara Creed argues, in contrast with the implied historical and cultural aspects of the
character.28
When Wikus later risks his life to give Christopher Johnson a chance to get to the mother
ship, he notably does so in a mechanical exo-suit designed in the form of an alien body. In an
inversion of the (internalized) alien DNA that has become a part of his body system, and in a
foreshadowing of his impending (external) transformation, Wikus becomes the internal
mechanism that guides the external alien body. He takes on the image of the alien, but only
superficially, and thus the problem of images remains. Confined to the hand, the exo-suit, and
the unseen internal reconfiguration that has altered his DNA, Wikus’s ‘alienation’ from himself
is threatening but marginalized. His social alienation is portrayed as unfair as he is condemned
despite the fact that his human psyche apparently remains intact – socially he gives off the wrong
‘image’, and hence is presented by the film as unjustly ostracized. The aliens, however, are not
given this same consideration – their CG status is intrinsic to their characters. Christopher
Johnson generates pathos in his plight and sympathy for his worthy objectives (to get his son to
safety, to get back to his home planet, to rescue his people), but doesn’t quite become a
sympathetic character. Like Gollum, he approaches the racial boundary but can’t cross it. James
Zborowski notes that the aliens, while certainly mistreated, are more social problem than society,
characterized as uneducated slum-dwellers of the xenophobic imagination for whom “progress
and integration are rendered unimaginable.”29 They are not positioned as potentially
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transformable or even assimilable, but are contained within the fixity integral to the colonial
construction of otherness.
Avatar is a text particularly intriguing for its superimposition of racial otherness and
digital alterity within a narrative of ostensibly positive (rather than negative) transformation. At a
time when digital effects have become commonplace in cinema and the spectacle has given way
to the simulation, Cameron’s film manages to impress and awe with its plenitude, as a sort of allconsuming digital effect that envelops the viewer, takes over the space of the film, and either
consumes its photographic bodies or diegetically expels them. In a blog entry on the film, Jeffrey
Sconce writes that Avatar is most interesting as an allegory of the cinema, “in the warring
production paradigms the film so conveniently spatializes within its diegesis.”30 This conflict, as
I have mentioned, is a salient aspect of the film’s technological mythos, and one firmly rooted in
racial discourse. Avatar positions the (photographic) humans as alien intruders within a pristine
(digital) landscape and a population of natives in an anti-colonialist fantasy aligning Western
hegemony with photographic realism, and (without any sense of irony from Cameron) digital
image production with nature and a prelapsarian idyll. The conflict of imaging technologies is
also a conflict of images in which one might say that native figures must endure the ‘trespass’ of
the photographic, which has long claimed the space of the screen as its own. With the indigenous
Na’vi, native images are cast as, and played by, native people, and the Na’vi bodies are
integrated into the film in a way that reduces or eliminates the otherness often present in initial
appearances of special effects creatures.
Vivian Sobchack writes that science fiction films “present us with a confrontation
between and mixture of those images to which we respond as ‘alien’ and those we know to be
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familiar” – a confrontation that is only partly dependent on content, as style and representational
forms also construe visual objects as familiar or strange.31 Cameron’s use of alluring bodies
instead of monstrous forms, along with the film’s sympathetic positioning of the beleaguered and
outgunned Na’vi, shift audience sympathy toward the digital figures. The Na’vi bodies were
designed and modified to make them more available for audience identification, eliminating
alien protuberances to create a humanoid form mixed with familiar animal elements, privileging
the exotic over the alien. Also, by the time we first meet Neytiri, the lithe blue Na’vi bodies have
already been introduced to us through the avatars that Jake, Grace, and Norm (Joel David
Moore) drive – seen first in laboratories, then on a training ground that includes trainees playing
basketball, and continuing in the mission to collect samples, during which Jake becomes
separated from the others and ends up meeting Neytiri.32 The contemporary clothing, trash talk
on the court, and Jake’s exuberant acclimation to his new body (and the capabilities it affords
him in giving him legs) serve as a prelude to seeing the Na’vi; thus when we first see Neytiri, it
is not her blue body or the effects processes behind it that stand out, and hence her character and
her particular body are foregrounded.
These strategies make the CG aliens less alien to us, but it is still unusual for an animated
character to be the protagonist in a live-action film. Cameron’s use of the avatar as a device
diegetically central to the film eases and facilitates Jake’s gradual transition into the CG body.
As Jake learns to use and accept his new body, the audience comes along for the ride, moving
from the difference between Jake and his avatar, to Jake’s enjoyment of and preference for the
new body, to Jake as the new body, cemented by his permanent transition at the end of the film.
31
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The fictional Na’vi culture comes along with the body, and the film spends more and more time
in the digital realm of Pandora, so that the world to which the CG body belongs becomes the
world of the film. After the victory of the Na’vi over the humans, and just before Jake leaves his
photographic body behind, Pandora reclaims the space of the screen for those native figures,
characters, and images for whom screens are their sole territory, while the photographic invaders
are driven out, off-screen. The motion-capture performer has in this respect ‘gone native’, given
his or her body over to the animators and computers that will render it as an image indigenous to
the screen.

Figure 31. Jake in ceremonial costume in Avatar.
The avatar device thus permits the colonization of the body to be positioned antithetically
to the colonization of the planet, even as it evokes the colonial White Messiah. Jake’s
assimilation into Na’vi culture is facilitated by his avatar body, which affords him both a visual
fit into their society and a functional compatibility in being able to form the ‘bond’ (Fig. 31).
Although he is immediately perceived to be one of the ‘sky people’, he was marked by the digital
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world (in the sign from Eywa) as different from the other humans, which allows his entry and
enculturation. Unlike the others whom the Na’vi have tried to teach, he is pliable and teachable
exactly because he has given up on the ‘reality’ of his own world and he seeks an escape into an
alternate reality. Jake’s inhabitation of the avatar is distinguished from the human presence in
Pandora – the avatar works as an acceptable colonization, while the human invasion is presented
as an atrocity. Avatar bodies are ‘empty’, and hence available for and even needing to be filled.
The human colonizers had initially taken this approach to the Na’vi, trying to educate and build
roads for them, but the film presents the Na’vi as comparatively ‘full’, receiving no benefit from
human intervention. They do need Jake, however, and his military skills and rationalism to save
them from the human invasion and fill the hole in their own society that makes them vulnerable.
The White Messiah comes wearing blue skin, with the digital body inhabited by the
photographic one which disappears in it, re-emerging periodically as a reminder of the
consciousness that drives the digital body before the final transition into the paradoxical figure of
the permanent avatar.
Ultimately, then, Cameron seems to attain the ‘unobtanium’ he seeks in pushing digital
effects into a realm that allows them to be characters and bodies available for audience
identification, and in this sense the widely seen Avatar represents a symbolic and technological
victory for native images. In the conflict between ‘warring production paradigms’, the violent
return of the index is put down not only by the motion-captured Na’vi and the avatarial Jake, but
by the digital animals that populate Pandora as well. Initially constituting a monstrous threat,
Jake learns to respect CG fauna, and with the bond joins them in communion with the digital
stuff that embodies the future (and present) of images. The triumph of the digital over the
photographic, framed within the libidinal rush of fantasy filmmaking, displaces fears of the
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disappearance of the real manifest in the threat to the physical body, and its ally in the
photograph, with digital plenitude and enviable ‘imageness’ – the fantasy of the transcendent,
disembodied image qua image, no longer constrained by the camera nor contained in the picture.
The existential implications of this contest are brought into relief at the end of the film, as the
photographic humans are driven out of the cinematic space which has already become
increasingly submerged in the proliferative digital overgrowth. The final shot of Avatar closely
parallels that of District 9 as each of the new image-bodies, the aliens we have come to know,
look directly at the camera. In District 9, however, the look is one of fear and depersonalization
in the face of a digital takeover; in Avatar, unabashed acceptance and irrefutable presence.
Like Neo, and Jobe before him, Jake makes a final avatarial transition. He has sloughed
off the connection at a distance espoused by the avatar and made his connectivity permanent. Is
he still avatarial, then? The avatar and CG character as two different image bodies each inform
our reading of the other in this film. The avatar might be thought of as horizontal, a spatialized
connection made across bodies, and the CG character as vertical, with layers of representative
(the character) and actual (the actor) embodiment super(im)posed into a composited image body.
I use the parenthetical here as a caveat regarding superimposition, for we may at times only see
or notice the final image as a manifestation of character, especially once the action gets going
and we have acclimated to Cameron’s techniques with the Na’vi, and at other times become
aware or consciously engage the imbricated layers incorporated in the CG body. Where body,
technology, and images intersect, we find the virtual, encountered in the shifting and
interpenetrating instantiations of each so that we are aware of all three but can’t quite tell where
one leaves off and the other begins. Thus what we ‘see’ when we view these bodies, I suggest,
can be something much deeper than what lies on the surface – a composited emblem of
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embodiment in digital culture, where disembodied film images seek a new materiality, and
human embodiment, caught up in a world of images, seeks a livable body that can be enworlded
in such an environment. The othered image, vis-à-vis the portentous demise of the photographic
body (the body of the photograph, the body in photographs), sloughs off its ghostly attributes as
a non-image and assumes the mantle of self-existence in its native status, as the pure image. In
the avatarial switch, we become the ghosts – rather than understanding ourselves as the bodies
that produce spectral images, we deign to inhabit and possess the images that constitute presence
in our wired, image-driven world.
What is missing is Jake’s distance from himself that the avatar provided. Cameron works
to extinguish the alterity of the digital, and while he is successful in doing so to the extent that
the increasingly digital Jake can occupy the role of protagonist rather than monster, as we see
Jobe become, we have noted how this is carried out within discourses of otherness.33 Jake joins
the screen natives, and this indigenous body will inhabit the two sequels to Avatar already in
production. Jake has become feminized as well, drawn into Neytiri’s world and undergoing
bodily changes that bring him closer to nature, to his new body, and ultimately to himself (the
‘wrongness’ of the disabled Marine sets this course early in the film, as his status as a male is
already compromised). Jake also becomes situated as an image – a conspicuously feminine act
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Another way in which the CG body is avatarial is that it can be played by different bodies; however, in most CG
productions, one actor plays a single body – an aspect due in large part to the Hollywood star system in which
animated characters are attached to celebrities. In traditional animation, it was not uncommon for a single performer
to voice several characters. Motion-capture need not be constricted the way it typically is (i.e. a stunt performer
could easily fill in for action sequences, or a dancer could be used for musical sequences, as Jenine Jennings
provided the rotoscoped dance moves for Holli Would in Cool World), but it typically is. The quasi-indexical
‘proof’ of the bodily connection between actor and character can often be found in DVD appendices, where bits of
the capturing sections can be viewed.
Where voice was once the sole connection between the work of actor and animator, digital technologies have
permitted the incorporation of the body into this relation; the index of the CG body is always indeterminate,
however, as we have seen, and thus the voice, while ‘invisible’ and perhaps marginalized relative to the attractions
of CG, still provides the strongest trace of the body. In virtual worlds as well, voice evokes the real, as it is “widely
assumed to be irredeemably actual” – sometimes too powerfully actual, as the vocal index can break the fantasy the
images supply (Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life, 114).
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which Jobe has to ward off with excessive masculinity and violence – and thus occupying the
paradoxical state of being both image and body, it seems that Jake’s final transformation was not
a move toward transcendence, in the uncoupling of mind and body for the cognitive download,
but rather one toward immanence and inhabiting one’s body more fully through acclimating to
the interimplication of materiality and the virtual that defines embodiment. In the next chapter I
take up the contradictions of femininity relative to avatars and the potential for a medial
embodiment that the figure of the female avatar suggests.
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CHAPTER 6
PRECARIOUS LIMINALITY
The magic and most powerful effect of women is, to speak the language of the
philosophers, action at a distance, actio in distans: but that requires, first and foremost –
distance!
Nietzsche1
The female avatar is a duplicitous figure. In virtual environments, male users have
traditionally outnumbered female users by significant numbers, and while ‘gender-bending’ goes
both ways, the numerical disparity between the number of women playing in a virtual world or
MMO and the number of female avatars means that, from the outset, a female avatar is more
likely to be male than vice versa – according to one study, seven or eight times as likely, with
roughly half of all female characters played by men.2 This situation induced paranoiac behavior
among some male players, inducing suspicion of any female avatar until it could be proven that
the user was indeed female; Julian Dibbell argues, however, that “such outright paranoia was
really just a deviation from a far more nuanced norm, in which players generally took for granted
the marked fluidity of gender in VR, yet at the same time also tended to take at face value the
virtual gender of whomever they were interacting with.”3 Reactions to female avatars thus tended
to be either subject to investigation to discover their ‘true’ gender, or accepted only with a

1

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 71.
2
As part of his Deadalus Project, Nick Yee surveyed World of Warcraft players in 2005 and concluded that “1 out
of every 2 female characters is played by a man,” while “1 out of every 100 male characters is played by a woman.”
In a hypothetical pool of 1000 players, there would be 348 female characters of which 193 (55%) would be played
by a male player, and 652 male characters of which 5 (< 1%) would be played by a female player. There are
multiple reasons why players gender-bend, not all associated with sexuality, but Yee notes that female players have
as many reasons and still do it much less frequently. http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/001369.php
3
Dibbell, My Tiny Life, 130. The frequent refrain “If it’s good, don’t look under the hood” implied that the
acceptability of manifest (female) gender was more dependent on whether the performance was convincing or
satisfying than if the player was actually female.
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compensatory investment in the ‘face value’ of their gender, relegating femininity to a taken-forgranted performance.
In a general sense, however, the argument could be made that all avatars are feminine to
some extent, especially in contrast with the disembodied FPS non-avatar, represented onscreen
by a hand or a gun. In the third-person perspective common in most virtual world interfaces, the
avatar is a body ‘to-be-looked-at’ – to evoke Laura Mulvey’s classic formulation – always in
view. This view is triangulated between an avatar’s user and other users in shared space. Women
are often theorized as viewing themselves more externally than males do, seeing themselves
from both the perspective of an outside (male) look and from their own embodied positions as
objects of the look. The avatar facilitates this kind of dual gaze, as the user looks at his or her
avatar from the outside while also identifying with the position of the avatar as the object of
another’s look.4 Avatars have no look of their own, but indicate or mark the presence of the look
of another, and no voice of their own, but are spoken through. Such a position, as the object at an
intersection of gazes, evokes the place of the the woman in classical Hollywood film, particularly
as theorized by Mulvey.
In their conflation of images and bodies, avatars are analogous with the feminine in that
within the avatarial relationship they occupy the space of the screen and the technologies of the
virtual, relative to the off-screen user; the crisis of the masculine in avatar texts is often the result
of male characters finding themselves in the (feminine) avatar position rather than (masculine)
user position. Avatars are also feminine in that their gender is a product of signifiers, not
necessarily tied to actual embodiment but at the same time taken at face value. The site of
simulation is feminine, as Sadie Plant writes: “The computer, like the woman, is both the
4

There is a male-coded element here as well – since users are ‘invisible’ in the virtual environment, they are in
some sense voyeurs. However, the voyeur’s gaze is always preceded and announced by the presence of one’s avatar,
as one must first produce a body in order to look, and that self-representative body is always in view.
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appearance and the possibility of simulation. [According to this logic], woman cannot be
anything, but she can imitate anything valued by man: intelligence, autonomy, beauty. . . .
Indeed, if woman is anything, she is the very possibility of mimesis.”5 In contrast with Donna
Haraway’s feminist appropriation of the cyborg’s associations with machines and information
technologies, the avatar exhibits a femininity coded as organic to the simulational (rather than
computational) capability that emerged as computers became increasingly imbricated within a
digital culture that has been moving toward the production of the image.
This is not to say, however, that the avatar as feminine is a wholly disempowered figure.
While avatars are by definition subject to control, they are also enviable figures in the
intercorporeality of their image bodies (they are not simply bodies subjected to a gaze within an
image regime, but bodies already incorporating images into themselves, and images have
power), and in the phenomenological immersion in the fantasy of virtual environments, while the
user is at some remove from what the avatar seems to experience. Relative to Mulvey, the
distinction between the empowered and disempowered feminine can be drawn out with one of
her own examples, read through the lens of the avatar.
In the voyeuristic classic Rear Window (1954), Hitchcock, in a key moment of the film,
sets the force of the look in opposition to an immersion in space. Jeff (James Stewart), trying to
gather evidence for what he suspects to be a murder by the tenant across the courtyard, Thorwald
(Raymond Burr), wonders what might be buried under a patch of flowers. Jeff’s girlfriend Lisa
(Grace Kelly) volunteers to find out, and while Jeff gets Thorwald out of the apartment with a
phone call, Lisa, with Jeff’s home-care nurse Stella (Thelma Ritter), enters the courtyard and
digs up the flowers. In this moment, Jeff’s relationship with Lisa becomes somewhat avatarial, as

5

Sadie Plant, “The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics,” in Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist
Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace, ed. Jenny Wolmark (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 112.
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Lisa bodily carries out Jeff’s wishes, his desire to find out what is buried (a desire she has come
to share). An avatarial relation is implicit in Mulvey’s understanding of cinema in general as
well, in which “the power to subject another person to the will sadistically or to the gaze
voyeuristically is turned on the woman as the object of both.”6 Lisa steps into the space of Jeff’s
gaze and the scene of his investigation, working almost as an extension of the apparatus – the
camera – which he uses (along with the aural instrument of the telephone) to exercise his
command over the investigation. This commanding position has its limits, however; finding
nothing under the flowers, Lisa decides to sneak into Thorwald’s apartment, and at this point
Jeff’s lack of control is manifest, evident not only in her independent action against his wishes,
but as well in her bodily entry into the space of the apartment rather than through the ‘portable
keyhole’, as Stella calls it, of the camera. As he gestures in vain and then watches helplessly, she
subjects herself to risk and assault in order to locate the damning evidence of the missing
woman’s wedding ring.
Tania Modleski sees Lisa, juxtaposed against Jeff’s passivity and confinement, as an
empowered woman. In Jeff, the voyeuristic gaze is associated with his immobility in such a way
that the gaze is itself disabled; when Lisa enters Thorwald’s apartment, Jeff’s helpless look is
fully dissociated from the scopophilic objectification and control that earlier characterize his
voyeuristic exploits, calling into question his position of power. Lisa takes over the investigation
at this point, and while she still to some extent executes Jeff’s will to see into the apartment, she
does so on her own terms. As she does, we remain in the position of voyeur as Hitchcock plays
the scene from Jeff’s confined perspective, which only allows Lisa’s bodily engagement of the
space of the apartment to be viewed through the windows, as reiterative screens.

6

Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in Feminist Film Theory: A Reader, ed. Sue Thornham
(New York: New York University Press, 1999), 66.
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Even when Lisa does not submit to the controlling male gaze, however, she is avatarial in
a different way: she sees what Jeff cannot, and goes where he cannot go – he does not share her
view, only gaining a sense of the space secondhand through the information she gestures to him
(Fig. 32). Also, she not only enters the screen space of the windows he previously gazed into, but
the off-screen space between windows as well. Her presence there, including what she sees and
finds, dominates the scene even as it is withheld from us or kept at a distance, while Jeff’s
helpless gaze produces only paralysis and frustration – we want to go with Lisa, but must remain
with Jeff. In a sense, this is not so different from immersion in a virtual environment, in which
only the avatar is ‘immersed’, while immersion is vicarious for the user.

Figure 32. Lisa’s ‘hands-on’ approach, through Jeff’s lens.
Female characters in avatar films occupy various roles that mostly adhere to the
conventional positions of women in Hollywood cinema, but are interesting and problematic for
their associations with the virtual.7 These characters are aligned at various times and in various
7

For the sake of convenience I allude to the various allusions and representations of virtual space in these films
simply as ‘virtulized’ or ‘virtual’. This is not meant to imply that these are images of the virtual, but rather that those
spaces posited as alternative or oppositional to the real are drawn from cultural notions of technological virtual
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ways with both the imaginal body and virtual technologies, and in these conflations come to
stand in for virtuality itself. Oliver Grau, in his study of immersive spaces in art history and new
media, defines virtuality as “the relationship of humans to images” (which, for Anne Friedberg,
are already themselves virtual); avatars, CG characters, and women in film all incorporate
images into bodies, to one extent or another, or are the objects of perceptual modes that make of
bodies images.8 Female characters in avatar films thus epitomize the imaginal embodiment I
have explored in this study, as it is characterized by the feminine.

Playing the Image
In their depictions of virtual environments and the rendering of virtualized existence,
avatar texts commonly present male characters in transition: escaping or defeating the virtuality
encroaching on their lives, harnessing it to become monstrous villains, or passing through it on
their way to a transcendent virtuality. For male characters, the avatarial position is a problem to
be resolved or overcome; for female characters, it is more likely to fix them ontologically. They
do not find themselves as alien in the virtual as male characters do, and they are often depicted as
having an intuitive or even intimate connection with it.
The Guild, for instance, begins with Codex being cut off by her therapist for failing to
extract herself from the Game. While all of the characters can be seen as overinvolved, it is
Codex and another woman, Clara (Robin Thorsen), a neglectful mother of several young
children, who are presented as most vulnerable to the lure of the game, and Codex’s problems

space, even if the spaces depicted are not themselves technological (as in Avatar, where the ‘virtual’ is a natural
space, albeit an alien one inhospitable to humans, accessed through interfaces and avatars, and produced through
digital imagery). Thus my use of the term ‘virtual’ here is an extension of that in ‘virtual technologies’ or ‘virtual
worlds’ rather than implying the virtual as the cultural and phenomenological aspects of the material world, although
the latter certainly permeates this discussion, as noted.
8
Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion, trans. Gloria Custance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 5.
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begin when the virtual world permeates her real life – when she is unable to ‘turn it off’.9 Angie,
in Gamer, is unable to extract herself from Society and must be rescued by Tillman, who has
managed to overcome his avatarial status. Angie’s avatarial functioning is different from
Tillman’s, in that while he must act as dictated by his player, he retains a conscious sense of his
surroundings; when he notices an enemy attacker behind him that his player Simon doesn’t see,
for instance, he gruffly whispers “turn me around.” Kable’s success is dependent more on their
collaboration than on him completely relinquishing control (as Tillman observes, “that don’t
work so good”), and eventually Tillman is able to communicate with Simon and persuade him to
give up control. Angie, however, has no such rapport with her player (although, given his
sadism, she may not want it), and she seems to be subject to a more complete mind control, as
indicated by the blank stare that persists even when Tillman has come to her rescue. This is not a
complete absence, however, as she remains conscious of the degraded experiences she
undergoes, but rather a lack of agency that characterizes her participation in the virtual world.
The Lawnmower Man’s Marnie is thrilled with the cybersex she has with Jobe in the virtual
world, and entry into the virtual is for her a liberating and enjoyable experience. The virtual has
been made deleterious for Jobe, however, and when he lashes out Marnie is victimized, never
fully returning from the virtual world.
Classic feminist theory sheds some light on the particular way that these characters are
aligned with the virtual. Joan Riviére’s theorization of womanliness as masquerade posits that
femininity is something worn as a mask, a behavior women are expected to display. This
approach to femininity as alter ego implies a connection to the virtual, but Riviére complicates
what might be thought of as the avatarial nature of femininity, for in the question of drawing the
9

Felicia Day created the series after deciding to make something useful out of the actual two-year addiction to
MMOs she experienced during off-time from acting roles, adding an additional associative layer to both the creation
and reception of the show.
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line between the masquerade and genuine womanliness she concludes that they are same thing.
Where the avatar inheres distance and an oscillation between connection and disconnection, the
woman wears a mask (an image) she can’t remove. Mary Ann Doane reconfigures the
masquerade as a mode of resistance, by which femininity is held at a distance, denying its
production as “closeness, as presence-to-itself, as, precisely, imagistic,” while simultaneously
reproducing the signs of femininity.10 In Doane’s view, womanliness can be worn or removed,
but she neglects to define a feminine identity outside of its relation to men, for the alternative to
the masquerade is the transvestite, “in which the woman becomes a man in order to attain the
necessary distance from the image.”11
To assume or ‘play’ the image of femininity in the masquerade thus presents
womanliness as a form of distanciation which nevertheless produces little distance, at least from
the male perspective; the performances that are transparent to women, notes Riviére, work for
men, who take the masquerade at face value even if they recognize its performative aspects. The
woman is presumed unable to achieve an objective distance from herself (too close) and is at the
same time abstracted from herself through her performance of femininity (but having no other
clear identity to retreat to), and thus embodies a paradox – she is self-distance without
separation, halved and doubled. Female characters are also often ensnared in a virtual which is
presented cinematically in terms of images and performance, as in the duplicate bodies in
Surrogates and the mind control of Gamer. The paradox of femininity comes to typify the
paradox of the virtual as both real and not real, as an alluring and deceiving world. In the
inequality of cinematic images, those nearer the index are privileged and those further away are
marginalized, as I have discussed; female characters in avatar films have a strained relation to the
10

Mary Ann Doane, “Film and the Masquerade: Theorising the Female Spectator,” in Feminist Film Theory: A
Reader, ed. Sue Thornham (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 138.
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index, and as the virtual in cinema is most often represented as excessively imaginal, the
feminine is associated with both. Women may be victims of the virtual in need of rescuing, as I
explore in greater detail with Maggie below, or they may use their complicity with the virtual, as
the femme fatale uses her sex, to manipulate male characters for their own benefit or pleasure.
Feminine duplicity is pronounced in the semi-animated films of Cool World and Who
Framed Roger Rabbit?, as the liminality of Holli and Jessica motivate the action of the films’
male characters to temper or discover their transgressive behavior. Jessica is a Toon who plays it
both ways, as her supposed affair (and subsequent flirting) are at the center of the scandal that
puts the Toon and human worlds at odds.12 Holli Would’s desire to become human inflicts near
disaster on both the Cool and real worlds, yet she is always on the margins of her own story, as
Bakshi hangs the film’s sympathies on Jack and Frank. From Holli the drawing to Holli the
Doodle, to Kim Basinger and back, she drives the fantasy for boundary transgression before
being fully reinstated and contained as an ‘image’.
In the French avatar film Black Heaven, Gaspard (Grégoire Leprince-Ringuet) is drawn
into dangerous intrigue by femme fatale Audrey (Louise Bourgoin), who plays the sexy avatar
Sam in the Black Hole, a virtual world. Audrey’s real-world brokenness (Gaspard first finds her
attempting a double suicide with one of her online flings) reinforces her seductiveness in the
virtual environment, as her enigmatic duality is central to her enchantments. Black Heaven is one
of the few avatar films to depict the virtual world with a videogame cutscene aesthetic, as it
would be in the real world – another paradox, that realism should appear so blatantly digital.13
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Judge Doom is the far more duplicitous character in the film, as a Toon wearing a rubber suit to appear human,
while Jessica is exonerated in the end. However, Doom’s duplicity is the surprise reveal, whereas Jessica’s
coquettishness drives the story.
13
The problem of the indexicality of voice is here dealt with in the casting of a second actress to do voice work for
Sam, while Gaspard himself uses a modulator to disguise his own.
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Other examples abound: in Virtual Girl (1998, Richard Gabai), a cybersex program
becomes a sentient and possessive black widow, entrapping and killing the men who enter her
cyberspace lair, while in Ghost Machine (2010, Chris Hartwill), the female victim of military
rendition returns as a dark spirit, haunting the VR military simulation set up by brash young
soldiers in an abandoned prison. And in the world-within-a-world-within-a-world enigma of The
Thirteenth floor, in which Hall is involved in the production of a VR simulation before realizing
that he is already an avatar in a larger one, it is a woman, Jane (Gretchen Mol), who manipulates
the virtual world from both inside and outside, as an avatar and a user. Jane enters to shut down
the simulation, while Hall tries desperately to figure out what’s happening to him and whether he
can trust her. However, Jane becomes a victim in the end, as her husband David (on whom Hall
was based, also played by Bierko), attempts to rape and murder Jane while operating Hall’s
body. When David dies in the virtual world, Hall’s consciousness fills the void in David’s
physical body; again it is the male character who transforms and transcends.
In representing the virtual cinematically, avatar films seek concrete ways not only to
depict virtual technologies, but also to evoke the virtual as an embodied, enworlded existence in
materiality, and the feminine is the frequent device for doing so. At one point in Surrogates, as
Greer and his partner, Agent Peters, enter the headquarters for surrogate production they are
engulfed in advertisements for surrogates that closely mirror the kinds of ads common in real
world media culture. The ads feature no robotics or specific technological information, but rather
focus on images of attractive bodies coupled with promises of better living, including the ultrageneric, all-encompassing “Life. Only Better.” Most prominent among these is the all-toofamiliar image of an eye-catching woman emerging from the water in a bikini, and by this point
the message is clear: photogenic bodies are attainable, but only through the acquisition of a new

233

body – a synthetic body, or an image body that permits the operator/consumer entry into a world
of images.14 Interestingly, the ads in the film are directed at a populace that has already bought
into surrogacy (ninety-eight percent live through surrogates), with detractors abstaining on
ideological grounds, unlikely to be swayed by advertisements. The ads then work to uphold the
consumerist (rather than utilitarian) rationale that surrogacy plays in the film, resulting when the
functional robots became more photogenic (their original intention was to facilitate full-bodied
experience for the disabled), and providing insights into the campaigns that apparently helped
make surrogacy nearly ubiquitous.15
Greer’s wife Maggie is presented as a woman caught up in the consumerist impulse that
insists on the inherent inadequacy of the physical body and the need for a new one more in line
with fashion imagery. Maggie refuses to be without her surrogate, even at home (reflecting the
increasing commodification of domestic space), driving Greer to question the role of surrogacy
in their lives. Maggie is unable or unwilling to accept his arguments for spending time together
in their biological bodies, and seems much more content at the salon where she works than at
home. Salon work on robots is an odd amalgamation, juxtaposing feminine primping with
something like a computer repair shop. A face-peeling scene (or face-lift, perhaps) reveals the
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This point is uncannily reinforced through Mostow’s creation of living photographs, or perhaps human statuary, in
the surrogate models on display in a corner store; filmed using real actors that are digitally stabilized to appear
perfectly still, the bodies exists as dimensional, embodied images somewhere between portrait photography and a
wax museum.
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Three different advertising campaigns attended the Surrogates film and comic. The comics featured print
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young, attractive bodies, with the tagline “Human Perfection. What Could Go Wrong?” The endoskeletons are
clearly intended as the implicit answer to the question (as in, something here is not ‘right’), but the shiny metal
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cyborg and digital sexiness. An accompanying website, ostensibly for Virtual Self Industries (the company that
makes the surrogates) acts like a company site, again addressing viewers directly with promotional information
about the bodies, downplaying simulacral aspects of surrogate living in favor of the features of new models.
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metal skeleton underneath in a clear allusion to the iconic visage of the Terminator series, but
with its impact and meaning shifted: rather than laying bare the “forceful masculine image of a
technological human,” as Claudia Springer refers to the Terminator android, the exposure of the
metal underneath is contextualized within a situation of women tending to women, where
appearances and the secret of what lies beneath the artificial flesh (the foundation, so to speak)
can be exposed in the process of constructing themselves and each other as imagistic (Fig. 33).16

Figure 33. Peeling away the image in Surrogates.
The ‘masculine’ machinery underneath the feminine flesh evokes constructivist and
cyborg perspectives of femininity as something manufactured and worn, producing gender
16
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difference on the surface through appearance and behavior while revealing a ‘non-identity’
underneath (or an implicitly masculine one), again recalling the masquerade. In the salon scene,
the removal of the face produces feminine appearance quite literally as mask, or more precisely
the image of a face, as the special effect in the shot uses not a rubber prosthetic, but a
photographic image composited with a latex peel. It is this cinematic image that the surrogate
operator seems to ‘wear’, while the vacuous, bulging robotic eyes underneath, framed by a blond
bob, convey a blankness much different from the red glowing light of the Terminator – lost,
rather than penetrating.
Faces are not the only masks, for the body itself becomes a front for the operator, as the
woman “uses her own body as a disguise.”17 In one of the more interesting aspects of the film,
Maggie, until the final scene, is shown only in her surrogate. While Bruce Willis oscillates
between the two versions of Greer, we only get to know Maggie as a character through the body
she wears, knowing that there is another body, a woman, behind a closed door, and so it seems
“there is a certain over-presence of the image – she is the image.”18 She is always already
doubled, yet unable to achieve a critical distance from herself. Further, the film makes a strong
association between the pain pills Maggie keeps beside her bed and her dependence on her
surrogate, with both situated at the level of addiction. The film half-heartedly connects her
dependencies to grief over her dead son, a plot point that does lend itself to a psychoanalytical
reading (her inability to possess the phallus in the male child fixes her in her lack), but the
character motivation of the lost son is weak in the film (and absent in the comics by Robert
Venditti upon which the film is based), and thus her motivation is more closely aligned with a
desire to be young and attractive, and to ward off ‘reality’ in general.
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Thus Maggie hides in plain sight, playing the image in the form of a body, and at the
same time nowhere to be found, hollow underneath the surface. In the end, Greer is only able to
unmask her by destroying surrogacy altogether. The surrogates fall, and gradually their operators
stumble out into the world beyond their apartments and stim chairs, squinting in the sunlight.
The final scene depicts Maggie’s emergence from her room, standing at a window next to Greer,
looking out on the brave new world of better living through plain old biology. Greer’s arm
around Maggie is a tender but ultimately feeble signifier of the return to the real, while the film
spends much more time exploring the real as it is manifest in the reservation where the Dreads
are sequestered, depicting it as decrepit and impoverished – a poverty, it seems, of the smooth
bodies and Hollywood production that characterizes the rest of the film, a poverty of the image
as defined in mainstream cinema. On the other side of the imaginal world, the film seems to say,
one finds only non-image.

Enablers and Inamoratas
Female characters also act as facilitators for their male counterparts, with the implicit
logic that the feminine position is already part of the virtual, and thus they are acquainted with its
processes and able to guide and support the male protagonists into and through a virtuality that is
more foreign to them, not so near a part of their ‘nature’. When Sleep Dealer’s Memo is looking
to become a node worker, he gets duped by a man in a back alley who promises him a good deal.
His money gone, Memo is helpless in the big city, unable to make the bio-connections that will
allow him to work. Luz feels sorry for him, and, in a tender, intimate scene, implants the nodes
in his body herself. The process of helping the male character enter the virtualized realm also
works to bring him closer to the feminine; the image of Luz penetrating Memo’s body with a
gun-like device, and the resulting sockets in his body, mark his removal from the cohesive sense
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of embodiment emblemized by the milpa (a similar scene between Allegra and Pikul in eXistenZ
inducts Pikul into the virtual). In the city Memo is no longer one with the land, but fluid like Luz,
a point in a network, a body to be exploited.
In The Matrix, Trinity is the first character we encounter, and the last person the blind
Neo ‘sees’ before his death. Her femininity, along with that of the Oracle, is aligned with the
Matrix itself, in contrast with Morpheus, who is primarily connected with the predominantly
black Zion, and even Smith who, by the end, wants out of the Matrix. (In Avatar, Neytiri, who in
many ways parallels Trinity, is the first of the Na’vi we meet as well, and is next to Jake at the
end of the film.) Trinity is also the one who makes the first face-to-face contact with Neo at the
dance club, and her cool embrace there prefigures the relationship that develops between them.
Her love for Neo becomes a subjective indicator for her, as foretold by the Oracle, in discerning
the One, thus granting her an overtly emotional impetus distinct from Morpheus’s quasi-religious
belief. This aspect further feminizes Trinity, who, despite her dominatrix wardrobe and mostly
affectless demeanor, becomes subject to her emotions, allowing her to become the ‘heart’ of the
virtual, as well as to become further subject to it, as it is her inner femininity (despite the external
masculinity of her short hair, cool comportment, and kung fu skills) that binds her to the virtual.
Trinity is positioned as Neo’s double, or perhaps his shadow, as an inherently doubled
character whose intuitive aspects do not permit her to become the One. Trinity and Morpheus
instruct Neo on how to maximize his virtuality (in contrast with being unknowingly, passively
virtual, as are most denizens of the Matrix), but only he meets the conditional subjectivity to be
sufficiently inside and outside the virtual at the same time. They share with Neo their closeness
to the virtual, but it is this same proximity to it that prevents either from becoming the
transcendent One; while the One is iterative, as we have seen, its iterations move toward
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abstraction, while those coded as closer to their bodies are unable to extract themselves. The
double-consciousness here, that women are both abstracted from and too near their bodies, is one
that is shared with raced characters, who also act as facilitators, and one that problematizes the
situating of embodiment relative to the virtual. Rather than a simple dichotomy of real and
virtual which a character cycles through (even though it is very much that way on the surface),
sexual and racial difference in the Matrix trilogy point to a third space, an interstitial center
between real and virtual which marginalizes both.
Lisa Nakamura notes that in The Matrix and other films involving computer interfacing,
access to digital information is racialized in depictions of “white and male users experiencing
‘direct’ or immediate relations with computer interfaces, while users of color are relegated to the
background,” with access only through bulkier or more highly mediating interfaces. “These users
are visible reminders of the necessity of human objects to support and underwrite others’ sublime
experience of ‘transparent’ and direct interactions with digital technology.”19 White male
protagonists are assisted both by women and people of color whose particular gifts and
perspectives help the protagonist achieve his goals. Morpheus locates, trains, challenges and
protects Neo, supporting him with unflagging faith and willingly stepping aside to allow the
Neo-phyte to battle for Zion, even though Morpheus has much more experience. As the One,
Neo has the potential already in him (i.e. he is a white male in big-budget, Hollywood film),
whereas Morpheus does not.20
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The role of the black hacker/sage is perhaps epitomized in the Oracle, whose cryptic
advice and homegrown wisdom guides characters obliquely in their quest to defeat the (logic of)
the machines. Nakamura argues that “her authority and power as a black woman and a source of
knowledge are undermined by her depiction as a woman baking cookies, wearing an apron, and
living in a housing project;” however, it is her gender and working class status that give her
pronouncements authenticity, and which, in the simulated world, are in some sense the source of
her wisdom.21 Indeed, “the presence of people of color in the film,” writes Nakamura, “lets us
know that we are in the realm of the real.”22 Nakamura also, as noted previously, contends that
they are virtual, and here again the paradox is manifest. In this duality of being excessively ‘real’
and excessively ‘virtual’, women and people of color are granted an additional capacity for
knowing their way through these worlds that are troubled by an influx of virtuality. In this they
evoke the native guides on whom white explorers, colonists, and militias have traditionally
relied, both for their closeness to the land (an ear to the ground) and their pronounced
spiritualism, which gave them something of a second sense (when it wasn’t being ridiculed as
superstition). The natives, simultaneously earthy and mystical, were in their dualism never able
to occupy the middle, never able to gain an objective distance. The white men profit from their
connections to the earth and spirit realm, but themselves maintain such connections at a distance,
through the mediation of the native body. Both Trinity and Morpheus oscillate between the real
and virtual worlds as Neo does, but only Neo is positioned to successfully occupy the middle and
manage the relation between the two. Subsequently, the antithesis of the real and the virtual is
not resolved through eradication of the ‘false’ virtuality (which is allowed to continue at the end
of the trilogy), but through a synthesis achieved in the white body.
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The black hacker/sage appears in other avatar films as well, as in Humanz Brother,
played by Chris ‘Ludacris’ Hodges, who hacks telecom systems in Gamer to inform the hapless
citizenry about Castle’s mind-control plan. Brother orients Tillman once he has escaped the
Slayers game, and later deactivates the mind-control cells in Angie’s brain. In Surrogates, Ving
Rhames plays the Prophet, leader of the anti-surrogate Dreads, who in voice-over begins the film
with a sermon lambasting listeners for “living a lie” and exhorting them to “wake up” (Fig. 34).
It is as significant as it is obvious that neither of these characters have real names, but are given
titles indicating their roles in the film as, essentially, Rastafarian seer and streetwise black man.
While each has a certain vision regarding the virtualization of their respective societies, like
Morpheus they are not permitted to fully act on their vision directly, but only indirectly through
the white protagonist. Brother is eventually killed by Castle’s henchmen, and the Prophet, it
turns out, was himself a surrogate, puppeted by none other than an old white man, the ‘father’ of
surrogacy who is attempting to undo his own work. Not only is the voice of the black man
silenced after its utility has been extracted in Surrogates, but in the end it is revealed that it was
never even his voice to begin with.
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Figure 33. The Prophet (and secret surrogate) in Surrogates.
These sagacious characters comport with the wise black man or magical AfricanAmerican friend that appear elsewhere in film and literature, but their inclusion in avatar films is
notable for the compatibility of this trope with virtuality as the characters both caution against
the deceptive dangers of an encroaching virtuality, and are expert at moving within it, as if it
comes naturally to them.23 In this, Neytiri is different. She only knows the world of Pandora and
the Na’vi, and is willfully ignorant of human culture and technology except to acknowledge their
clumsiness and deride their half-hearted attempts to educate the Na’vi; she has learned English
well enough to make communication with Jake convenient, but otherwise her place is clearly
away from the humans with whom she wants nothing to do, and she only begrudgingly takes on
the assignment to teach Jake the ways of their culture.
As with Trinity and Neo, and Luz and Memo, an emotional bond between Neytiri and
Jake develops and then grows into love. She becomes the connecting link between Jake and the
Na’vi, or rather a key component in a chain of connecting links, including Jake’s avatar body and
its network-ready tendril with which bonds are formed, as well as the technological interface
Jake uses to drive it. As Neytiri helps him ‘bond’ with his avatar body, teaching him what it
means to truly inhabit the body he has inherited, she becomes part of the medial chain that results
in his eventual transformation. She is perhaps part of what Bernadette Wegenstein refers to when
she argues “that the notions of body and image have come together in what can be called an
epistemological shift from a body emphasis to a medium emphasis.”24 Neytiri, Trinity, and Luz
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fulfill medial roles in their facilitation of male characters into and through the virtual (whether
telepresent labor, all-encompassing simulation, or a digital planet accessed by avatars), but the
technologies that produce Neytiri’s CG body ‘organically’ channel the embodied actions that for
Jake require a technological interface. Each of their Na’vi bodies convey the performance of an
actor, but whereas Jake’s is diegetic, Neytiri’s is hidden and implicit; his doubling is on the
surface, hers is intrinsic, her mediality doubled.
The mediative function of these facilitating women is integral to the interweaving of real
and virtual in the worlds for which they are guides. In Avatar, the ‘natural’ world is also the
world of digital imagery, and that which is presented as most ‘real’ is the same that is an almost
total digital construction, while in The Matrix, the deceptive simulation is patterned after a U.S.
city circa 1999 – a familiar scene – while the real world of 2199 is a dark dystopia plagued by
machine overlords and CG sentinels. Even in the quasi-futuristic world of Sleep Dealer, the
‘virtual environment’ is a job site in San Diego. In Avatar and The Matrix especially, the virtual
– and the feminine – are uncontained, even profuse or all-consuming. For the satirical S1m0ne,
Hollywood cinema itself becomes the virtual world, sustained by practices of inflated selfrepresentation and a celebrity frenzy that feeds on its own hype, while cinematic realism wanes.
The insertion of a digital actress into this mix counterposes the irreality of the dream factory with
a computer simulation in which the virtual woman remains contained on screens, while the
screens proliferate. Rather than the digital contagion of The Lawnmower Man and the digital
warfare and gritty game space of Avalon, Simone typifies digital purity in a corrupt world (of
analog media), presented as feminine ideal.

Vestal Virtuality
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In her influential essay, Mulvey points out the ways in which the female body is made to
be more imagistic within a cinematic form in which all is image – the ways in which women
have been made to play the image in addition to being imaged, by being styled for the look and
subject to a cinematic gaze that lingers on the body or spies voyeuristically.25 Ann Kibbey
however argues that Mulvey contributed to the reified symbiosis of woman and image:
Mulvey’s filmic woman was, and meant, Cinematic Image. This was much more than an
association between woman and image, much more than an analogy. The core idea might
be expressed in this way: The substance of woman is image. Mulvey accepted the
misogynist precepts of psychoanalysis about the nonexistence of women. The empty
token, the bread of the sacrament, morphed into the ‘structuring lack’ of female sexuality,
to be filled by a new kind of spiritual presence, image-ness itself. The compensation for
the extinction of women – women as empty tokens – was the survival of
Woman/Cinematic Image. What the camera recorded was the image-ness of women.26
Kibbey argues that Mulvey’s theoretical approach empties the woman and leaves only her
‘image-ness’. What, however, might this image-ness implicitly contain? Kibbey’s language, even
in its somewhat hyperbolic critique of Mulvey’s theorization, suggests that there is more to the
positioning of the woman in cinema than simply being styled and presented for the look – that is,
she is situated not just photogenically, but consubstantial with the images in which she appears.
Mulvey described the three ‘looks’ of the cinema as the look of the camera, the look of
the audience, and the look of “the characters at each other within the screen illusion. The
conventions of narrative film deny the first two and subordinate them to the third,” so that the
intratextual look incorporates all three.27 Facilitating the scopophilic desire Mulvey finds in
narrative cinema, these looks synchronize a curious, controlling gaze, with male characters
25
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acting as surrogates for the presumably male viewer, and the woman the object of all three. At
least she is so occasionally, when the three coincide, but of course cinema does much more than
simply stare at women. Still, in Mulvey the cinema is generally defined by man’s relation to
women, as we are primed for the objectifying look before it actually settles on a female body.
Male characters become surrogates for the audience in apprehending the shifty ontology of the
image, and, one can extrapolate, the mystery of the virtual, the inscrutability of the digital;
investigating the woman and mastering her enigmas become symbolic measures for preserving
the index and the integrity of (male) embodiment.28 S1m0ne paints a Mulvyesque picture in its
characterization of Viktor’s (Al Pacino) relationship with a simulated actress, Simone (Rachel
Roberts), for whom body and image are literally of the same substance.
Viktor is a Hollywood producer whose latest film is stymied when his lead actress walks
out on the production. Frustrated with having to rely on other people, Viktor’s self-centeredness
is serendipitously rewarded when a one-eyed man (evoking the camera’s monocular gaze) slips a
disk into his hand. Viktor runs the program and finds Simone (short for ‘simulation one’), a
digital actress who can be easily manipulated through a microphone and a camera by which she
mimics Viktor’s words and expressions, and who also comes packaged with a database of
performance enhancements. Viktor replaces his erstwhile actress with Simone, completing his
film and creating a new star, who quickly becomes the object of obsession by paparazzi and
studio head Elaine (Catherine Keener), Viktor’s ex-wife.
Viktor puts Simone in another production, and as media demand becomes frenzied he
puts on more elaborate charades to perpetuate the ruse, including teleconferencing, body
28
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doubles, and lingerie left in a hotel room for a private investigator to find. As the demand for
Simone becomes overwhelming he tries to temper her popularity with an art film credited to her,
defacing her image by having her wallow in the mud with pigs and questioning her artistic
sensibilities at the same time, but it only ends up adding to her credibility. Eventually he tries to
kill her off by dumping the software in the ocean and holding a funeral for her, but when the
coffin is opened under suspicion of foul play, only a life-sized cardboard picture is found. Under
interrogation Viktor tries to convince the police that Simone was only ever a program, but they
don’t believe him. He is saved when Elaine and their daughter resurrect Simone from a disk he
neglected to throw out, and the film ends with a scene in which she and Viktor appear together in
a green screen composite – Simone apparently happy to be back, while Viktor, now positioned in
the image world outside of his control (and in the hands of women), seems quite unhappy with
her return.
Simone is a rather vaguely defined digital construct who appears as a woman but has no
sentience or agency of her own (to the extent that the program is a ‘she’). Simone is an avatar
that can be composited into films or video feeds, and is also put to personal use in Viktor’s
relationship with her, or rather his relationship with himself through the woman and the image.
Since Viktor works in secret to maintain the charade that Simone is real, he spends a lot of time
alone with her, quickly becoming comfortable at the computer interface through which she is
accessed and performed. “I can be myself around you,” he sighs contentedly in one of several
solipsistic exchanges in which he speaks simultaneously to and through her. She becomes not
only his avatar in the films in which she stars, but in his ego-boosting relationship with himself
as well, and with his self-serving ventriloquism he heaps praise on himself while avoiding his
deep-seated issues with women and need for love. As an aspiring Hollywood producer, he is also
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desperate to be seen and acknowledged, and the Pygmalion in him that produces the woman to
be looked upon soon appropriates her look for his own vanity. As he has trouble pleasing the
other women in his life, she becomes a means for him to love himself, which he can only
accomplish through Simone’s docility and avatarial interface.
A clear parallel here is another object of Mulvey’s scrutiny, Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958),
in which Scottie (James Stewart) “follows, watches and falls in love with a perfect image of
female beauty and mystery.”29 Not only is Madeleine (Kim Novak) presented as such an image,
she is also connected with a painting, another image (and another woman), with which she has a
mysterious relationship. Scottie fails to solve this mystery (which ultimately conceals that there
is none besides deception), but later encounters the subject of his investigation again when he
runs into Judy. Scottie (mis)recognizes Madeleine in Judy (having failed to see the Judy in
Madeleine), but she doesn’t quite fit the image he has in mind, and he reconstructs the image of
Madeleine in Judy as she is compelled to take up the performance, to again play the image.
Mulvey argues that “her exhibitionism, her masochism, make her an ideal passive counterpart to
Scottie’s active sadistic voyeurism. She knows her part is to perform.”30 However, while Judy
complies with his wishes, she does so reluctantly, and this reluctance is an important part of the
drama between them. Having once been turned into a ‘perfect image’ in a process we don’t see,
Judy’s subsequent liberation and hesitance to re-enact it demonstrate her displeasure, as a
woman, to become image. Part of this is Hitchcock (briefly) allowing her to ‘see’ rather than
simply be seen, as Modleski understands the flashback from Judy’s point of view (dismissed by
Mulvey) as a key visual element in Judy’s active and resistant role. In Scottie’s efforts to break
her down and expose the image as false, Judy admits to the ruse, but in the chasm between the
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destruction of the image and the possible non-identity behind it, she presents herself to him as a
woman – a Judy to take the place of the lost Madeleine. Scottie’s iconoclasm breaks the spell of
the image, but not his obsession; if the woman is punished in the end, as Mulvey argues, she at
least dies as a woman rather than an image of one. Scottie, on the other hand, is left broken and
hollow, having failed to gain either; occupying the voyeur’s position, he becomes nothing when
his gaze is emptied.
While Judy relinquishes but resists, Simone is fully docile as a preconstituted image of
femininity and the avatar body; rather than a discursive and performative construct imposed on a
body, Simone is a body made for the purpose of compliance and visuality, needing only to be
vivified or enacted (Fig. 35). While Judy can never fully become the imagistic Madeleine,
Simone is always and fully the image for which she is created. Even when control of Simone
shifts to Elaine and her and Viktor’s daughter, Simone is still Simone, an image body available
for use. The influence of the digital is clear; Viktor changes Simone’s wardrobe with a few
mouse clicks, with none of the cajoling required of Scottie. Rachel Roberts plays the
programmed image of a woman, or, in Simone’s capacity as a digital body for cinematic
productions, a visual effect that hides its programmed construction in the body of Rachel
Roberts. With the exception of some stylistic pixelation at startup, Roberts’s image undergoes no
digital treatment, as the digital is expressed as feminine ideal, in the face and body of a model
(which Roberts also is).

248

Figure 35. Viktor and the docile Simone.
As a story about the infiltration of the digital into Hollywood filmmaking, and more
broadly addressing a general disconnect with reality, the film undermines its own intentions by
resorting to conventional forms – photographic images, an actor playing a role – to represent that
which it finds subversive. It is not strange to view Simone acting in a film, since Simone is only
Roberts acting in a film. While this is partly due to Niccol’s over-reliance on traditional
filmmaking to explore new cinematic territory, it also demonstrates a failure to understand the
fascination of difference. As Dan North points out in his work on ‘synthespians’, the thrill of the
digital illusion is not just photorealism, as “visual illusions have always depended upon a kind of
doublethink on the part of the spectator – we need to recognise the illusion as such before we can
engage with it meaningfully at a semiological level.”31 While Simone passes for human in her
films, she does not pass as digital for us, and unconvincingly plays the kind of image called for
in the role, embodying none of its coded mysteries.
In one scene, Viktor dips into Simone’s database to retrieve a performance by Audrey
Hepburn in Breakfast at Tiffany’s, attempting to integrate some essence of the film (Holly
31
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Golightly turning, saying demurely and with a hint of desperation, “How do I look?”), as well as
Hepburn herself. The result – Roberts flatly mimicking the line – is unconvincing to say the
least, though the allusion is to some extent apt. Audrey Hepburn stars in films in which she is
constantly remade, replaying the construction of femininity in My Fair Lady, Sabrina, and Funny
Face, among others. Simone, however, comes prepackaged; she doesn’t need to be inducted into
femininity because it programmed into her – it is her (her image-ness, constructedness, docility).
But as a picture of femininity she is empty, a construct with no mystery. Viktor’s possession
stops short of Scottie’s obsession, as Scottie attempted to possess what he could not have (a
condition ultimately shared by the male spectator) – Viktor has too much control, and is thus a
flaccid ‘victor’ over her, having demystified her when he turned her on.32
While Simone seems to ‘appear’ everywhere, she only inhabits screens – the computer
display with which Viktor accesses her, and the television and cinema screens through which she
appears to others. Contained as she is, the screen becomes her body – a restricted visuality that
recalls Max Headroom, the corrupted and reconfigured digital copy of Edison Carter (both
played by Matt Frewer). In the television film Max Headroom: 20 Minutes into the Future
(1985, Annabel Jankel and Rocky Morton), Carter is knocked into a coma and his consciousness
is downloaded, although it at first seems to malfunction. Carter survives, and with some
tweaking the digital copy becomes operative as well, taking on a life of its own as television
personality (literally) Max who alternately vexes and assists Carter. Whereas the mischievous
Max travels through the network and resists control, Simone never gains agency or self32
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awareness, and thus never becomes a character. She is part of a computer system, but the
technology is minimized and simplified (Viktor’s custom keyboard makes control a single-touch
effort). Max Headroom is essentially a program-based character without a body, while Simone is
a program-based body disallowed from becoming a character – a non-character, who as an avatar
is still performed. Max’s appearance on screens is often invasive and unpredictable; Simone
waits quietly for instructions, her head down slightly, her expression blank – perhaps even
somewhat sad.33 She exhibits none of the video noise or signal corruption of Max, who, while
maximizing his televisual presence, seems never quite content with it. Rather than a video
agitation, the imaginal and picturesque Simone is a digital star.
In S1m0ne, the digital is presented as virginal. She is unavailable to the paparazzi who
seek a body from which to steal images, and from the private investigator who sniffs the lingerie
and rolls in the rumpled bed sheets planted by Viktor in a hotel room. She is also unavailable to
the (commercially) impotent Viktor, ever shielded behind the prophylactic screen. Her
desexualization implies a promiscuity of the analog that ‘touches’ its object indexically. Allegra,
on the other hand, as the game designer in eXistenZ exudes a strange sensuousness and tactility
that permeates the game, through the pods that wriggle when stroked, the touch of the BioPort,
and Jennifer Jason Leigh’s languorous sexuality. The pristine Simone is fully manipulable but
completely untouchable; divorced from the index, prevented from being a character, and played
by a model, Simone’s virtuality, despite Niccol’s attempt to humanize her, is presented in
idealized feminine terms as a play of attractive surfaces in which there is nothing to see, but it
looks very nice.

33
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Afterimage
I’m sure I’m going to look in the mirror and see no one, nothing. People are always
calling me a mirror and if a mirror looks into a mirror, what is there to see?
Steven Shaviro, as Andy Warhol34
In this dissertation I have attempted to trace a path from the fragmentation of the mirror
to a body of connections, and from an alterity dividing bodies and images to an affinity between
them. The avatar has served in multiple capacities as a digital body that represents an embodied
user in a virtual environment; a type of ‘image body’ in which imaging and informational
technologies meet in the form of the body; a metaphor for a body in connections through the
‘avatar’, linking two bodies (biological and digital) in a phenomenological circuit; a cultural
figure appearing in popular films and other media texts, situated at the juncture between a
slippery hold on material reality and the evolution of cinematic imagery within digital culture;
and a model for navigating through a world of images, screens, computer technologies, the
digitization of everyday life, the replication of bodies through images, and the difficulty or
impossibility of encountering ourselves and our bodies outside of the images (or image-ness, the
vague quality of the image outside of specific instantiations) of which the world in digital culture
is increasingly comprised.
I have used the mirror less for its psychological implications (although these are implicit,
as noted) than for the relational and technological aspects of being present to oneself through a
sense of images and layers (the mirror’s surface, the ‘virtual’ space of the reflection, the image
body staring back at you, which you already inhabit across the distance to the mirror).
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Technologies of the virtual are new mirrors, and new media have made our connections to media
and images more frequent, more interactive and hands-on, more immediate and tactile. Although
in certain ways our media have lost their bodies, they have moved closer to our own through an
increase in the framing function of the body, in the way we touch images and they respond, in
the imaginal worlds and interactive interfaces that respond to our embodied interactions, in the
abundance of functional image bodies in videogames and virtual environments, and the digital
production of cinematic bodies that combine human data, image layers, and complex
computational processes.
I have not intended to deny the materiality or the body – far from it, if my attempts have
been successful – as I concur with media theorist Pierre Lévy when he states, “I am convinced
that a major element of our morality consists simply in the acceptance of being in the world, not
in fleeing it, in being there for others and for oneself. . . . For the actual is so precious that we
must, and at once, attempt to recognize and acclimate to the virtualization that destabilizes it.”35
My project here is about acclimation, about recognizing and navigating the virtual that not only
exists within the material world, but inevitably forms it. I have attempted to delineate various
aspects of virtuality in order to demonstrate that to engage the virtual is to engage the material,
the biological, the ‘real’ – in addition to recognizing the ways in which that ‘real’ world has
shifted toward increased virtualization, in the evolving relationships and connections between
materiality and immateriality, and especially bodies and images, which it necessitates.
Insights into these connections and the ‘layers’ of imbricated virtuality and materiality
that constitute our world are increasingly presented in, and problematized by, the discourse of the
digital, the interface, the videogame, as well as the cinema (in both its stories and its
35
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technologies – and perhaps especially in the ways these two converge). Bernadette Wegenstein’s
conception of a ‘corporealization of the image’, in which, “far from witnessing a gradual
disembodiment of information and images, the age of new media constitutes the current moment
in a process of embodiment or corporealization,” suggests an embodiment outside the physical
instantiations in which visual media have traditionally been embodied.36 This corporealization
coincides with her view that the body itself has become mediative:
The body constitutes mediation and vice versa . . . [in] a body concept that oscillates
between holism and fragmentation. . . . The body – ‘the fabric into which all objects are
woven’ – is thus not a mere intermediary, in-between the subject and the world, but
rather a unifier of a holistic subjectivity and a fragmented objectivity that effectively
undermines the existence of these very categories.37
A holistic subjectivity is that which makes sense of a fragmented objectivity through the
connections and mediation for which, I suggest, the avatar provides a multifaceted model. This is
a holism that appears only in connections, and only through multiplicity can any sense of the
‘body’ exist. It is medial not simply in its function as intermediary, but in its capacity to frame,
channel, and process images and information – to develop affinities, to engage with the body, to
flow with the virtual.
In the media texts I have explored here, this particular ability falls within the sphere of
the feminine. While women in avatar films are most often relegated to conventional female roles
and often presented as ensnared by the virtual, they are also the ones who are best able to
navigate it. The double-consciousness of the feminine position – simultaneously primitive and
abstracted – becomes, in this view, not a paradox, but the dualism necessary for navigating a
world in which unity and bodily integrity, and a ‘real’ apart from images, projections,
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imagination, and information, in layered interweaving and imaginal composites, is a hollow
fantasy pursued by white men.
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